feat(deploy): USB-bootable douro image (disk-image-douro-usb)

The douro cutover to bitspire is being done remotely with a USB stick
and the machine's internal drive is not NixOS, so the stick has to be
the system rather than an installer medium. Give douro the same
run-from-USB shape batm3 already has.

flake.nix
- Lift the batm3-usb module and image post-processing into shared
  `usbBootModule` / `mkUsbDiskImage` helpers (distinct nixos-usb/ESP-USB
  labels, nofail /boot, no growPartition, autoUpgrade off, ESP relabel).
  batm3-usb evaluates to the same fileSystems/upgrade config as before.
- Add `nixosConfigurations.douro-usb` and
  `packages.disk-image-douro-usb` on top of douro-installed.

douro.nix
- Blacklist uas and set usbcore.autosuspend=-1, the same bus-drop
  hardening batm3.nix carries, so a stick is a reliable boot medium on
  the Bay Trail box.

README
- Document the -usb outputs and the flash-with-Etcher, no-installer flow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CLAUDE.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Guidance for Claude Code when working in this repo. Read this before touching co
 
 ## Project Overview
 
-**bitSpire** is a Nostr-native Lightning ATM. Production ATMs (`batm3`, `douro`) currently run from `main` against Lightning.Pub; the `dev` branch — which is what this file describes — has been migrated to **LNbits over the nostr-native-transport**.
+**bitSpire** is a Nostr-native Lightning ATM running **LNbits over the nostr-native-transport**. The `dev` branch, which this file describes, is what the machines run.
 
 Core principles:
 
@@ -25,8 +25,53 @@ bitSpire is an independent project under AGPL-3.0 and is not affiliated with Lam
 
 ## Branch model
 
-- `main` — production. Lightning.Pub backend. The two production ATMs auto-pull from here daily at 04:00 (`flake.nix:152-160`). **DO NOT** push to `main` casually — a wrong commit gets baked into prod ATMs the next morning.
-- `dev` — staging. LNbits backend. The Sintra dev unit auto-pulls from here (`?ref=dev` pin on this branch's `flake.nix`). Push freely; tag `pre-bitspire-cutover` is the rollback target if the migration ever needs to be reverted on prod.
+- `dev` — **what every live machine runs.** Not a staging branch any more. Verified
+  2026-09-24 on batm3, whose `nixos-upgrade` unit pulls
+  `git+ssh://…/bitspire.git?ref=dev#batm3-installed` daily at 04:00. "Push freely
+  to dev" is no longer safe advice: a bad commit reaches production hardware the
+  next morning, unattended.
+- `main` — Lightning.Pub era, historical. Tag `pre-bitspire-cutover` is the
+  rollback target if the migration ever has to be reverted.
+
+> This section previously said the production ATMs ran `main` against
+> Lightning.Pub and that only Sintra was on `dev`. That was stale and it was
+> repeatedly taken at face value. Check the machine, not this file, before
+> relying on which stack a given box runs: `systemctl cat nixos-upgrade` gives
+> the branch, `/var/lib/bitspire` vs `/var/lib/lamassu-atm` gives the era.
+
+### Fleet state (surveyed 2026-09-24)
+
+| Machine | Reachable | Stack | GPU | Notes |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `sintra` | LAN `192.168.0.252` | dev / LNbits | Braswell `8086:22b0` → crocus | dev unit; ethernet `r8169` |
+| `batm3`  | wg `10.0.0.5` | dev / LNbits | Haswell GT2 `8086:0412` → crocus | **networks over WiFi**, `iwlwifi` 7260; ethernet down |
+| `douro`  | **down** | — | Bay Trail (Gen7) | needs reflashing with the current image and reconnecting to WireGuard |
+| `tejo`   | wg `10.0.0.3` | **Debian** (`ubilinux4`, kernel 4.9) | Braswell `8086:22b0` | never had bitspire installed; a flake target, not a deployment |
+
+Two consequences worth holding onto. Every GPU in the fleet binds **crocus**, not
+iris — sintra's Braswell does so despite being Gen8. And batm3's only working
+network path is Intel WiFi, so `intel/iwlwifi` firmware is load-bearing there;
+trimming it would strand the machine with no way back in.
+
+### batm3's nightly upgrade is currently FAILING
+
+Confirmed 2026-09-24. The run dies at:
+
+```
+04:03:26 building '…-bitspire-atm-app-0.1.0.drv'...
+04:04:28 error: timed out after 60 seconds
+```
+
+The ATM app is built in-house and is **not in `aiolabs.cachix.org` or
+`cache.nixos.org`**, so batm3 has to build it locally, and `nix.settings.timeout
+= 60` in `flake.nix` kills it. The comment there assumes heavy derivations are
+"effectively cache-only … upstream-cached", which is true of nixpkgs and false of
+our own app.
+
+So the machine is pinned to whatever generation last succeeded, and nothing
+merged to `dev` reaches it. This is the same class of silent-updater failure as
+#98, in a new form. The fix is pushing `atm-app-*` to the aiolabs cachix as part
+of releasing, not raising the timeout — a 60s ceiling on ATM hardware is correct.
 
 ## Architecture
 
@@ -219,7 +264,8 @@ UP Board enumerates its eMMC controller via ACPI, not PCI. `upboard.nix` force-l
 ## Useful invariants when debugging
 
 - The renderer logs prefix every line with a tag: `[Lightning]`, `[ATM]`, `[ATM Service]`, `[LNURL Session]`, `[CLINK]`, `[StateStore]`. `journalctl -u bitspire | grep '\['` is your friend.
-- `bitspire.service` runs as the `lamassu` user; `/var/lib/bitspire` is its `dataDir` (ReadWritePaths). DB lives at `/var/lib/bitspire/state.db` (we previously had `/var/lib/lamassu-atm` — that path is gone on dev, see commit `9c455d6`).
+- **Never pass an object as a console argument in the renderer.** Electron's console bridge stringifies each argument, so `console.log('msg:', { a, b })` reaches the journal as `msg: [object Object]` and every field is lost. Interpolate instead. Cost a debugging session on 2026-09-23, when a cassette publish that had worked looked like it had done nothing.
+- `bitspire.service` runs as the `bitspire` user (verified on sintra 2026-09-24; this line used to say `lamassu`, left over from the rename in `46e52f6`); `/var/lib/bitspire` is its `dataDir` (ReadWritePaths). DB lives at `/var/lib/bitspire/state.db` (we previously had `/var/lib/lamassu-atm` — that path is gone on dev, see commit `9c455d6`).
 - The `lightning.lightningPub` field on `LightningServices` is a `LightningBackend` *adapter*, not a `LightningPubClient`. Don't try to call LP-only methods on it.
 
 ## Related documentation

apps/machine/.env.example

@@ -93,3 +93,31 @@ VITE_SPIRE_SEED=
 # Set to 'true' for development/demo environments only
 # When false (production default), initialization failures show a maintenance screen
 # VITE_ALLOW_MOCK_FALLBACK=true
+
+# =============================================================================
+# Access Control (ADR-003)
+# =============================================================================
+
+# Tap-to-enter gate. When disabled (default), the machine boots straight to
+# idle exactly as before. When enabled, it boots into a locked screen and a
+# Bolt Card tap (read by the main-process NFC service over pcscd) unlocks it
+# and loads the card for the session, so buy/sell finish with one Complete.
+# ACCESS_CONTROL_ENABLED=true
+
+# Admit ANY Bolt Card when the allow-list has no match. With this on the gate
+# only keeps casual users off the menu — any NDEF tag with a /scan/<id> URL
+# unlocks it; money still moves only on a valid SUN at Complete. Turn OFF once
+# a real allow-list (/var/lib/bitspire/access.json) is provisioned.
+# ACCESS_OPEN_ENROLLMENT=true
+
+# Show the on-screen runtime dev/operator unlock button on the locked screen.
+# Default OFF — it bypasses the gate, so enable only on a bench/dev machine.
+# ACCESS_DEV_UNLOCK=true
+
+# Per-machine salt for hashing credentials/PINs. Provision a real value in
+# production (or in access.json); a fixed default is used if unset.
+# ACCESS_SALT=change-me-per-machine
+
+# Build/dev bypass — forces the gate OPEN even when enabled (browser dev / CI).
+# Renderer-side (Vite) flag, never set in a production image.
+# VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE=true

apps/machine/electron/__tests__/state-store-transactions.test.ts

@@ -12,10 +12,16 @@
 
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
 import {
+  applyOperatorCassetteOps,
   closeDatabase,
+  getAppliedOpIds,
+  getCassetteStateSeq,
   getCashbox,
+  getCountsUncertainSince,
+  getInventory,
   initDatabase,
   loadCassettes,
+  markCountsUncertain,
   recordTransaction,
   setCassettes,
 } from '../state-store.js'
@@ -168,3 +174,322 @@ describe('state-store: recordTransaction cash_in cashbox', () => {
     expect(countsByPosition()).toEqual({ 1: 50, 2: 50, 3: 30 })
   })
 })
+
+describe('state-store: recordTransaction manual_dispense inventory (#76)', () => {
+  it('decrements the bays an operator remediation actually emptied', () => {
+    recordTransaction({
+      ...TX_BASE,
+      txid: 'tx-manual',
+      type: 'manual_dispense',
+      status: 'complete',
+      bills: [{ denomination: 20, count: 2 }],
+      cassettes: [
+        {
+          name: 'cassette1',
+          position: 1,
+          denomination: 20,
+          provisioned: 2,
+          dispensed: 2,
+          rejected: 0,
+        },
+      ],
+    })
+    // Bills physically left bay 1; before #76 this row was untouched and the
+    // inflated count became truth on the next boot.
+    expect(countsByPosition()).toEqual({ 1: 48, 2: 50, 3: 30 })
+  })
+
+  it('decrements again when remediating a partly-dispensed cash-out', () => {
+    // Original cash-out managed 1 of the 2 notes it provisioned.
+    recordTransaction({
+      ...TX_BASE,
+      txid: 'tx-partial',
+      type: 'cash_out',
+      status: 'partial',
+      bills: [{ denomination: 50, count: 1 }],
+      cassettes: [
+        {
+          name: 'cassette3',
+          position: 3,
+          denomination: 50,
+          provisioned: 2,
+          dispensed: 1,
+          rejected: 0,
+        },
+      ],
+    })
+    expect(countsByPosition()[3]).toBe(29)
+
+    // The operator dispenses the missing note by hand. That is a second lot of
+    // bills leaving the bay, so it debits again — the original only ever
+    // debited what physically left.
+    recordTransaction({
+      ...TX_BASE,
+      txid: 'tx-remediate',
+      type: 'manual_dispense',
+      status: 'complete',
+      bills: [{ denomination: 50, count: 1 }],
+      cassettes: [
+        {
+          name: 'cassette3',
+          position: 3,
+          denomination: 50,
+          provisioned: 1,
+          dispensed: 1,
+          rejected: 0,
+        },
+      ],
+    })
+    expect(countsByPosition()[3]).toBe(28)
+  })
+
+  it('leaves the cashbox alone (bills leave, they do not arrive)', () => {
+    const before = getCashbox()
+    recordTransaction({
+      ...TX_BASE,
+      txid: 'tx-manual-cashbox',
+      type: 'manual_dispense',
+      status: 'complete',
+      bills: [{ denomination: 20, count: 1 }],
+      cassettes: [
+        {
+          name: 'cassette2',
+          position: 2,
+          denomination: 20,
+          provisioned: 1,
+          dispensed: 1,
+          rejected: 0,
+        },
+      ],
+    })
+    expect(getCashbox()).toEqual(before)
+    expect(countsByPosition()[2]).toBe(49)
+  })
+})
+
+describe('state-store: getInventory represents a drained machine', () => {
+  it('keeps configured bays at zero rather than dropping them', () => {
+    recordTransaction({
+      ...TX_BASE,
+      txid: 'tx-drain-50s',
+      type: 'cash_out',
+      status: 'complete',
+      bills: [{ denomination: 50, count: 30 }],
+      cassettes: [
+        {
+          name: 'cassette3',
+          position: 3,
+          denomination: 50,
+          provisioned: 30,
+          dispensed: 30,
+          rejected: 0,
+        },
+      ],
+    })
+    // The $50 bay is empty but still configured. Dropping the key made this
+    // look like "no inventory known", and callers then fell back to a stale
+    // snapshot or to HAL.
+    expect(getInventory()).toEqual({ 20: 100, 50: 0 })
+  })
+
+  it('reports every bay at zero when the machine is fully drained', () => {
+    for (const [txid, position, denomination, count] of [
+      ['d1', 1, 20, 50],
+      ['d2', 2, 20, 50],
+      ['d3', 3, 50, 30],
+    ] as const) {
+      recordTransaction({
+        ...TX_BASE,
+        txid,
+        type: 'cash_out',
+        status: 'complete',
+        bills: [{ denomination, count }],
+        cassettes: [
+          {
+            name: `cassette${position}`,
+            position,
+            denomination,
+            provisioned: count,
+            dispensed: count,
+            rejected: 0,
+          },
+        ],
+      })
+    }
+    expect(getInventory()).toEqual({ 20: 0, 50: 0 })
+  })
+
+  it('returns an empty map only when no cassettes are configured', () => {
+    // A fresh DB with no bays at all — the one case that should read as
+    // "nothing known", so callers may legitimately defer to the hardware.
+    closeDatabase()
+    initDatabase(':memory:')
+    expect(getInventory()).toEqual({})
+  })
+})
+
+describe('state-store: unverified counts after a silent dispense', () => {
+  it('starts clear, latches the first time, and keeps the earliest time', () => {
+    expect(getCountsUncertainSince()).toBeNull()
+    markCountsUncertain(1000)
+    expect(getCountsUncertainSince()).toBe(1000)
+    // A second failure does not move the clock forward — the question is how
+    // long the numbers have been untrustworthy, not when we last noticed.
+    markCountsUncertain(2000)
+    expect(getCountsUncertainSince()).toBe(1000)
+  })
+
+  it('clears on a recount, because that is what a recount is', () => {
+    markCountsUncertain(1000)
+    const result = applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'recount', position: 1, count: 40 },
+    ])
+    expect(result.applied).toEqual(['op-1'])
+    expect(getCountsUncertainSince()).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('does not clear on a refill', () => {
+    // A refill adds to a number still known to be wrong. Only someone
+    // opening the bay and counting it resolves that.
+    markCountsUncertain(1000)
+    const result = applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 10 },
+    ])
+    expect(result.applied).toEqual(['op-1'])
+    expect(getCountsUncertainSince()).toBe(1000)
+  })
+
+  it('leaves the flag alone when the op is rejected', () => {
+    markCountsUncertain(1000)
+    // Bay 9 does not exist — the layout is hardware-determined.
+    const result = applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'recount', position: 9, count: 40 },
+    ])
+    expect(result.applied).toEqual([])
+    expect(result.rejected).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(getCountsUncertainSince()).toBe(1000)
+  })
+})
+
+describe('state-store: operator cassette operations (ADR-004)', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    seedDuplicateDenomBays()
+  })
+
+  it('applies a refill as a delta, not a total', () => {
+    applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 30 },
+    ])
+    expect(loadCassettes().find((c) => c.position === 1)!.count).toBe(80)
+  })
+
+  it('is a no-op on a re-delivered operation', () => {
+    // Addressable events are re-delivered on every relay reconnect and the
+    // operator republishes a WINDOW, so the same op arrives many times. A
+    // delta applied twice is simply wrong, which is why every op carries an
+    // id and this table records the ones already applied.
+    const op = {
+      id: 'op-1',
+      at: 1_700_000_000,
+      type: 'refill' as const,
+      position: 1,
+      bills: 30,
+    }
+    expect(applyOperatorCassetteOps([op]).applied).toEqual(['op-1'])
+    expect(applyOperatorCassetteOps([op]).applied).toEqual([])
+    expect(applyOperatorCassetteOps([op, op]).applied).toEqual([])
+    expect(loadCassettes().find((c) => c.position === 1)!.count).toBe(80)
+  })
+
+  it('applies only the unseen ops from a window that mixes both', () => {
+    applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 10 },
+    ])
+    const result = applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 10 },
+      { id: 'op-2', at: 1_700_000_001, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 5 },
+    ])
+    expect(result.applied).toEqual(['op-2'])
+    expect(loadCassettes().find((c) => c.position === 1)!.count).toBe(65)
+  })
+
+  it('applies a window oldest-first regardless of arrival order', () => {
+    // A recount then a refill is not the same as the reverse, so ordering is
+    // load-bearing and cannot be left to however the array arrived.
+    applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-b', at: 1_700_000_002, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 7 },
+      { id: 'op-a', at: 1_700_000_001, type: 'recount', position: 1, count: 3 },
+    ])
+    expect(loadCassettes().find((c) => c.position === 1)!.count).toBe(10)
+  })
+
+  it('empties a bay and sets a denomination', () => {
+    applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'empty', position: 2 },
+      { id: 'op-2', at: 1_700_000_001, type: 'set_denomination', position: 2, denomination: 10 },
+    ])
+    const bay = loadCassettes().find((c) => c.position === 2)!
+    expect(bay.count).toBe(0)
+    expect(bay.denomination).toBe(10)
+  })
+
+  it('rejects a malformed op without applying or recording it', () => {
+    // Unrecorded on purpose: it stays pending on the operator's dashboard,
+    // which is the honest outcome. Recording it as applied would silence the
+    // noise by telling the operator their refill landed.
+    const result = applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: -5 },
+    ])
+    expect(result.applied).toEqual([])
+    expect(result.rejected[0]!.id).toBe('op-1')
+    expect(loadCassettes().find((c) => c.position === 1)!.count).toBe(50)
+    expect(getAppliedOpIds()).not.toContain('op-1')
+  })
+
+  it('echoes applied ids back, newest first', () => {
+    applyOperatorCassetteOps([
+      { id: 'op-1', at: 1_700_000_000, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 1 },
+      { id: 'op-2', at: 1_700_000_001, type: 'refill', position: 1, bills: 1 },
+    ])
+    expect(getAppliedOpIds()).toContain('op-1')
+    expect(getAppliedOpIds()).toContain('op-2')
+  })
+
+  it('advances the sequence on an applied op but not on a duplicate', () => {
+    const op = {
+      id: 'op-1',
+      at: 1_700_000_000,
+      type: 'refill' as const,
+      position: 1,
+      bills: 1,
+    }
+    const before = getCassetteStateSeq()
+    applyOperatorCassetteOps([op])
+    const after = getCassetteStateSeq()
+    expect(after).toBeGreaterThan(before)
+    applyOperatorCassetteOps([op])
+    expect(getCassetteStateSeq()).toBe(after)
+  })
+
+  it('advances the sequence on a dispense', () => {
+    const before = getCassetteStateSeq()
+    recordTransaction({
+      ...TX_BASE,
+      txid: 'tx-seq',
+      type: 'cash_out',
+      status: 'complete',
+      bills: [{ denomination: 20, count: 1 }],
+      cassettes: [
+        {
+          name: 'cassette1',
+          position: 1,
+          denomination: 20,
+          provisioned: 1,
+          dispensed: 1,
+          rejected: 0,
+        },
+      ],
+    })
+    expect(getCassetteStateSeq()).toBeGreaterThan(before)
+  })
+})

apps/machine/electron/boltcard-session.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
+import { openCardSession, scanUrlToSessionUrl } from './boltcard-session'
+
+const LNURLW =
+  'lnurlw://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/scan/abc123?p=DEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEF&c=1122334455667788'
+
+/** Mock fetch returning the given JSON bodies per call, in order (status 200). */
+function mockFetch(bodies: unknown[], status = 200) {
+  const calls: string[] = []
+  const impl = vi.fn(async (url: string | URL) => {
+    calls.push(url.toString())
+    const body = bodies[calls.length - 1]
+    return { status, json: async () => body } as Response
+  })
+  return { impl: impl as unknown as typeof fetch, calls }
+}
+
+const SESSION = {
+  authenticated: true,
+  external_id: 'abc123',
+  card_name: 'Alice',
+  balance_msat: 123_456_789,
+  currency: 'usd',
+  fiat: 98.76,
+  withdraw: {
+    callback: 'https://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/lnurl/cb/hit1',
+    k1: 'hit1',
+    minWithdrawable: 1000,
+    maxWithdrawable: 50_000_000,
+  },
+  withdraw_blocked_reason: null,
+  pay: {
+    callback: 'https://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/pay/cb/hit1',
+    minSendable: 1000,
+    maxSendable: 50_000_000,
+    metadata: '[["text/plain","Bolt Card top-up"]]',
+  },
+}
+
+describe('scanUrlToSessionUrl', () => {
+  it('rewrites /scan/ to /session/ and preserves p + c', () => {
+    const u = scanUrlToSessionUrl(LNURLW)
+    expect(u).toContain('https://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/session/abc123')
+    expect(u).toContain('p=DEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEF')
+    expect(u).toContain('c=1122334455667788')
+  })
+  it('returns null for a non-scan URL', () => {
+    expect(scanUrlToSessionUrl('lnurlw://host/somethingelse?p=1&c=2')).toBeNull()
+    expect(scanUrlToSessionUrl('http://host/boltcards/api/v1/scan/x')).toBeNull()
+  })
+})
+
+describe('openCardSession', () => {
+  it('opens a session: balance in sats, upper-cased currency, both steps', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([SESSION])
+    const out = await openCardSession(LNURLW, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(f.calls).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(f.calls[0]).toContain('/session/abc123')
+    expect(out).toEqual({
+      ok: true,
+      session: {
+        externalId: 'abc123',
+        cardName: 'Alice',
+        balanceSats: 123_456,
+        currency: 'USD',
+        fiat: 98.76,
+        withdraw: SESSION.withdraw,
+        withdrawBlockedReason: null,
+        pay: SESSION.pay,
+      },
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('carries a withheld withdraw step with its reason', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([
+      { ...SESSION, withdraw: null, withdraw_blocked_reason: 'Max daily limit spent.' },
+    ])
+    const out = await openCardSession(LNURLW, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out.ok).toBe(true)
+    if (!out.ok) return
+    expect(out.session.withdraw).toBeNull()
+    expect(out.session.withdrawBlockedReason).toBe('Max daily limit spent.')
+    expect(out.session.pay.callback).toBe(SESSION.pay.callback)
+  })
+
+  it('has no fiat when the server sent no currency', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ ...SESSION, currency: null, fiat: null }])
+    const out = await openCardSession(LNURLW, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out.ok && out.session.currency).toBeNull()
+    expect(out.ok && out.session.fiat).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('surfaces the server reason on a rejected tap', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ authenticated: false, reason: 'This link is already used.' }])
+    const out = await openCardSession(LNURLW, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'This link is already used.' })
+  })
+
+  it('rejects an incomplete session (no pay step)', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ ...SESSION, pay: undefined }])
+    const out = await openCardSession(LNURLW, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'card server returned an incomplete session' })
+  })
+
+  it('names an old card server that has no /session', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ detail: 'Not Found' }], 404)
+    const out = await openCardSession(LNURLW, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'card server does not support sessions' })
+  })
+
+  it('rejects a non-card tag without a network call', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([])
+    const out = await openCardSession('https://host/not/a/card', { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out.ok).toBe(false)
+    expect(f.calls).toHaveLength(0)
+  })
+
+  it('reports an unreachable card server', async () => {
+    const impl = vi.fn(async () => {
+      throw new TypeError('fetch failed')
+    }) as unknown as typeof fetch
+    const out = await openCardSession(LNURLW, { fetchImpl: impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'could not reach the card: fetch failed' })
+  })
+})

apps/machine/electron/boltcard-session.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/**
+ * Bolt Card session (tap-to-enter) — one tap, one verified visit.
+ *
+ * A Bolt Card tap yields a single-use SUN `p`/`c`; anything that verifies it
+ * spends it. The access gate (ADR-003) wants to verify the card at entry AND
+ * let the holder finish a buy or sell later without tapping again, so the
+ * aiolabs `boltcards` fork exposes `/session/<external_id>?p=&c=` — a sibling
+ * of `/scan` and `/pay` that verifies once, records one hit, and returns:
+ *   - the card wallet's balance and fiat equivalent (display only),
+ *   - the LUD-03 second step (withdraw callback + k1 = hit) for cash-out,
+ *   - the LUD-06 second step (pay callback) for cash-in.
+ * Both callbacks are keyed by the hit — the same single-use bearer `/scan`
+ * and `/pay` hand out — so the ATM holds no p/c for the rest of the visit.
+ * The withdraw step is withheld (with a reason) once the card's daily limit is
+ * spent, exactly as `/scan` would refuse.
+ *
+ * Runs in the MAIN process (Node fetch) to avoid renderer CORS, like the other
+ * LNURL modules. See docs/boltcard-session.md for the wire contract.
+ */
+
+import { lnurlwToHttps, type WithdrawStep } from './lnurl-withdraw.js'
+import type { PayStep } from './lnurl-pay.js'
+
+export interface CardSession {
+  externalId: string
+  cardName: string
+  balanceSats: number
+  /** ISO currency the card server priced the balance in; null → no fiat. */
+  currency: string | null
+  /** Balance in `currency` at the card server's rate; null when unknown. */
+  fiat: number | null
+  /** LUD-03 second step, or null when the card server withheld it. */
+  withdraw: WithdrawStep | null
+  /** Why `withdraw` is null (e.g. daily limit spent); safe to show on-screen. */
+  withdrawBlockedReason: string | null
+  /** LUD-06 second step for topping the card wallet up. */
+  pay: PayStep
+}
+
+export type OpenCardSessionResult =
+  | { ok: true; session: CardSession }
+  | { ok: false; reason: string }
+
+type FetchLike = typeof fetch
+
+export interface OpenCardSessionOptions {
+  /** Injected for tests; defaults to global fetch. */
+  fetchImpl?: FetchLike
+  /** Per-request timeout (default 15s). */
+  timeoutMs?: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derive the session URL from a tapped card's `lnurlw`: the card presents
+ * `…/boltcards/api/v1/scan/<id>?p=&c=`; the session endpoint is its sibling
+ * `…/boltcards/api/v1/session/<id>?p=&c=` with the same SUN.
+ */
+export function scanUrlToSessionUrl(lnurlw: string): string | null {
+  const https = lnurlwToHttps(lnurlw)
+  if (!https) return null
+  const u = new URL(https)
+  if (!u.pathname.includes('/scan/')) return null
+  u.pathname = u.pathname.replace('/scan/', '/session/')
+  return u.toString()
+}
+
+/** Wire shape of a `/session` reply (any of the fields may be missing/odd). */
+interface SessionWire {
+  authenticated?: unknown
+  reason?: unknown
+  external_id?: unknown
+  card_name?: unknown
+  balance_msat?: unknown
+  currency?: unknown
+  fiat?: unknown
+  withdraw?: unknown
+  withdraw_blocked_reason?: unknown
+  pay?: unknown
+}
+
+const isObj = (v: unknown): v is Record<string, unknown> => typeof v === 'object' && v !== null
+const optNum = (v: unknown): number | undefined => (typeof v === 'number' ? v : undefined)
+const optStr = (v: unknown): string | undefined => (typeof v === 'string' ? v : undefined)
+
+function parseWithdraw(v: unknown): WithdrawStep | null {
+  if (!isObj(v)) return null
+  const callback = optStr(v.callback)
+  const k1 = optStr(v.k1)
+  if (!callback || !k1) return null
+  return {
+    callback,
+    k1,
+    minWithdrawable: optNum(v.minWithdrawable),
+    maxWithdrawable: optNum(v.maxWithdrawable),
+  }
+}
+
+function parsePay(v: unknown): PayStep | null {
+  if (!isObj(v)) return null
+  const callback = optStr(v.callback)
+  if (!callback) return null
+  return {
+    callback,
+    minSendable: optNum(v.minSendable),
+    maxSendable: optNum(v.maxSendable),
+    metadata: optStr(v.metadata),
+  }
+}
+
+function errMsg(e: unknown): string {
+  if (e instanceof Error)
+    return e.name === 'TimeoutError' || e.name === 'AbortError' ? 'timed out' : e.message
+  return String(e)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Open a session for a tapped card. Spends the tap's SUN. Never throws —
+ * every failure returns `{ ok: false, reason }` (reasons come from the card
+ * server verbatim and are safe to show).
+ */
+export async function openCardSession(
+  lnurlw: string,
+  opts: OpenCardSessionOptions = {}
+): Promise<OpenCardSessionResult> {
+  const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch
+  const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 15_000
+
+  const url = scanUrlToSessionUrl(lnurlw)
+  if (!url) return { ok: false, reason: 'not a valid Bolt Card (lnurlw) tag' }
+
+  let wire: SessionWire
+  try {
+    const res = await doFetch(url, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs) })
+    if (res.status === 404) {
+      // Older fork without /session — say so rather than "card rejected".
+      return { ok: false, reason: 'card server does not support sessions' }
+    }
+    wire = (await res.json()) as SessionWire
+  } catch (e) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: `could not reach the card: ${errMsg(e)}` }
+  }
+
+  if (wire.authenticated !== true) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: optStr(wire.reason) || 'card rejected the tap' }
+  }
+  const externalId = optStr(wire.external_id)
+  const pay = parsePay(wire.pay)
+  if (!externalId || !pay) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'card server returned an incomplete session' }
+  }
+  const balanceMsat = optNum(wire.balance_msat) ?? 0
+  const currency = optStr(wire.currency)?.toUpperCase() ?? null
+  const fiat = optNum(wire.fiat)
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    session: {
+      externalId,
+      cardName: optStr(wire.card_name) ?? '',
+      balanceSats: Math.floor(balanceMsat / 1000),
+      currency,
+      fiat: currency && fiat !== undefined ? fiat : null,
+      withdraw: parseWithdraw(wire.withdraw),
+      withdrawBlockedReason: optStr(wire.withdraw_blocked_reason) ?? null,
+      pay,
+    },
+  }
+}

apps/machine/electron/lnurl-pay.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
-import { resolveCardInvoice, scanUrlToResolver, lnAddressToLnurlp } from './lnurl-pay'
+import {
+  resolveCardInvoice,
+  resolveInvoiceFromPayStep,
+  scanUrlToResolver,
+  lnAddressToLnurlp,
+} from './lnurl-pay'
 
 const LNURLW =
   'lnurlw://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/scan/abc123?p=DEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEFDEADBEEF&c=1122334455667788'
@@ -118,3 +123,43 @@ describe('resolveCardInvoice', () => {
     expect(res.reason).toMatch(/could not reach the card/i)
   })
 })
+
+describe('resolveInvoiceFromPayStep (session second step, no tap)', () => {
+  const step = {
+    callback: 'https://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/pay/cb/hit1',
+    minSendable: 1000,
+    maxSendable: 50_000_000,
+    metadata: '[["text/plain","Bolt Card top-up"]]',
+  }
+
+  it('fetches an invoice for the amount from the callback', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ pr: BOLT11 }])
+    const out = await resolveInvoiceFromPayStep(step, 25_000, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: true, bolt11: BOLT11 })
+    expect(f.calls).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(f.calls[0]).toContain('amount=25000')
+  })
+
+  it('enforces the step bounds without calling out', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([])
+    expect(await resolveInvoiceFromPayStep(step, 500, { fetchImpl: f.impl })).toEqual({
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'amount is below the card wallet minimum',
+    })
+    expect(await resolveInvoiceFromPayStep(step, 60_000_000, { fetchImpl: f.impl })).toEqual({
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'amount is above the card wallet maximum',
+    })
+    expect(await resolveInvoiceFromPayStep(step, 0, { fetchImpl: f.impl })).toEqual({
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'no amount to send',
+    })
+    expect(f.calls).toHaveLength(0)
+  })
+
+  it('surfaces a callback decline', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ status: 'ERROR', reason: 'Card is disabled.' }])
+    const out = await resolveInvoiceFromPayStep(step, 25_000, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'Card is disabled.' })
+  })
+})

apps/machine/electron/lnurl-pay.ts

@@ -59,6 +59,17 @@ interface CardPayTarget {
   lnurl?: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * The LUD-06 second step on its own: what a `payRequest` (or a Bolt Card
+ * session, see boltcard-session.ts) hands us to fetch an invoice.
+ */
+export interface PayStep {
+  callback: string
+  minSendable?: number
+  maxSendable?: number
+  metadata?: string
+}
+
 /** LUD-06 payRequest (subset) + error shape. */
 interface PayRequest {
   tag?: string
@@ -163,17 +174,18 @@ async function toPayRequest(
 }
 
 async function requestInvoice(
-  pr: PayRequest,
+  pr: PayStep,
   amountMsat: number,
   ctx: Ctx
 ): Promise<ResolveCardInvoiceResult> {
+  if (!(amountMsat > 0)) return { ok: false, reason: 'no amount to send' }
   if (typeof pr.minSendable === 'number' && amountMsat < pr.minSendable) {
     return { ok: false, reason: 'amount is below the card wallet minimum' }
   }
   if (typeof pr.maxSendable === 'number' && amountMsat > pr.maxSendable) {
     return { ok: false, reason: 'amount is above the card wallet maximum' }
   }
-  const cbUrl = appendQuery(pr.callback!, { amount: String(amountMsat) })
+  const cbUrl = appendQuery(pr.callback, { amount: String(amountMsat) })
   let vals: PayValues
   try {
     const res = await ctx.doFetch(cbUrl, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ctx.timeoutMs) })
@@ -222,5 +234,19 @@ export async function resolveCardInvoice(
   if (!pr.ok) return pr
 
   // 3) Ask for an invoice for the payout amount.
-  return requestInvoice(pr.payRequest, amountMsat, ctx)
+  return requestInvoice({ ...pr.payRequest, callback: pr.payRequest.callback! }, amountMsat, ctx)
+}
+
+/**
+ * The LUD-06 second step alone: fetch a BOLT11 for `amountMsat` from an
+ * already-obtained pay step (from a Bolt Card session opened at tap-to-enter).
+ * Never throws — every failure returns `{ ok: false, reason }`.
+ */
+export async function resolveInvoiceFromPayStep(
+  step: PayStep,
+  amountMsat: number,
+  opts: ResolveCardInvoiceOptions = {}
+): Promise<ResolveCardInvoiceResult> {
+  const ctx: Ctx = { doFetch: opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch, timeoutMs: opts.timeoutMs ?? 15_000 }
+  return requestInvoice(step, amountMsat, ctx)
 }

apps/machine/electron/lnurl-withdraw.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
-import { executeLnurlWithdraw, lnurlwToHttps } from './lnurl-withdraw'
+import { executeLnurlWithdraw, executeWithdrawCallback, lnurlwToHttps } from './lnurl-withdraw'
 
 const BOLT11 = 'lnbc10u1p3xyz...'
 const LNURLW =
@@ -101,3 +101,44 @@ describe('executeLnurlWithdraw', () => {
     expect(res.reason).toMatch(/could not reach the card/i)
   })
 })
+
+describe('executeWithdrawCallback (session second step, no tap)', () => {
+  const step = {
+    callback: 'https://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/lnurl/cb/hit1',
+    k1: 'hit1',
+    maxWithdrawable: 5_000_000,
+  }
+
+  it('hands the invoice straight to the callback with k1', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ status: 'OK' }])
+    const out = await executeWithdrawCallback(step, BOLT11, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: true })
+    expect(f.calls).toHaveLength(1)
+    expect(f.calls[0]).toContain('k1=hit1')
+    expect(f.calls[0]).toContain('pr=' + BOLT11)
+  })
+
+  it('refuses an amount above the step limit without calling out', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([])
+    const out = await executeWithdrawCallback(step, BOLT11, {
+      fetchImpl: f.impl,
+      amountMsat: 6_000_000,
+    })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'card limit is below this amount' })
+    expect(f.calls).toHaveLength(0)
+  })
+
+  it('surfaces a callback decline', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([{ status: 'ERROR', reason: 'Payment already claimed.' }])
+    const out = await executeWithdrawCallback(step, BOLT11, { fetchImpl: f.impl })
+    expect(out).toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'Payment already claimed.' })
+  })
+
+  it('rejects a missing invoice', async () => {
+    const f = mockFetch([])
+    expect(await executeWithdrawCallback(step, '', { fetchImpl: f.impl })).toEqual({
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'no invoice to charge',
+    })
+  })
+})

apps/machine/electron/lnurl-withdraw.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,17 @@ interface WithdrawRequest {
 
 type FetchLike = typeof fetch
 
+/**
+ * The LUD-03 second step on its own: what a `withdrawRequest` (or a Bolt Card
+ * session, see boltcard-session.ts) hands us to actually pull a payment.
+ */
+export interface WithdrawStep {
+  callback: string
+  k1: string
+  minWithdrawable?: number
+  maxWithdrawable?: number
+}
+
 export interface ExecuteLnurlWithdrawOptions {
   /** Injected for tests; defaults to global fetch. */
   fetchImpl?: FetchLike
@@ -73,7 +84,8 @@ function appendQuery(url: string, params: Record<string, string>): string {
 }
 
 function errMsg(e: unknown): string {
-  if (e instanceof Error) return e.name === 'TimeoutError' || e.name === 'AbortError' ? 'timed out' : e.message
+  if (e instanceof Error)
+    return e.name === 'TimeoutError' || e.name === 'AbortError' ? 'timed out' : e.message
   return String(e)
 }
 
@@ -105,16 +117,46 @@ export async function executeLnurlWithdraw(
   if (params.tag !== 'withdrawRequest' || !params.callback || !params.k1) {
     return { ok: false, reason: 'card did not return a withdraw voucher' }
   }
+
+  // 2) Hand our invoice to the callback — the card's wallet pays it.
+  return executeWithdrawCallback(
+    {
+      callback: params.callback,
+      k1: params.k1,
+      minWithdrawable: params.minWithdrawable,
+      maxWithdrawable: params.maxWithdrawable,
+    },
+    bolt11,
+    opts
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * The LUD-03 second step alone: hand our invoice to an already-obtained
+ * withdraw step (from a `/scan` withdrawRequest, or from a Bolt Card session
+ * opened at tap-to-enter) — the card's wallet pays it. `{ ok: true }` means the
+ * card accepted the pull; settlement is observed by the invoice watcher.
+ */
+export async function executeWithdrawCallback(
+  step: WithdrawStep,
+  bolt11: string,
+  opts: ExecuteLnurlWithdrawOptions = {}
+): Promise<LnurlWithdrawResult> {
+  const doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch
+  const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 15_000
+
+  if (!bolt11 || !/^ln[a-z0-9]/i.test(bolt11.trim())) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'no invoice to charge' }
+  }
   if (
     opts.amountMsat != null &&
-    typeof params.maxWithdrawable === 'number' &&
-    opts.amountMsat > params.maxWithdrawable
+    typeof step.maxWithdrawable === 'number' &&
+    opts.amountMsat > step.maxWithdrawable
   ) {
     return { ok: false, reason: 'card limit is below this amount' }
   }
 
-  // 2) Hand our invoice to the callback — the card's wallet pays it.
-  const cbUrl = appendQuery(params.callback, { k1: params.k1, pr: bolt11.trim() })
+  const cbUrl = appendQuery(step.callback, { k1: step.k1, pr: bolt11.trim() })
   let cb: { status?: string; reason?: string }
   try {
     const res = await doFetch(cbUrl, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs) })

apps/machine/electron/main.ts

@@ -24,26 +24,36 @@ import {
   markCommandExecuting,
   completeCommand,
   getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt,
-  getBootstrapPublishedAt,
-  markBootstrapPublished,
-  resetBootstrapGate,
+  getCountsUncertainSince,
+  getLastStatePublishedAt,
+  markCountsUncertain,
+  markStatePublished,
+  resetStatePublishWatermark,
   resetForRepair,
-  applyOperatorCassettesConfig,
+  applyOperatorCassetteOps,
+  getAppliedOpIds,
+  getCassetteStateSeq,
   getFeeConfig,
   getLastKnownFeeConfigCreatedAt,
   applyFeeConfig,
   getBunkerBinding,
   saveBunkerBinding,
   clearBunkerBinding,
-  type OperatorCassettesPayload,
+  type CassetteOp,
+  type ApplyOpsResult,
   type FeeConfigPayload,
   type FeeConfigRow,
   type ApplyResult,
   type StoredBunkerBinding,
 } from './state-store.js'
 import { initializeHal, type HalInstance } from './hal-service.js'
-import { executeLnurlWithdraw } from './lnurl-withdraw.js'
-import { resolveCardInvoice } from './lnurl-pay.js'
+import {
+  executeLnurlWithdraw,
+  executeWithdrawCallback,
+  type WithdrawStep,
+} from './lnurl-withdraw.js'
+import { resolveCardInvoice, resolveInvoiceFromPayStep, type PayStep } from './lnurl-pay.js'
+import { openCardSession, type OpenCardSessionResult } from './boltcard-session.js'
 import { startNfcReader, type NfcStatus } from './nfc-service.js'
 
 // ESM equivalent of __dirname
@@ -164,6 +174,62 @@ function loadBranding(): BrandingConfig | null {
   return { title, theme, customColors, customColorsDark, logoDataUrl, logoDarkDataUrl }
 }
 
+// Access-control config loader (ADR-003). Env toggles the gate; an optional
+// /var/lib/bitspire/access.json carries the salt + allow-list. Defaults OFF —
+// a machine with neither env nor file behaves as if there is no access layer.
+// The allow-list shape mirrors the renderer's AllowListEntry (authorize.ts);
+// duplicated here to avoid a cross-project (electron↔renderer) import.
+interface AccessAllowListEntry {
+  idHash: string
+  role: 'user' | 'operator'
+  pinHash?: string
+  label?: string
+}
+function loadAccessControl() {
+  // Env provides defaults; access.json (writable, operator-provisioned — same
+  // spirit as branding/) overrides them, so the gate can be toggled on a
+  // deployed machine by dropping a file + restarting the service, with no image
+  // rebuild. Defaults OFF.
+  let enabled = process.env.ACCESS_CONTROL_ENABLED === 'true'
+  // Dev unlock is OFF unless explicitly enabled: a gated machine must not ship
+  // a visible bypass button by default.
+  let devUnlock = process.env.ACCESS_DEV_UNLOCK === 'true'
+  let openEnrollment = process.env.ACCESS_OPEN_ENROLLMENT === 'true'
+  let salt = process.env.ACCESS_SALT || ''
+  let allowList: AccessAllowListEntry[] = []
+
+  const jsonPath = path.join(
+    fs.existsSync('/var/lib/bitspire') ? '/var/lib/bitspire' : process.cwd(),
+    'access.json'
+  )
+  if (fs.existsSync(jsonPath)) {
+    try {
+      const raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(jsonPath, 'utf-8'))
+      if (typeof raw.enabled === 'boolean') enabled = raw.enabled
+      if (typeof raw.devUnlock === 'boolean') devUnlock = raw.devUnlock
+      if (typeof raw.openEnrollment === 'boolean') openEnrollment = raw.openEnrollment
+      if (typeof raw.salt === 'string' && raw.salt) salt = raw.salt
+      if (Array.isArray(raw.allowList)) {
+        allowList = (raw.allowList as unknown[]).filter(
+          (e): e is AccessAllowListEntry =>
+            !!e &&
+            typeof (e as AccessAllowListEntry).idHash === 'string' &&
+            ((e as AccessAllowListEntry).role === 'user' ||
+              (e as AccessAllowListEntry).role === 'operator')
+        )
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      console.warn('[Electron] Failed to parse access.json:', e)
+    }
+  }
+
+  // A gated machine needs a stable salt for deterministic hashing. Fall back to
+  // a fixed default (prototype); production should provision a real salt.
+  if (!salt) salt = 'bitspire-access-v1'
+
+  return { enabled, devUnlock, openEnrollment, salt, allowList }
+}
+
 // Determine if we're in development
 const isDev =
   process.env.ELECTRON_FORCE_PROD !== '1' &&
@@ -311,6 +377,9 @@ ipcMain.handle('get-config', () => {
 
     // Operator branding (logo/title/theme) — null when no override
     branding: loadBranding(),
+
+    // Access-control gate (ADR-003) — `enabled` defaults false (no gate).
+    accessControl: loadAccessControl(),
   }
 })
 
@@ -346,7 +415,7 @@ ipcMain.handle('get-atm-secrets', () => {
 })
 
 // Bunker binding persistence — the renderer writes the binding after a
-// successful pairing (connectNewSeed), and resets the bootstrap gate so the
+// successful pairing (connectNewSeed), and resets the publish watermark so the
 // new operator receives the spire's hello-event (aiolabs/bitspire#52 / #56).
 ipcMain.handle('state:save-bunker-binding', (_event, binding: StoredBunkerBinding): void => {
   saveBunkerBinding(binding)
@@ -354,8 +423,8 @@ ipcMain.handle('state:save-bunker-binding', (_event, binding: StoredBunkerBindin
 ipcMain.handle('state:clear-bunker-binding', (): void => {
   clearBunkerBinding()
 })
-ipcMain.handle('state:reset-bootstrap-gate', (): void => {
-  resetBootstrapGate()
+ipcMain.handle('state:reset-state-publish-watermark', (): void => {
+  resetStatePublishWatermark()
 })
 ipcMain.handle('state:reset-for-repair', (): void => {
   resetForRepair()
@@ -444,6 +513,37 @@ ipcMain.handle(
   }
 )
 
+// Bolt Card tap-to-enter (ADR-003): open a verified session for a tapped card.
+// Spends the tap's SUN once and returns balance + fiat + the withdraw/pay
+// second steps the session reuses at Complete. See boltcard-session.ts.
+ipcMain.handle(
+  'lnurl:open-card-session',
+  async (_event, args: { lnurlw: string }): Promise<OpenCardSessionResult> => {
+    return openCardSession(args.lnurlw)
+  }
+)
+
+// Session variants of the two Complete paths: no tap, no p/c — just the
+// hit-keyed second step the session already holds.
+ipcMain.handle(
+  'lnurl:withdraw-session',
+  async (
+    _event,
+    args: { withdraw: WithdrawStep; bolt11: string; amountMsat?: number }
+  ): Promise<{ ok: boolean; reason?: string }> => {
+    return executeWithdrawCallback(args.withdraw, args.bolt11, { amountMsat: args.amountMsat })
+  }
+)
+ipcMain.handle(
+  'lnurl:pay-session',
+  async (
+    _event,
+    args: { pay: PayStep; amountMsat: number }
+  ): Promise<{ ok: boolean; bolt11?: string; reason?: string }> => {
+    return resolveInvoiceFromPayStep(args.pay, args.amountMsat)
+  }
+)
+
 // State persistence IPC handlers
 ipcMain.handle('state:load-cassettes', () => loadCassettes())
 ipcMain.handle('state:set-cassettes', (_event, cassettes) => setCassettes(cassettes))
@@ -460,15 +560,22 @@ ipcMain.handle('state:remediate-transaction', (_event, txid: string, remediatedB
 ipcMain.handle('state:get-last-known-config-created-at', (): number =>
   getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt()
 )
-ipcMain.handle('state:get-bootstrap-published-at', (): number | null => getBootstrapPublishedAt())
-ipcMain.handle('state:mark-bootstrap-published', (_event, unixTimestamp: number): void => {
-  markBootstrapPublished(unixTimestamp)
+ipcMain.handle('state:get-last-state-published-at', (): number | null => getLastStatePublishedAt())
+ipcMain.handle('state:get-counts-uncertain-since', (): number | null => getCountsUncertainSince())
+ipcMain.handle('state:mark-counts-uncertain', (_event, unixTimestamp: number): void => {
+  markCountsUncertain(unixTimestamp)
+})
+ipcMain.handle('state:mark-state-published', (_event, unixTimestamp: number): void => {
+  markStatePublished(unixTimestamp)
 })
 ipcMain.handle(
-  'state:apply-operator-cassettes-config',
-  (_event, payload: OperatorCassettesPayload, eventCreatedAt: number): ApplyResult =>
-    applyOperatorCassettesConfig(payload, eventCreatedAt)
+  'state:apply-operator-cassette-ops',
+  (_event, ops: CassetteOp[]): ApplyOpsResult => applyOperatorCassetteOps(ops)
 )
+ipcMain.handle('state:get-applied-op-ids', (_event, limit?: number): string[] =>
+  getAppliedOpIds(limit)
+)
+ipcMain.handle('state:get-cassette-state-seq', (): number => getCassetteStateSeq())
 
 // Operator-fees consumer (aiolabs/lamassu-next#57) — persisted singleton
 // fee config + per-d-tag replay watermark + atomic apply for kind-30078
@@ -746,6 +853,11 @@ function startCommandPoller(): void {
           error: result.error,
         })
 
+        // This dispense happened entirely in the main process, so the renderer
+        // has no idea the bays moved — it would keep serving a stale inventory
+        // and would never republish the operator's view. Tell it.
+        mainWindow?.webContents.send('cassettes:changed')
+
         // Only remediate the original tx if ALL requested bills were dispensed
         let refRemediated = false
         if (parsed.ref_txid && result.dispensed) {

apps/machine/electron/preload.ts

@@ -108,16 +108,21 @@ contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electronAPI', {
   // Operator-config consumer (aiolabs/lamassu-next#56)
   getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt: (): Promise<number> =>
     ipcRenderer.invoke('state:get-last-known-config-created-at'),
-  getBootstrapPublishedAt: (): Promise<number | null> =>
-    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:get-bootstrap-published-at'),
-  markBootstrapPublished: (unixTimestamp: number): Promise<void> =>
-    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:mark-bootstrap-published', unixTimestamp),
+  getLastStatePublishedAt: (): Promise<number | null> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:get-last-state-published-at'),
+  getCountsUncertainSince: (): Promise<number | null> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:get-counts-uncertain-since'),
+  markCountsUncertain: (unixTimestamp: number): Promise<void> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:mark-counts-uncertain', unixTimestamp),
+  markStatePublished: (unixTimestamp: number): Promise<void> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:mark-state-published', unixTimestamp),
 
   // Bunker binding persistence (aiolabs/bitspire#52)
   saveBunkerBinding: (binding: BunkerBindingRecord): Promise<void> =>
     ipcRenderer.invoke('state:save-bunker-binding', binding),
   clearBunkerBinding: (): Promise<void> => ipcRenderer.invoke('state:clear-bunker-binding'),
-  resetBootstrapGate: (): Promise<void> => ipcRenderer.invoke('state:reset-bootstrap-gate'),
+  resetStatePublishWatermark: (): Promise<void> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:reset-state-publish-watermark'),
   resetForRepair: (): Promise<void> => ipcRenderer.invoke('state:reset-for-repair'),
 
   // QR-pairing wizard (aiolabs/bitspire#52): persist a scanned spire-seed,
@@ -141,13 +146,40 @@ contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electronAPI', {
   }): Promise<{ ok: boolean; bolt11?: string; reason?: string }> =>
     ipcRenderer.invoke('lnurl:pay-card', args),
 
-  applyOperatorCassettesConfig: (
-    payload: {
-      positions: Record<string, { denomination: number; count: number }>
-    },
-    eventCreatedAt: number
-  ): Promise<{ applied: true } | { applied: false; reason: string }> =>
-    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:apply-operator-cassettes-config', payload, eventCreatedAt),
+  // Bolt Card tap-to-enter: one verified session per tap (balance + fiat +
+  // the withdraw/pay second steps reused at Complete). Payload shapes are
+  // declared in src/types/electron.d.ts (CardSession).
+  openCardSession: (args: { lnurlw: string }): Promise<unknown> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('lnurl:open-card-session', args),
+  withdrawWithSession: (args: {
+    withdraw: { callback: string; k1: string; minWithdrawable?: number; maxWithdrawable?: number }
+    bolt11: string
+    amountMsat?: number
+  }): Promise<{ ok: boolean; reason?: string }> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('lnurl:withdraw-session', args),
+  resolveSessionInvoice: (args: {
+    pay: { callback: string; minSendable?: number; maxSendable?: number; metadata?: string }
+    amountMsat: number
+  }): Promise<{ ok: boolean; bolt11?: string; reason?: string }> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('lnurl:pay-session', args),
+
+  applyOperatorCassetteOps: (
+    ops: {
+      id: string
+      at: number
+      type: 'refill' | 'empty' | 'recount' | 'set_denomination'
+      position: number
+      bills?: number
+      count?: number
+      denomination?: number
+    }[]
+  ): Promise<{
+    applied: string[]
+    rejected: { id: string; reason: string }[]
+  }> => ipcRenderer.invoke('state:apply-operator-cassette-ops', ops),
+  getAppliedOpIds: (limit?: number): Promise<string[]> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke('state:get-applied-op-ids', limit),
+  getCassetteStateSeq: (): Promise<number> => ipcRenderer.invoke('state:get-cassette-state-seq'),
 
   // Operator-fees consumer (aiolabs/lamassu-next#57)
   getFeeConfig: (): Promise<{
@@ -205,6 +237,13 @@ contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electronAPI', {
   // Bolt Card reader (main process → renderer). removeAllListeners first: a
   // renderer reload re-runs this, and a duplicated card-tap listener would
   // trigger the LNURL-withdraw twice.
+  // The main process changed the cassettes table (an operator-command dispense,
+  // boot seeding). The renderer reloads its inventory and republishes state.
+  onCassettesChanged: (callback: () => void) => {
+    ipcRenderer.removeAllListeners('cassettes:changed')
+    ipcRenderer.on('cassettes:changed', () => callback())
+  },
+
   onNfcCardTapped: (callback: (lnurlw: string) => void) => {
     ipcRenderer.removeAllListeners('nfc:card-tapped')
     ipcRenderer.on('nfc:card-tapped', (_event, lnurlw) => callback(lnurlw))
@@ -265,11 +304,13 @@ declare global {
       emptyCashbox: () => Promise<void>
       remediateTransaction: (txid: string, remediatedByTxid: string) => Promise<boolean>
       getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt: () => Promise<number>
-      getBootstrapPublishedAt: () => Promise<number | null>
-      markBootstrapPublished: (unixTimestamp: number) => Promise<void>
+      getLastStatePublishedAt: () => Promise<number | null>
+      getCountsUncertainSince: () => Promise<number | null>
+      markCountsUncertain: (unixTimestamp: number) => Promise<void>
+      markStatePublished: (unixTimestamp: number) => Promise<void>
       saveBunkerBinding: (binding: BunkerBindingRecord) => Promise<void>
       clearBunkerBinding: () => Promise<void>
-      resetBootstrapGate: () => Promise<void>
+      resetStatePublishWatermark: () => Promise<void>
       resetForRepair: () => Promise<void>
       saveSpireSeed: (seed: string) => Promise<void>
       relaunchApp: () => Promise<void>
@@ -283,10 +324,22 @@ declare global {
         lnurlw: string
         amountMsat: number
       }) => Promise<{ ok: boolean; bolt11?: string; reason?: string }>
-      applyOperatorCassettesConfig: (
-        payload: { positions: Record<string, { denomination: number; count: number }> },
-        eventCreatedAt: number
-      ) => Promise<{ applied: true } | { applied: false; reason: string }>
+      applyOperatorCassetteOps: (
+        ops: {
+          id: string
+          at: number
+          type: 'refill' | 'empty' | 'recount' | 'set_denomination'
+          position: number
+          bills?: number
+          count?: number
+          denomination?: number
+        }[]
+      ) => Promise<{
+        applied: string[]
+        rejected: { id: string; reason: string }[]
+      }>
+      getAppliedOpIds: (limit?: number) => Promise<string[]>
+      getCassetteStateSeq: () => Promise<number>
       getFeeConfig: () => Promise<{
         cashInFeeFraction: number
         cashOutFeeFraction: number

apps/machine/electron/state-store.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import fs from 'node:fs'
 
 let db: Database.Database | null = null
 
-const SCHEMA_VERSION = '12'
+const SCHEMA_VERSION = '13'
 
 function getDbPath(): string {
   const prodDir = '/var/lib/bitspire'
@@ -57,6 +57,17 @@ export function initDatabase(dbPath?: string): void {
       count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
     );
 
+    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS cassette_ops (
+      id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+      position INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      op_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+      bills INTEGER,
+      count INTEGER,
+      denomination INTEGER,
+      op_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+      applied_at INTEGER NOT NULL
+    );
+
     CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS cashbox (
       id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
       total_bills INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
@@ -295,7 +306,9 @@ export function initDatabase(dbPath?: string): void {
     `)
     db.pragma('foreign_keys = ON')
     db.prepare('UPDATE meta SET value = ? WHERE key = ?').run('9', 'schema_version')
-    console.log('[StateStore] Migrated schema v8 → v9 (cassettes PK position; allow duplicate denominations)')
+    console.log(
+      '[StateStore] Migrated schema v8 → v9 (cassettes PK position; allow duplicate denominations)'
+    )
     existing.value = '9'
   }
 
@@ -371,12 +384,47 @@ export function initDatabase(dbPath?: string): void {
     console.log('[StateStore] Migrated schema v11 → v12 (bunker_binding transport config)')
   }
 
+  if (existing && existing.value === '12') {
+    // Migration v12 → v13: operator OPERATIONS replace operator counts
+    // (aiolabs/bitspire ADR-004).
+    //
+    // The operator used to publish absolute counts and this machine applied
+    // them outright. Both sides wrote the same value over a transport that
+    // never tells a writer it lost, so a dashboard form loaded before a
+    // dispense silently discarded that dispense — and nothing on either side
+    // could detect it afterwards. The operator now publishes what it DID and
+    // this machine, which holds the notes, owns the running total.
+    //
+    // `cassette_ops` is the dedup ledger. A delta applied twice is wrong, and
+    // addressable events are re-delivered on every reconnect, so the operator
+    // mints an id per operation and we record the ones we have applied. The
+    // operator's window is a slice of recent operations rather than just the
+    // newest, so one we missed arrives with the next publish; dedup is what
+    // makes re-delivery free instead of dangerous.
+    db.exec(`
+      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS cassette_ops (
+        id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        position INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        op_type TEXT NOT NULL,
+        bills INTEGER,
+        count INTEGER,
+        denomination INTEGER,
+        op_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        applied_at INTEGER NOT NULL
+      );
+    `)
+    db.prepare('UPDATE meta SET value = ? WHERE key = ?').run('13', 'schema_version')
+    console.log('[StateStore] Migrated schema v12 → v13 (added cassette_ops)')
+    existing.value = '13'
+  }
+
   // Defensive: a fresh install at SCHEMA_VERSION skips all migrations.
   // Seed the operator-config meta rows if they're missing (idempotent).
   const seedMeta = db.prepare('INSERT OR IGNORE INTO meta (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)')
   seedMeta.run('lastKnownConfigCreatedAt', '0')
   seedMeta.run('bootstrapPublishedAt', '')
   seedMeta.run('lastKnownFeeConfigCreatedAt', '0')
+  seedMeta.run('cassetteStateSeq', '0')
 
   const cashboxRow = db.prepare('SELECT id FROM cashbox WHERE id = 1').get()
   if (!cashboxRow) {
@@ -397,32 +445,110 @@ export function initDatabase(dbPath?: string): void {
  */
 export function getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt(): number {
   if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
-  const row = db
-    .prepare('SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key = ?')
-    .get('lastKnownConfigCreatedAt') as { value: string } | undefined
+  const row = db.prepare('SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key = ?').get('lastKnownConfigCreatedAt') as
+    | { value: string }
+    | undefined
   return row ? Number(row.value) || 0 : 0
 }
 
 /**
- * Read the one-shot bootstrap-publish gate. Returns null if the ATM has
- * not yet published its `bitspire-cassettes-state:<machine_id>` hello-event.
+ * The `created_at` of the last `bitspire-cassettes-state` event this machine
+ * published, or null if it has never published one.
+ *
+ * This used to be a one-shot gate ("have we said hello yet"), which meant a
+ * layout change after first boot was never announced (#94). It is now a
+ * high-water mark: every publish records its stamp, and the next one is forced
+ * strictly above it. Addressable events are ordered by `created_at` at second
+ * granularity, and a relay silently keeps the higher one, so a clock that steps
+ * backwards would otherwise make this machine's reports vanish with an `OK`.
+ *
+ * Stored under the original `bootstrapPublishedAt` meta key so no migration is
+ * needed; the name is historical, the meaning is not.
  */
-export function getBootstrapPublishedAt(): number | null {
+export function getLastStatePublishedAt(): number | null {
   if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
-  const row = db
-    .prepare('SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key = ?')
-    .get('bootstrapPublishedAt') as { value: string } | undefined
+  const row = db.prepare('SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key = ?').get('bootstrapPublishedAt') as
+    | { value: string }
+    | undefined
   if (!row || row.value === '') return null
   const n = Number(row.value)
   return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null
 }
 
 /**
- * Mark the bootstrap hello-event as published. Idempotent — only takes
- * effect the first time it's set. Subsequent calls overwrite the
- * timestamp (harmless; the gate just needs to be non-null).
+ * Whether the bay counts are known to be unverified, and since when.
+ *
+ * Set when a dispense ends without the dispenser reporting what it moved — a
+ * driver throw, or the dispense timeout. Bills may well have reached the
+ * customer, but nothing knows how many, so neither the rows here nor HAL's
+ * bays were debited and both now read high. Reporting that number as fact is
+ * the worst option available; saying the number is unverified is honest and
+ * tells the operator to open the machine and recount.
+ *
+ * Cleared when an operator asserts authoritative counts (a config apply),
+ * which is precisely what a recount is. Uses an upsert so no migration is
+ * needed for machines whose meta table predates the key.
  */
-export function markBootstrapPublished(unixTimestamp: number): void {
+export function getCountsUncertainSince(): number | null {
+  if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  const row = db.prepare('SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key = ?').get('countsUncertainSince') as
+    | { value: string }
+    | undefined
+  if (!row || row.value === '') return null
+  const n = Number(row.value)
+  return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null
+}
+
+/** Flag the counts as unverified. Keeps the earliest time it went bad. */
+export function markCountsUncertain(unixTimestamp: number): void {
+  if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  if (getCountsUncertainSince() !== null) return
+  db.prepare(
+    'INSERT INTO meta (key, value) VALUES (?, ?) ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value'
+  ).run('countsUncertainSince', String(unixTimestamp))
+  console.warn('[StateStore] Cassette counts flagged unverified at', unixTimestamp)
+}
+
+/** Clear the flag — an operator has asserted real counts. */
+export function clearCountsUncertain(): void {
+  if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  db.prepare(
+    'INSERT INTO meta (key, value) VALUES (?, ?) ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value'
+  ).run('countsUncertainSince', '')
+}
+
+/**
+ * A counter bumped on every local change to a bay count, from any cause.
+ *
+ * It rides along in the state document so a reader can reject a regression
+ * without trusting a clock. `created_at` cannot carry that: it has
+ * second granularity, so two publishes in the same second are ordered by
+ * whichever event id hashes lower — and a machine whose clock stepped
+ * backwards would otherwise have every later report look older than the one
+ * already on the relay.
+ */
+export function getCassetteStateSeq(): number {
+  if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  const row = db.prepare('SELECT value FROM meta WHERE key = ?').get('cassetteStateSeq') as
+    | { value: string }
+    | undefined
+  return row ? Number(row.value) || 0 : 0
+}
+
+/**
+ * Bump the counter. Safe to call inside an open transaction — every caller
+ * that mutates a count does, so the bump commits or rolls back with it.
+ */
+export function bumpCassetteStateSeq(): void {
+  if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  db.prepare(
+    'INSERT INTO meta (key, value) VALUES (?, ?) ' +
+      'ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value = CAST(CAST(meta.value AS INTEGER) + 1 AS TEXT)'
+  ).run('cassetteStateSeq', '1')
+}
+
+/** Record the `created_at` just published, as the next publish's floor. */
+export function markStatePublished(unixTimestamp: number): void {
   if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
   db.prepare('UPDATE meta SET value = ? WHERE key = ?').run(
     String(unixTimestamp),
@@ -531,11 +657,12 @@ export function clearBunkerBinding(): void {
 }
 
 /**
- * Reset the bootstrap-publish gate so the ATM re-publishes its
- * `bitspire-cassettes-state` hello-event. Called on a re-pair (new seed) so
- * the new operator receives the spire's current state (aiolabs/bitspire#56).
+ * Forget the publish high-water mark. Called on a re-pair (new seed): the
+ * next publish is then free to use the wall clock, which is what a fresh
+ * operator relationship wants. The state itself is republished on startup
+ * regardless, so the new operator always receives current counts.
  */
-export function resetBootstrapGate(): void {
+export function resetStatePublishWatermark(): void {
   if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
   db.prepare('UPDATE meta SET value = ? WHERE key = ?').run('', 'bootstrapPublishedAt')
 }
@@ -566,108 +693,190 @@ export function resetForRepair(): void {
   })()
 }
 
-export type OperatorCassettesPayload = {
-  positions: Record<string, { denomination: number; count: number }>
+/**
+ * Outcome of applying an operator-authored absolute config. Still the right
+ * shape for fee config, where the operator is the only writer of the value
+ * and a later event simply supersedes an earlier one. Cassette counts left
+ * this model in ADR-004 precisely because they had two writers.
+ */
+export type ApplyResult = { applied: true } | { applied: false; reason: string }
+
+/** One operator-authored operation, as it arrives on the wire. */
+export type CassetteOp = {
+  id: string
+  at: number
+  type: 'refill' | 'empty' | 'recount' | 'set_denomination'
+  position: number
+  bills?: number
+  count?: number
+  denomination?: number
 }
 
-export type ApplyResult =
-  | { applied: true }
-  | { applied: false; reason: string }
+export type ApplyOpsResult = {
+  /** Ids applied by this call. Empty when every op was already on file. */
+  applied: string[]
+  /** Ids rejected, with why. These stay unapplied and unrecorded. */
+  rejected: { id: string; reason: string }[]
+}
+
+const CASSETTE_OP_TYPES = new Set(['refill', 'empty', 'recount', 'set_denomination'])
 
 /**
- * Atomic apply of an operator-published cassette config (aiolabs/lamassu-next#56).
+ * Validate one operation in isolation. Returns null when it is well-formed.
  *
- * Caller has already verified the event signature and decrypted the
- * content. This function:
- *
- * 1. Rechecks replay-protection against `meta.lastKnownConfigCreatedAt`
- *    (defense-in-depth — caller should have done this too).
- * 2. Validates the payload's `positions` key set is *exactly* the set of
- *    positions currently in the `cassettes` table. The bay count is
- *    hardware-determined and can't be added to or removed from via this
- *    path; only the per-bay denomination and count are operator-mutable.
- * 3. Validates per-entry `denomination` is a positive int, `count` is a
- *    non-negative int. **Duplicate denominations across positions are
- *    intentionally permitted** — real machines load multiple cassettes
- *    with the same denomination for cash-out throughput.
- * 4. In a single SQLite transaction: updates `cassettes` rows by position
- *    (denomination + count both mutable per row) AND advances
- *    `meta.lastKnownConfigCreatedAt` to `eventCreatedAt`.
- *
- * Mid-write crashes roll back cleanly; on restart the same event is
- * re-delivered by the relay and the watermark check drops it as already
- * consumed (or the watermark is pre-event because the tx rolled back,
- * and the apply runs again from scratch).
+ * Shape errors and unknown positions are treated the same way by the caller:
+ * the op is neither applied nor recorded, so it stays pending on the
+ * operator's dashboard. That is the honest outcome — it did not happen — and
+ * it beats recording it as applied to stop the noise, which would tell the
+ * operator their refill landed when the notes are unaccounted for.
  */
-export function applyOperatorCassettesConfig(
-  payload: OperatorCassettesPayload,
-  eventCreatedAt: number
-): ApplyResult {
+function validateCassetteOp(op: CassetteOp, knownPositions: Set<number>): string | null {
+  if (typeof op.id !== 'string' || op.id.length === 0) return 'missing id'
+  if (!CASSETTE_OP_TYPES.has(op.type)) return `unknown type ${String(op.type)}`
+  if (!Number.isInteger(op.position)) return `position must be an integer (got ${op.position})`
+  if (!knownPositions.has(op.position)) return `unknown position ${op.position}`
+  if (!Number.isFinite(op.at)) return 'missing at'
+
+  if (op.type === 'refill') {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(op.bills) || (op.bills as number) <= 0) {
+      return `refill needs a positive integer bills (got ${op.bills})`
+    }
+  }
+  if (op.type === 'recount') {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(op.count) || (op.count as number) < 0) {
+      return `recount needs a non-negative integer count (got ${op.count})`
+    }
+  }
+  if (op.type === 'set_denomination') {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(op.denomination) || (op.denomination as number) <= 0) {
+      return `set_denomination needs a positive integer denomination (got ${op.denomination})`
+    }
+  }
+  return null
+}
+
+/**
+ * Apply an operator's cassette operations, skipping any already on file.
+ *
+ * This replaces applying absolute counts. The operator authors what it DID —
+ * a refill in notes added, an empty, a recount, a denomination change — and
+ * this machine, which holds the physical notes, keeps the running total.
+ * Nobody but this process writes a count any more, so there is no second
+ * writer to lose a race to.
+ *
+ * Deltas are not idempotent and addressable events ARE re-delivered on every
+ * relay reconnect, so idempotency is carried explicitly: the operator mints an
+ * id per operation, `cassette_ops` records the ones applied, and a repeat is a
+ * no-op. That is also why there is no `created_at` watermark here any more.
+ * Under absolute counts the watermark was the only replay defence; with
+ * per-op ids it is strictly weaker than the dedup and would do active harm,
+ * because an event that arrives out of order may still carry an operation this
+ * machine has never seen.
+ *
+ * Applied oldest-first by `at`, ties broken by id so two operations stamped in
+ * the same second still order the same way on every machine. Ordering matters
+ * because a recount followed by a refill is not the same as the reverse.
+ *
+ * The whole batch runs in one SQLite transaction with the sequence bump, so a
+ * crash mid-apply rolls back to a coherent count and the next publish re-offers
+ * every op in the window.
+ */
+export function applyOperatorCassetteOps(ops: CassetteOp[]): ApplyOpsResult {
   if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  const database = db
+  const result: ApplyOpsResult = { applied: [], rejected: [] }
+  if (ops.length === 0) return result
 
-  const watermark = getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt()
-  if (eventCreatedAt <= watermark) {
-    return {
-      applied: false,
-      reason: `event.created_at (${eventCreatedAt}) <= lastKnownConfigCreatedAt (${watermark})`,
-    }
-  }
-
-  const currentRows = db
-    .prepare('SELECT position FROM cassettes')
-    .all() as { position: number }[]
-  const currentPositions = new Set(currentRows.map((r) => r.position))
-  const payloadPositions = new Set(Object.keys(payload.positions).map((k) => Number(k)))
-
-  if (currentPositions.size !== payloadPositions.size) {
-    return {
-      applied: false,
-      reason: `position count mismatch: state.db has ${currentPositions.size}, payload has ${payloadPositions.size}`,
-    }
-  }
-  for (const p of currentPositions) {
-    if (!payloadPositions.has(p)) {
-      return { applied: false, reason: `payload missing position ${p}` }
-    }
-  }
-  for (const p of payloadPositions) {
-    if (!currentPositions.has(p)) {
-      return { applied: false, reason: `payload includes unknown position ${p}` }
-    }
-  }
-
-  for (const [posKey, entry] of Object.entries(payload.positions)) {
-    if (!Number.isInteger(entry.denomination) || entry.denomination <= 0) {
-      return {
-        applied: false,
-        reason: `denomination must be positive int (position ${posKey}, got ${entry.denomination})`,
-      }
-    }
-    if (!Number.isInteger(entry.count) || entry.count < 0) {
-      return {
-        applied: false,
-        reason: `count must be non-negative int (position ${posKey}, got ${entry.count})`,
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  const updateCassette = db.prepare(
-    'UPDATE cassettes SET denomination = ?, count = ? WHERE position = ?'
+  const knownPositions = new Set(
+    (database.prepare('SELECT position FROM cassettes').all() as { position: number }[]).map(
+      (r) => r.position
+    )
   )
-  const setWatermark = db.prepare('UPDATE meta SET value = ? WHERE key = ?')
+  const seen = database.prepare('SELECT 1 FROM cassette_ops WHERE id = ?')
 
-  const run = db.transaction(() => {
-    for (const [posKey, entry] of Object.entries(payload.positions)) {
-      updateCassette.run(entry.denomination, entry.count, Number(posKey))
+  const pending: CassetteOp[] = []
+  for (const op of ops) {
+    if (op && typeof op.id === 'string' && seen.get(op.id)) continue
+    const reason = validateCassetteOp(op, knownPositions)
+    if (reason) {
+      result.rejected.push({ id: op?.id ?? '<no id>', reason })
+      continue
     }
-    setWatermark.run(String(eventCreatedAt), 'lastKnownConfigCreatedAt')
-  })
+    pending.push(op)
+  }
+  if (pending.length === 0) return result
+
+  pending.sort((a, b) => a.at - b.at || (a.id < b.id ? -1 : a.id > b.id ? 1 : 0))
+
+  const addBills = database.prepare(
+    'UPDATE cassettes SET count = MAX(0, count + ?) WHERE position = ?'
+  )
+  const setCount = database.prepare('UPDATE cassettes SET count = ? WHERE position = ?')
+  const setDenomination = database.prepare(
+    'UPDATE cassettes SET denomination = ? WHERE position = ?'
+  )
+  const recordOp = database.prepare(
+    'INSERT INTO cassette_ops (id, position, op_type, bills, count, denomination, op_at, applied_at) ' +
+      'VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)'
+  )
+  const upsertMeta = database.prepare(
+    'INSERT INTO meta (key, value) VALUES (?, ?) ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value'
+  )
+
+  const appliedAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
+  let sawRecount = false
+
+  database.transaction(() => {
+    for (const op of pending) {
+      if (op.type === 'refill') addBills.run(op.bills, op.position)
+      else if (op.type === 'empty') setCount.run(0, op.position)
+      else if (op.type === 'recount') {
+        setCount.run(op.count, op.position)
+        sawRecount = true
+      } else setDenomination.run(op.denomination, op.position)
+
+      recordOp.run(
+        op.id,
+        op.position,
+        op.type,
+        op.bills ?? null,
+        op.count ?? null,
+        op.denomination ?? null,
+        Math.floor(op.at),
+        appliedAt
+      )
+      result.applied.push(op.id)
+    }
+    bumpCassetteStateSeq()
+    // A recount is an operator opening the bay and counting it, which is
+    // exactly what resolves an unverified count. Nothing else does: a refill
+    // adds to a number still known to be wrong.
+    if (sawRecount) upsertMeta.run('countsUncertainSince', '')
+  })()
 
-  run()
   console.log(
-    `[StateStore] Applied operator cassettes config @ created_at=${eventCreatedAt} (${Object.keys(payload.positions).length} positions)`
+    `[StateStore] Applied ${result.applied.length} cassette op(s)` +
+      (result.rejected.length ? `, rejected ${result.rejected.length}` : '')
   )
-  return { applied: true }
+  return result
+}
+
+/**
+ * The ids most recently applied, newest first — the acknowledgement leg of
+ * the protocol.
+ *
+ * An addressable event gives its publisher no failure signal at all: the relay
+ * returns OK for an event it then discards, and a losing writer is never told.
+ * Echoing the ids back in this machine's own state document is the only way
+ * the operator can distinguish an operation that landed from one that was
+ * merely sent.
+ */
+export function getAppliedOpIds(limit = 50): string[] {
+  if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  const rows = db
+    .prepare('SELECT id FROM cassette_ops ORDER BY applied_at DESC, rowid DESC LIMIT ?')
+    .all(limit) as { id: string }[]
+  return rows.map((r) => r.id)
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -752,10 +961,7 @@ export interface FeeConfigPayload {
  */
 const FEE_CAP_PER_DIRECTION = 0.15
 
-export function applyFeeConfig(
-  payload: FeeConfigPayload,
-  eventCreatedAt: number
-): ApplyResult {
+export function applyFeeConfig(payload: FeeConfigPayload, eventCreatedAt: number): ApplyResult {
   if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
 
   const watermark = getLastKnownFeeConfigCreatedAt()
@@ -848,6 +1054,7 @@ export function setCassettes(
         const row = rows[i]!
         upsert.run(row.position ?? i + 1, row.denomination, row.count)
       }
+      bumpCassetteStateSeq()
     }
   )
 
@@ -862,11 +1069,14 @@ export function setCassettes(
  */
 export function updateCassetteCountByPosition(position: number, delta: number): void {
   if (!db) throw new Error('Database not initialized')
+  const database = db
 
-  db.prepare('UPDATE cassettes SET count = MAX(0, count + ?) WHERE position = ?').run(
-    delta,
-    position
-  )
+  database.transaction(() => {
+    database
+      .prepare('UPDATE cassettes SET count = MAX(0, count + ?) WHERE position = ?')
+      .run(delta, position)
+    bumpCassetteStateSeq()
+  })()
 }
 
 /**
@@ -879,9 +1089,14 @@ export function getInventory(): Record<number, number> {
   const rows = loadCassettes()
   const inv: Record<number, number> = {}
   for (const row of rows) {
-    if (row.count > 0) {
-      inv[row.denomination] = (inv[row.denomination] ?? 0) + row.count
-    }
+    // Zero-count bays are KEPT. Dropping them made a drained machine
+    // indistinguishable from an unconfigured one, and every caller reads an
+    // empty map as "I don't know, ask the hardware" — so the last non-empty
+    // snapshot stuck and the availability beacon went on advertising bills
+    // that had already been dispensed. An empty map now means exactly one
+    // thing: no cassettes are configured. Consumers already filter for
+    // `> 0` before offering a denomination (CashOutView, machine.ts).
+    inv[row.denomination] = (inv[row.denomination] ?? 0) + row.count
   }
   return inv
 }
@@ -1026,7 +1241,15 @@ export function recordTransaction(tx: TransactionInput): void {
       }
     }
 
-    if (t.type === 'cash_out') {
+    // Any dispense empties bays, whoever asked for it. `manual_dispense`
+    // (operator remediation, via the command poller or a kind-21003 command)
+    // used to fall outside this branch: HAL decremented its in-memory bays but
+    // the rows here did not move, and on the next boot HAL re-seeds from these
+    // rows — so the machine came back believing it still held bills a customer
+    // had already been handed (#76). A remediation against a partly-dispensed
+    // original decrements again on purpose: the original only ever debited what
+    // physically left, and this is a second lot of bills leaving.
+    if (t.type === 'cash_out' || t.type === 'manual_dispense') {
       // Decrement cassettes by ACTUALLY dispensed count (not requested).
       // Position is the addressable unit (v9): duplicate denominations
       // across bays are legal, so a denomination-keyed UPDATE would
@@ -1056,6 +1279,10 @@ export function recordTransaction(tx: TransactionInput): void {
           }
         }
       }
+      // The counts moved, so the sequence must move with them, inside this
+      // same transaction. It rides in the state document as the operator's
+      // way to reject a regression without trusting either clock.
+      bumpCassetteStateSeq()
     }
 
     if (t.type === 'cash_in') {

apps/machine/index.html

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 <html lang="en" class="dark">
   <head>
     <meta charset="UTF-8" />
-    <link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/vite.svg" />
+    <link rel="icon" type="image/png" href="/logo.png" />
     <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0, user-scalable=no" />
     <!--
       Content Security Policy:
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
       http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
       content="default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self' ws: wss: http: https:; img-src 'self' data: blob:; font-src 'self'; frame-src 'none'; object-src 'none'"
     />
-    <title>Lamassu ATM</title>
+    <title>bitSpire ATM</title>
     <style>
       /* Prevent text selection and context menu on kiosk */
       * {
@@ -33,12 +33,17 @@
         padding: 0;
         background: #000;
       }
-      /* Kiosk-only: lock overflow and hide cursor */
+      /* Kiosk-only: lock overflow. The cursor is NOT hidden here — that is
+         src/style.css's `.kiosk` rule, which main.ts applies at runtime unless
+         VITE_DEMO_TAG is set. This block can't make that distinction (static
+         HTML, and the CSP forbids an inline script to read the env), so a
+         `cursor: none` here would also blank the pointer on the public web
+         demo, where people drive the kiosk with a mouse. One owner for cursor
+         hiding, and it is the one that knows whether this is a real machine. */
       @media (min-width: 1024px) {
         html,
         body {
           overflow: hidden;
-          cursor: none;
         }
       }
     </style>

apps/machine/src/App.vue

@@ -1,18 +1,39 @@
 <script setup lang="ts">
 import { onMounted, onUnmounted, ref, computed, watch } from 'vue'
-import { useRoute } from 'vue-router'
+import { useRoute, useRouter } from 'vue-router'
 import { useAtmStore } from '@/stores/atm'
 import { useTheme } from '@/composables/useTheme'
+import { useSessionSecurity } from '@/composables/useSessionSecurity'
 import { setBranding } from '@/composables/useBranding'
 import { classifyInitError } from '@/services/init-error'
 import { Badge } from '@/components/ui/badge'
 import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
-import { Sun, Moon } from 'lucide-vue-next'
 import PairingWizard from '@/components/PairingWizard.vue'
+import LockedView from '@/views/LockedView.vue'
+import ColorModeToggle from '@/components/ColorModeToggle.vue'
 
 const atmStore = useAtmStore()
 const route = useRoute()
+const router = useRouter()
 const { current: currentTheme, themes, colorMode } = useTheme()
+
+// ADR-003 session security: idle-inactivity re-lock (resets on touch) + an
+// absolute hard session cap. Enforced here at the always-mounted shell so it
+// spans the whole unlocked session, not just the idle view.
+useSessionSecurity()
+
+// When the machine re-locks after a transaction (access gate enabled), the
+// router is still on /cash-in or /cash-out under the LockedView overlay. Reset
+// it to home so that when the gate reopens to `idle`, IdleView shows — not the
+// stale transaction view (e.g. a completed cash-out's collect screen). Runs
+// while locked, so the router-view is hidden; no flicker. The disabled-gate path
+// (never dwells in `locked`) still returns home via each view's isIdle watch.
+watch(
+  () => atmStore.isLocked,
+  (locked) => {
+    if (locked && route.path !== '/') void router.push('/')
+  }
+)
 const debugExpanded = ref(false)
 const isSupport = computed(() => route.path === '/support')
 // Network detected dynamically from Lightning invoice prefix
@@ -110,9 +131,7 @@ onMounted(async () => {
       // Same env → pairing-seed precedence as lightning.ts: on a blank-.env
       // seed-driven machine the relay comes from the pairing transport, not env.
       const relayUrl =
-        config?.relayUrl ||
-        import.meta.env.VITE_RELAY_URL ||
-        resolved?.transport?.relays?.[0]
+        config?.relayUrl || import.meta.env.VITE_RELAY_URL || resolved?.transport?.relays?.[0]
       if (signer && relayUrl) {
         const client = new NostrClient({ relays: [{ url: relayUrl }], signer })
         await client.connect()
@@ -289,6 +308,11 @@ function toggleLiveServices() {
       </Button>
     </div>
 
+    <!-- Access gate (ADR-003): shown when the machine is healthy but locked,
+         below the init/maintenance gates above. Never renders when access
+         control is disabled (the machine never dwells in `locked`). -->
+    <LockedView v-else-if="atmStore.isLocked" />
+
     <template v-else>
       <router-view />
 
@@ -340,16 +364,10 @@ function toggleLiveServices() {
       </div>
 
       <!-- Light/dark toggle (production only — debug panel has this in dev) -->
-      <Button
+      <ColorModeToggle
         v-if="!atmStore.allowMockFallback"
-        variant="outline"
-        class="fixed bottom-3 right-3 lg:bottom-6 lg:right-6 z-50 h-10 px-3 py-1 text-sm rounded-lg lg:h-[7vh] lg:min-h-[70px] lg:px-8 lg:py-3 lg:text-2xl lg:rounded-xl gap-2 lg:gap-3"
-        @click="colorMode = colorMode === 'dark' ? 'light' : 'dark'"
-      >
-        <Sun v-if="colorMode === 'dark'" class="w-5 h-5 lg:w-7 lg:h-7" />
-        <Moon v-else class="w-5 h-5 lg:w-7 lg:h-7" />
-        {{ colorMode === 'dark' ? 'Light' : 'Dark' }}
-      </Button>
+        class="fixed bottom-3 right-3 z-50 lg:bottom-6 lg:right-6"
+      />
 
       <!-- Debug overlay (dev only) -->
       <div

apps/machine/src/components/CardChip.vue

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+<script setup lang="ts">
+/**
+ * The Bolt Card loaded for this session (ADR-003 tap-to-enter): card label,
+ * and the card wallet's balance HIDDEN BY DEFAULT behind an eye toggle — a
+ * kiosk in a public space must not show a stranger's balance unasked. The
+ * revealed line mirrors the LNbits wallet page: sats, then the fiat
+ * equivalent in the wallet's own currency (Intl currency formatting), falling
+ * back to the ATM's fiat at its display rate when the card server priced
+ * nothing. Reveal state lives in the store and resets on re-lock.
+ */
+import { computed } from 'vue'
+import { useAtmStore } from '@/stores/atm'
+import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
+import { Nfc, Eye, EyeOff } from 'lucide-vue-next'
+
+const atmStore = useAtmStore()
+const card = computed(() => atmStore.loadedBoltCard)
+
+const label = computed(() => {
+  const c = card.value
+  if (!c) return ''
+  return c.cardName
+    ? `${c.cardName} · ••${c.externalId.slice(-4)}`
+    : `Card ••${c.externalId.slice(-4)}`
+})
+const sats = computed(() =>
+  card.value ? new Intl.NumberFormat().format(card.value.balanceSats) : ''
+)
+const fiat = computed(() => {
+  const f = atmStore.loadedCardFiat
+  if (!f) return null
+  try {
+    return new Intl.NumberFormat(undefined, { style: 'currency', currency: f.currency }).format(
+      f.amount
+    )
+  } catch {
+    return `${f.amount.toFixed(2)} ${f.currency}`
+  }
+})
+</script>
+
+<template>
+  <div
+    v-if="card"
+    class="flex items-center gap-3 rounded-xl border border-border bg-card px-4 py-2 text-left lg:gap-4 lg:px-6 lg:py-3"
+  >
+    <Nfc class="size-6 shrink-0 text-primary lg:size-8" />
+    <div class="flex min-w-0 flex-col leading-tight">
+      <span class="truncate text-xs uppercase tracking-wide text-muted-foreground lg:text-sm">
+        {{ label }}
+      </span>
+      <span
+        v-if="atmStore.cardBalanceRevealed"
+        class="text-base font-semibold text-foreground lg:text-2xl"
+      >
+        {{ sats }} sats
+        <span v-if="fiat" class="ml-2 font-normal text-muted-foreground">≈ {{ fiat }}</span>
+      </span>
+      <span
+        v-else
+        class="text-base font-semibold tracking-widest text-muted-foreground lg:text-2xl"
+        aria-label="Balance hidden"
+      >
+        ••••••
+      </span>
+    </div>
+    <Button
+      variant="ghost"
+      size="icon"
+      class="ml-auto h-10 w-10 shrink-0 rounded-full lg:h-14 lg:w-14"
+      :aria-label="atmStore.cardBalanceRevealed ? 'Hide balance' : 'Show balance'"
+      @click="atmStore.toggleCardBalance()"
+    >
+      <EyeOff v-if="atmStore.cardBalanceRevealed" class="size-5 lg:size-7" />
+      <Eye v-else class="size-5 lg:size-7" />
+    </Button>
+  </div>
+</template>

apps/machine/src/components/ColorModeToggle.vue

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<script setup lang="ts">
+/**
+ * Light/dark toggle — the single reusable control for switching color mode.
+ *
+ * Kiosk-sized by default (large touch target for a public display). colorMode
+ * is global + persisted (toggles `.dark` on <html>, and dark mode pulls
+ * branding.json's dark palette + logo-dark.png), so this stays in sync
+ * wherever it's used. Position it via a fallthrough `class` on the consumer,
+ * e.g. `<ColorModeToggle class="fixed bottom-6 right-6" />`.
+ */
+import { useTheme } from '@/composables/useTheme'
+import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
+import { Sun, Moon } from 'lucide-vue-next'
+
+const { colorMode } = useTheme()
+
+function toggle() {
+  colorMode.value = colorMode.value === 'dark' ? 'light' : 'dark'
+}
+</script>
+
+<template>
+  <Button
+    variant="outline"
+    class="h-10 gap-2 rounded-lg px-3 py-1 text-sm lg:h-[7vh] lg:min-h-[70px] lg:gap-3 lg:rounded-xl lg:px-8 lg:py-3 lg:text-2xl"
+    :aria-label="colorMode === 'dark' ? 'Switch to light mode' : 'Switch to dark mode'"
+    @click="toggle"
+  >
+    <Sun v-if="colorMode === 'dark'" class="h-5 w-5 lg:h-7 lg:w-7" />
+    <Moon v-else class="h-5 w-5 lg:h-7 lg:w-7" />
+    {{ colorMode === 'dark' ? 'Light' : 'Dark' }}
+  </Button>
+</template>

apps/machine/src/composables/useSessionSecurity.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+import { watch } from 'vue'
+import { useEventListener, useIntervalFn } from '@vueuse/core'
+import { useAtmStore } from '@/stores/atm'
+
+/**
+ * Session security timeouts for the ADR-003 access gate.
+ *
+ * Enforced at the DOM layer on purpose: the state machine can't observe raw
+ * pointer events, so an XState `after` delay can only count from state entry —
+ * it never resets on a screen touch and therefore can't measure *inactivity*.
+ * Two independent, fail-closed limits, both of which re-lock via the machine's
+ * root-level END_SESSION transition:
+ *
+ *  - SOFT idle (SOFT_IDLE_MS): re-lock after this long with no trusted user
+ *    input while on the idle menu. Resets on every genuine pointer/touch/key
+ *    event. Scoped to `idle` so it never interrupts an in-flight cash-in/out
+ *    (those carry their own, longer machine timeouts).
+ *  - HARD cap (HARD_CAP_MS): re-lock this long after the session began,
+ *    regardless of activity. Anchored to unlock time and never reset — an
+ *    absolute ceiling a forgotten or relayed card can't hold open. Like the
+ *    soft limit it only fires while on the idle menu: locking mid-transaction
+ *    would strand stacked bills or an in-flight dispense, and every
+ *    transaction already returns to `locked` on its own, so the cap simply
+ *    takes effect the moment the machine is back at idle.
+ *
+ * Security properties:
+ *  - Only `event.isTrusted` input resets the soft timer, so synthetic/scripted
+ *    events in the renderer can't keep a session alive.
+ *  - Limits are wall-clock deadline comparisons, not chained setTimeouts: a
+ *    suspended/resumed renderer re-locks on the very next tick instead of
+ *    silently extending the session past its deadline.
+ *  - Both limits only ever *lock*. The machine's accessGateActive guard makes
+ *    END_SESSION a no-op when the gate is off, so this is inert on a
+ *    gate-disabled machine.
+ *  - One-shot per session: after firing, it disarms until the next unlock, so
+ *    a lock that (under dev bypass) doesn't take can't spin.
+ *
+ * Call once from the always-mounted App shell.
+ */
+const SOFT_IDLE_MS = 60_000 // 60s of no interaction on the idle menu
+const HARD_CAP_MS = 600_000 // 10min absolute session ceiling
+
+export function useSessionSecurity() {
+  const atm = useAtmStore()
+
+  // Wall-clock anchors. `null` sessionStartedAt == disarmed (no live session).
+  let sessionStartedAt: number | null = null
+  let lastActivityAt = 0
+
+  function arm() {
+    const now = Date.now()
+    sessionStartedAt = now
+    lastActivityAt = now
+  }
+  function disarm() {
+    sessionStartedAt = null
+  }
+
+  // Arm on each locked → unlocked edge; disarm on lock. Anchored to the
+  // isLocked transition so the hard cap starts at unlock and does NOT restart
+  // when moving idle → cashIn → idle within a single session.
+  watch(
+    () => atm.isLocked,
+    (locked, wasLocked) => {
+      if (wasLocked && !locked && atm.accessControl.enabled) arm()
+      else if (locked) disarm()
+    }
+  )
+
+  // Only genuine hardware input counts as activity. Passive + capture so it
+  // observes every touch without interfering with handling. useEventListener
+  // auto-detaches on unmount.
+  const onActivity = (e: Event) => {
+    if (e.isTrusted) lastActivityAt = Date.now()
+  }
+  for (const type of ['pointerdown', 'touchstart', 'keydown', 'wheel'] as const) {
+    useEventListener(document, type, onActivity, { passive: true, capture: true })
+  }
+
+  // Single 1s evaluator — cheap, and coarse enough that timer drift/suspend
+  // can only ever make it fire late-then-immediately, never early.
+  useIntervalFn(() => {
+    if (sessionStartedAt === null || atm.isLocked || !atm.accessControl.enabled) return
+    // Never lock out from under a transaction (the machine only accepts
+    // END_SESSION from idle anyway); the deadlines keep counting meanwhile, so
+    // an expired session re-locks on the first tick back at the menu.
+    if (atm.currentState !== 'idle') return
+    const now = Date.now()
+
+    // Hard cap first — absolute, activity-independent.
+    if (now - sessionStartedAt >= HARD_CAP_MS) {
+      disarm() // one-shot; re-arms on next unlock
+      atm.endSession('session-cap')
+      return
+    }
+
+    // Soft inactivity — resets on trusted input.
+    if (now - lastActivityAt >= SOFT_IDLE_MS) {
+      disarm()
+      atm.endSession('inactivity')
+    }
+  }, 1000)
+}

apps/machine/src/lib/utils.ts

@@ -5,3 +5,26 @@ import { twMerge } from 'tailwind-merge'
 export function cn(...inputs: ClassValue[]) {
   return twMerge(clsx(inputs))
 }
+
+/**
+ * Render a denomination/count list for the journal.
+ *
+ * Electron's console bridge stringifies every console argument on its way to
+ * the journal, so passing the array itself arrives as `[object Object]` and
+ * the numbers are lost. Interpolate one of these instead. See CLAUDE.md,
+ * "Useful invariants when debugging".
+ */
+export function formatBays(rows: { denomination: number; count?: number }[]): string {
+  if (!rows?.length) return '(none)'
+  // `count` is optional on a device-config cassette: a preset can declare the
+  // denomination a bay holds without claiming how many notes are in it. Show
+  // that as unknown rather than as zero, which would read as a drained bay.
+  return rows.map((r) => `${r.denomination}x${r.count ?? '?'}`).join(' ')
+}
+
+/** Same, for a denomination-keyed count map as `getInventory()` returns. */
+export function formatInventory(inv: Record<number, number>): string {
+  const entries = Object.entries(inv ?? {})
+  if (!entries.length) return '(none)'
+  return entries.map(([denom, count]) => `${denom}x${count}`).join(' ')
+}

apps/machine/src/services/__tests__/settlement-watch.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
+import { initialContext, type ATMContext } from '@bitSpire/state-machine'
+import type { LnbitsClient, LnbitsPayment } from '@bitSpire/lnbits'
+import { createATMServices } from '../lightning'
+
+/**
+ * The cash-out settlement watch (2026-09-22 regression).
+ *
+ * A one-tap Bolt Card Complete settles in about a second; subscribing over
+ * nostr takes several. When the watch was armed at display time the push —
+ * an ephemeral event with no replay — fired before anything listened, and the
+ * machine sat on a paid invoice until it timed out, taking the sats without
+ * dispensing. These pin the three defences: arm before the invoice is handed
+ * out, latch a settlement that still beats the consumer, and poll so a push
+ * that never arrives cannot strand a payment.
+ */
+
+const BOLT11 = 'lnbc265u1p4t9gthpp5td44vd9a0s5er'
+const HASH = 'aa'.repeat(32)
+
+const paid = (preimage = 'PREIMAGE'): LnbitsPayment =>
+  ({ payment_hash: HASH, status: 'success', preimage }) as LnbitsPayment
+
+function makeLnbits(over: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
+  let pushTo: ((p: LnbitsPayment) => void) | null = null
+  const api = {
+    createInvoice: vi.fn(async () => ({ payment_request: BOLT11, payment_hash: HASH })),
+    subscribePayments: vi.fn(
+      async (_w: unknown, _f: unknown, onPush: (p: LnbitsPayment) => void) => {
+        pushTo = onPush
+        return 'sub-1'
+      }
+    ),
+    getPayment: vi.fn(async (): Promise<LnbitsPayment | null> => null),
+    unsubscribe: vi.fn(async () => true),
+    decodePayment: vi.fn(async () => ({ payment_hash: HASH })),
+    ...over,
+  }
+  return { api, push: (p: LnbitsPayment) => pushTo?.(p) }
+}
+
+const ctx = (): ATMContext => ({ ...initialContext, satsAmount: 26_500, exchangeRate: 1325 })
+
+const services = (l: { api: Record<string, unknown> }) =>
+  createATMServices(vi.fn(), l.api as unknown as LnbitsClient, 'wallet-1')
+
+beforeEach(() => vi.useFakeTimers())
+afterEach(() => vi.useRealTimers())
+
+describe('cash-out settlement watch', () => {
+  it('is armed before the invoice is handed out, without decoding it back', async () => {
+    const l = makeLnbits()
+    const invoice = await services(l).generateInvoice(ctx())
+
+    expect(invoice).toBe(BOLT11)
+    // Armed during generateInvoice, not later at display time.
+    expect(l.api.subscribePayments).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+    expect(l.api.subscribePayments.mock.calls[0]![1]).toMatchObject({ payment_hash: HASH })
+    // The hash came from the creation response, so no round trip to recover it.
+    expect(l.api.decodePayment).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('replays a settlement that beat the consumer (the race that lost payments)', async () => {
+    const l = makeLnbits()
+    const svc = services(l)
+    const invoice = await svc.generateInvoice(ctx())
+
+    // Card pays before the machine reaches displayingInvoice.
+    l.push(paid())
+
+    const onPaid = vi.fn()
+    svc.watchInvoice(invoice, onPaid)
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
+
+    expect(onPaid).toHaveBeenCalledWith('PREIMAGE')
+  })
+
+  it('delivers a push that arrives while the consumer is attached', async () => {
+    const l = makeLnbits()
+    const svc = services(l)
+    const invoice = await svc.generateInvoice(ctx())
+
+    const onPaid = vi.fn()
+    svc.watchInvoice(invoice, onPaid)
+    l.push(paid('LATER'))
+
+    expect(onPaid).toHaveBeenCalledWith('LATER')
+  })
+
+  it('settles from the poll when no push ever arrives', async () => {
+    const l = makeLnbits()
+    l.api.getPayment = vi.fn(async () => paid('VIA-POLL'))
+    const svc = services(l)
+    const invoice = await svc.generateInvoice(ctx())
+
+    const onPaid = vi.fn()
+    svc.watchInvoice(invoice, onPaid)
+    expect(onPaid).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(7_000)
+    expect(onPaid).toHaveBeenCalledWith('VIA-POLL')
+  })
+
+  it('polls even when arming the subscription fails', async () => {
+    const l = makeLnbits()
+    l.api.subscribePayments = vi.fn(async () => {
+      throw new Error('relay down')
+    })
+    l.api.getPayment = vi.fn(async () => paid('VIA-POLL'))
+    const svc = services(l)
+    const invoice = await svc.generateInvoice(ctx())
+
+    const onPaid = vi.fn()
+    svc.watchInvoice(invoice, onPaid)
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(7_000)
+
+    expect(onPaid).toHaveBeenCalledWith('VIA-POLL')
+  })
+
+  it('reports each settlement once, whichever path saw it first', async () => {
+    const l = makeLnbits()
+    l.api.getPayment = vi.fn(async () => paid('VIA-POLL'))
+    const svc = services(l)
+    const invoice = await svc.generateInvoice(ctx())
+
+    const onPaid = vi.fn()
+    svc.watchInvoice(invoice, onPaid)
+    l.push(paid('VIA-PUSH'))
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(20_000)
+
+    expect(onPaid).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+    expect(onPaid).toHaveBeenCalledWith('VIA-PUSH')
+  })
+
+  it('stops polling and unsubscribes when the transaction ends', async () => {
+    const l = makeLnbits()
+    const svc = services(l)
+    const invoice = await svc.generateInvoice(ctx())
+    const stop = svc.watchInvoice(invoice, vi.fn())
+
+    stop()
+    expect(l.api.unsubscribe).toHaveBeenCalledWith(undefined, 'sub-1')
+
+    const pollsAfterStop = (l.api.getPayment as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock.calls.length
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(30_000)
+    expect((l.api.getPayment as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock.calls.length).toBe(pollsAfterStop)
+  })
+})

apps/machine/src/services/access/__tests__/authorize.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
+import { npubEncode, nprofileEncode } from 'nostr-tools/nip19'
+import { authorize, hashId, hashPin, type AllowListEntry } from '../authorize'
+import { parseBoltcardLnurlw } from '../boltcard'
+
+const SALT = 'test-salt'
+const HEX_A = 'aa'.repeat(32)
+const HEX_B = 'bb'.repeat(32)
+const NPUB_A = npubEncode(HEX_A)
+const NPUB_B = npubEncode(HEX_B)
+
+describe('access authorize (ADR-003)', () => {
+  describe('open enrollment (prototype)', () => {
+    it('grants any valid npub as user', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_A }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      expect(out.status).toBe('granted')
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'granted', role: 'user' })
+    })
+
+    it('rejects a stray / non-npub QR', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: 'https://example.com/not-an-npub' }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      expect(out.status).toBe('denied')
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ reason: 'not a valid npub' })
+    })
+
+    it('accepts a `nostr:` URI prefix (with surrounding whitespace)', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: `  nostr:${NPUB_A}\n` }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      expect(out.status).toBe('granted')
+    })
+
+    it('accepts an nprofile and resolves to the same identity as its npub', async () => {
+      const nprofile = nprofileEncode({ pubkey: HEX_A, relays: ['wss://relay.example'] })
+      const viaNprofile = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: nprofile }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      const viaNpub = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_A }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      expect(viaNprofile.status).toBe('granted')
+      // Same underlying pubkey → same credential hash.
+      expect(viaNprofile.credentialIdHash).toBe(viaNpub.credentialIdHash)
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('allow-list (closed)', () => {
+    it('denies an unlisted npub when not open-enrollment', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_A }, [], { salt: SALT })
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'denied', reason: 'not authorized' })
+    })
+
+    it('grants a listed npub with its role, no PIN', async () => {
+      const entry: AllowListEntry = { idHash: await hashId(HEX_A, SALT), role: 'operator' }
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_A }, [entry], { salt: SALT })
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'granted', role: 'operator' })
+    })
+
+    it('does not match npub B against npub A entry', async () => {
+      const entry: AllowListEntry = { idHash: await hashId(HEX_A, SALT), role: 'user' }
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_B }, [entry], { salt: SALT })
+      expect(out.status).toBe('denied')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('PIN second factor', () => {
+    const makeEntry = async (): Promise<AllowListEntry> => ({
+      idHash: await hashId(HEX_A, SALT),
+      role: 'user',
+      pinHash: await hashPin('1234', SALT),
+    })
+
+    it('asks for a PIN when one is configured and none supplied', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_A }, [await makeEntry()], {
+        salt: SALT,
+      })
+      expect(out.status).toBe('pin-required')
+    })
+
+    it('grants on correct PIN', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_A }, [await makeEntry()], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        pin: '1234',
+      })
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'granted', role: 'user' })
+    })
+
+    it('denies on wrong PIN', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'npub', npub: NPUB_A }, [await makeEntry()], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        pin: '9999',
+      })
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'denied', reason: 'incorrect PIN' })
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('challenge credential (v2 seam)', () => {
+    it('is not yet authorized', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'challenge', pubkey: HEX_A, nonce: 'n', sig: 's' }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      expect(out.status).toBe('denied')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('boltcard credential (tap-to-enter)', () => {
+    it('open-enrollment grants any card as user', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'boltcard', externalId: 'abc123' }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'granted', role: 'user' })
+    })
+
+    it('rejects a card with no external_id', async () => {
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'boltcard', externalId: '' }, [], {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: true,
+      })
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'denied', reason: 'not a valid card' })
+    })
+
+    it('allow-list matches by external_id hash', async () => {
+      const idHash = await hashId('abc123', SALT)
+      const list: AllowListEntry[] = [{ idHash, role: 'operator' }]
+      const out = await authorize({ kind: 'boltcard', externalId: 'abc123' }, list, {
+        salt: SALT,
+        openEnrollment: false,
+      })
+      expect(out).toMatchObject({ status: 'granted', role: 'operator' })
+    })
+  })
+})
+
+describe('parseBoltcardLnurlw', () => {
+  it('extracts external_id from a tapped lnurlw', () => {
+    expect(
+      parseBoltcardLnurlw('lnurlw://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/scan/abc123?p=DEAD&c=BEEF')
+    ).toEqual({ externalId: 'abc123' })
+  })
+  it('strips a lightning: prefix and accepts https', () => {
+    expect(parseBoltcardLnurlw('lightning:lnurlw://h/boltcards/api/v1/scan/xyz?p=1')).toEqual({
+      externalId: 'xyz',
+    })
+    expect(parseBoltcardLnurlw('https://h/boltcards/api/v1/scan/xyz?p=1')).toEqual({
+      externalId: 'xyz',
+    })
+  })
+  it('returns null for non-card / malformed input', () => {
+    expect(parseBoltcardLnurlw('https://h/something/else')).toBeNull()
+    expect(parseBoltcardLnurlw('not a url')).toBeNull()
+    expect(parseBoltcardLnurlw('')).toBeNull()
+  })
+})

apps/machine/src/services/access/authorize.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/**
+ * Credential authorization (ADR-003).
+ *
+ * Decides whether a presented credential may unlock the terminal. Matching is
+ * against a local allow-list of salted identity hashes, optionally behind a
+ * PIN second factor; `openEnrollment` admits any well-formed credential when
+ * the allow-list has no match (the current posture — see the ADR amendment:
+ * with it on, the gate is a convenience, not a security boundary). Only
+ * salted hashes are compared, stored or logged — never the raw id (KYC-free).
+ *
+ * Identity id per scan kind:
+ *   - boltcard  → the card's boltcards `external_id` (parsed locally from the
+ *                 lnurlw; the SUN p/c are NOT verified here — that happens at
+ *                 payment time, where the voucher is actually spent)
+ *   - npub      → hex pubkey (decoded, canonical)
+ *   - challenge → v2 seam, not yet authorized
+ */
+
+import { decode as nip19Decode } from 'nostr-tools/nip19'
+import type { AccessRole } from '@bitSpire/state-machine'
+import type { AccessScan } from './types'
+
+/** One authorized identity. `idHash` = hashId(<canonical id>, salt). */
+export interface AllowListEntry {
+  idHash: string
+  role: AccessRole
+  /** When set, access requires this PIN (hashPin(pin, salt)) as a 2nd factor. */
+  pinHash?: string
+  /** Optional operator-facing label (never a person's real identity). */
+  label?: string
+}
+
+export interface AuthorizeOptions {
+  /** Per-machine salt for all hashing. */
+  salt: string
+  /** Admit any valid credential when the allow-list has no match (prototype). */
+  openEnrollment?: boolean
+  /** PIN supplied on the follow-up call after a `pin-required` outcome. */
+  pin?: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * Three outcomes, so the caller can drive a two-step flow:
+ *  - `granted`      → send ACCESS_GRANTED
+ *  - `pin-required` → prompt for a PIN, then call authorize() again with `pin`
+ *  - `denied`       → send ACCESS_DENIED(reason)
+ */
+export type AuthorizeOutcome =
+  | { status: 'granted'; role: AccessRole; credentialIdHash: string }
+  | { status: 'pin-required'; credentialIdHash: string }
+  | { status: 'denied'; credentialIdHash: string; reason: string }
+
+/** Salted SHA-256, hex-encoded. */
+async function sha256Hex(input: string): Promise<string> {
+  const data = new TextEncoder().encode(input)
+  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data)
+  return [...new Uint8Array(digest)].map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
+}
+
+export const hashId = (id: string, salt: string): Promise<string> => sha256Hex(`id:${salt}:${id}`)
+export const hashPin = (pin: string, salt: string): Promise<string> =>
+  sha256Hex(`pin:${salt}:${pin}`)
+
+/**
+ * Resolve a scan to a canonical identity string, or `null` if malformed.
+ * npub is decoded to its hex pubkey so npub/hex forms compare equal and a
+ * stray (non-npub) string is rejected.
+ */
+function canonicalId(scan: AccessScan): string | null {
+  if (scan.kind === 'boltcard') return scan.externalId || null
+  if (scan.kind === 'challenge') return null // v2 — handled separately
+  // Tolerate real-world nostr QR shapes: a bare `npub1…`, a `nostr:` URI
+  // prefix, and `nprofile1…` (npub + relay hints, what many clients export).
+  const raw = scan.npub.trim().replace(/^nostr:/i, '')
+  try {
+    const decoded = nip19Decode(raw)
+    if (decoded.type === 'npub' && typeof decoded.data === 'string') {
+      return decoded.data
+    }
+    if (
+      decoded.type === 'nprofile' &&
+      decoded.data &&
+      typeof (decoded.data as { pubkey?: unknown }).pubkey === 'string'
+    ) {
+      return (decoded.data as { pubkey: string }).pubkey
+    }
+    return null
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide whether a scanned credential is authorized.
+ * Always resolves (never throws) so the caller can uniformly react.
+ */
+export async function authorize(
+  scan: AccessScan,
+  allowList: AllowListEntry[],
+  opts: AuthorizeOptions
+): Promise<AuthorizeOutcome> {
+  if (scan.kind === 'challenge') {
+    return {
+      status: 'denied',
+      credentialIdHash: '',
+      reason: 'challenge-response credentials not yet supported',
+    }
+  }
+
+  const id = canonicalId(scan)
+  if (!id) {
+    return {
+      status: 'denied',
+      credentialIdHash: '',
+      reason:
+        scan.kind === 'npub'
+          ? 'not a valid npub'
+          : scan.kind === 'boltcard'
+            ? 'not a valid card'
+            : 'invalid credential',
+    }
+  }
+
+  const credentialIdHash = await hashId(id, opts.salt)
+  const entry = allowList.find((e) => e.idHash === credentialIdHash)
+
+  if (!entry) {
+    if (opts.openEnrollment) {
+      return { status: 'granted', role: 'user', credentialIdHash }
+    }
+    return { status: 'denied', credentialIdHash, reason: 'not authorized' }
+  }
+
+  // No PIN configured → single-factor grant.
+  if (!entry.pinHash) {
+    return { status: 'granted', role: entry.role, credentialIdHash }
+  }
+
+  // PIN configured but not yet supplied → ask for it.
+  if (opts.pin === undefined) {
+    return { status: 'pin-required', credentialIdHash }
+  }
+
+  // PIN supplied → verify.
+  const pinHash = await hashPin(opts.pin, opts.salt)
+  if (pinHash !== entry.pinHash) {
+    return { status: 'denied', credentialIdHash, reason: 'incorrect PIN' }
+  }
+  return { status: 'granted', role: entry.role, credentialIdHash }
+}

apps/machine/src/services/access/boltcard.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/**
+ * Bolt Card lnurlw parsing for the access gate (ADR-003).
+ *
+ * The tap-to-enter flow reads a Bolt Card's `lnurlw://…/scan/<external_id>?p=&c=`
+ * voucher and needs the `external_id` for the session identity — WITHOUT hitting
+ * the server (that would burn the single-use SUN p/c we want to reuse at
+ * Complete). So this is a purely local parse: extract the id from the URL path;
+ * the p/c ride along in the stored lnurlw and are only spent at payment time.
+ */
+
+/** Extract a Bolt Card's `external_id` from its tapped lnurlw. Null if not one. */
+export function parseBoltcardLnurlw(lnurlw: string): { externalId: string } | null {
+  let s = lnurlw.trim()
+  if (!s) return null
+  if (s.toLowerCase().startsWith('lightning:')) s = s.slice('lightning:'.length)
+  const https = s.replace(/^lnurlw:\/\//i, 'https://').replace(/^lnurl:\/\//i, 'https://')
+  if (!/^https:\/\//i.test(https)) return null
+  try {
+    const u = new URL(https)
+    // …/boltcards/api/v1/scan/<external_id>
+    const m = u.pathname.match(/\/scan\/([^/?#]+)/)
+    if (!m || !m[1]) return null
+    return { externalId: decodeURIComponent(m[1]) }
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}

apps/machine/src/services/access/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/**
+ * Access-control module surface (ADR-003).
+ *
+ * Credential capture is NOT here: the reader is the main-process NFC service
+ * (`electron/nfc-service.ts`, over the `nfc:card-tapped` IPC), and the store
+ * turns a tapped lnurlw into a `boltcard` scan. This module only decides —
+ * parse the card, hash the identity, match the allow-list.
+ */
+
+export type { AccessScan, AccessRole } from './types'
+export { authorize, hashId, hashPin } from './authorize'
+export type { AllowListEntry, AuthorizeOptions, AuthorizeOutcome } from './authorize'
+export { parseBoltcardLnurlw } from './boltcard'

apps/machine/src/services/access/types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/**
+ * Access-control credential types (ADR-003).
+ *
+ * A credential is captured elsewhere — for Bolt Cards by the main-process NFC
+ * reader (`electron/nfc-service.ts`), which hands the tapped lnurlw to the
+ * store over IPC — and arrives here as a RAW `AccessScan`. Hashing and
+ * authorization (and the optional PIN second factor) happen in `authorize.ts`,
+ * so raw ids never leave this layer (KYC-free).
+ */
+
+import type { AccessRole } from '@bitSpire/state-machine'
+
+export type { AccessRole }
+
+/**
+ * A raw credential. Discriminated union so new factors are additive:
+ *   - `boltcard`  — what ships: a tapped Bolt Card, already verified by the
+ *                   card server's `/session` (the tap's SUN was spent there).
+ *                   `externalId` is the identity as the server returned it;
+ *                   it is the only thing hashed/authorized. The session's
+ *                   payment steps stay in the store, never in this layer.
+ *   - `npub`      — a Nostr pubkey (bare npub, `nostr:` URI or nprofile).
+ *                   No reader emits it today; kept, with the PIN second
+ *                   factor, for a future non-card credential.
+ *   - `challenge` — card-signed nonce, challenge-response. v2 seam; not yet
+ *                   authorized.
+ */
+export type AccessScan =
+  | { kind: 'boltcard'; externalId: string }
+  | { kind: 'npub'; npub: string }
+  | { kind: 'challenge'; pubkey: string; nonce: string; sig: string }

apps/machine/src/services/hal.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
  */
 
 import type { ATMServices } from '@bitSpire/state-machine'
+import { formatBays } from '@/lib/utils'
 
 export interface CassetteConfig {
   denomination: number
@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ export async function initializeHalServices(config: HalConfig): Promise<HalServi
 
   const atmServices: Pick<ATMServices, 'dispenseCash' | 'getInventory'> = {
     dispenseCash: async (amounts) => {
-      console.log('[HAL] Dispensing:', amounts)
+      console.log(`[HAL] Dispensing: ${formatBays(amounts)}`)
 
       // Re-initialize dispenser if it was closed after a previous error
       if (!dispenser.initialized) {

apps/machine/src/services/lightning.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import type { ATMServices, ATMContext } from '@bitSpire/state-machine'
 
 // Import Electron types
 import type {} from '@/types/electron'
+import { formatBays, formatInventory } from '@/lib/utils'
 
 // Check if we're running in Electron (electronAPI is exposed via preload)
 const isElectron = typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.electronAPI !== undefined
@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ export interface LightningBackend {
   }): Promise<{ paymentRequest: string; paymentHash?: string }>
   payInvoice(
     bolt11: string,
-    amountSats: number,
+    amountSats: number
   ): Promise<{ success: boolean; preimage?: string; error?: string }>
 }
 
@@ -434,12 +435,12 @@ export async function initializeLightningServices(options?: {
   console.log(
     '[Lightning] Relay(s):',
     relays.join(', '),
-    envRelay ? '(env)' : transport?.relays.length ? '(pairing)' : '(default)',
+    envRelay ? '(env)' : transport?.relays.length ? '(pairing)' : '(default)'
   )
   console.log(
     '[Lightning] LNbits server pubkey:',
     CONFIG.lnbitsServerPubkey || '(not configured)',
-    envPubkey ? '(env)' : transport?.lnbitsServerPubkey ? '(pairing)' : '',
+    envPubkey ? '(env)' : transport?.lnbitsServerPubkey ? '(pairing)' : ''
   )
   // Operator pubkey provenance. Today the ONLY source is VITE_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS
   // (env). An empty set disables the fees/operator-config services → the machine
@@ -449,7 +450,7 @@ export async function initializeLightningServices(options?: {
     '[Lightning] Operator pubkey(s):',
     CONFIG.operatorPubkeys.length
       ? CONFIG.operatorPubkeys.join(', ') + ' (env)'
-      : '(none — fee/operator config gated until a server-delivered operator pubkey; #70 P1)',
+      : '(none — fee/operator config gated until a server-delivered operator pubkey; #70 P1)'
   )
 
   // Strict mode: validate the RESOLVED config is production-ready (no
@@ -473,7 +474,7 @@ export async function initializeLightningServices(options?: {
   if (!CONFIG.lnbitsServerPubkey) {
     throw new Error(
       '[Lightning] LNbits server pubkey is required — set VITE_LNBITS_SERVER_PUBKEY ' +
-        'or pair with a seed that carries lnbits_npub (aiolabs/bitspire#70).',
+        'or pair with a seed that carries lnbits_npub (aiolabs/bitspire#70).'
     )
   }
 
@@ -542,7 +543,11 @@ export async function initializeLightningServices(options?: {
       const mc = await lnbits.getMachineConfig()
       if (mc.operator_pubkey) {
         CONFIG.operatorPubkeys = [mc.operator_pubkey]
-        console.log('[Lightning] Operator pubkey(s):', mc.operator_pubkey, '(server-delivered, #70 P1)')
+        console.log(
+          '[Lightning] Operator pubkey(s):',
+          mc.operator_pubkey,
+          '(server-delivered, #70 P1)'
+        )
       }
       if (mc.fee_config && isElectron && window.electronAPI) {
         // Persist the server-delivered fee config so atm.ts's awaiting-fees gate
@@ -555,17 +560,17 @@ export async function initializeLightningServices(options?: {
             cashOutFeeFraction: mc.fee_config.cash_out_fee_fraction,
             schemaVersion: mc.fee_config.schema_version,
           },
-          mc.created_at,
+          mc.created_at
         )
         console.log(
           '[Lightning] Server-delivered fee config:',
-          applied.applied ? 'applied' : `skipped (${applied.reason})`,
+          applied.applied ? 'applied' : `skipped (${applied.reason})`
         )
       }
     } catch (e) {
       console.warn(
         '[Lightning] get_machine_config unavailable; falling back to env/kind-30078 for operator config:',
-        (e as Error).message,
+        (e as Error).message
       )
     }
   }
@@ -671,7 +676,7 @@ export async function initializeLightningServices(options?: {
       }
     },
     lnbits,
-    lnbitsWalletId,
+    lnbitsWalletId
   )
 
   return {
@@ -706,13 +711,142 @@ export async function initializeLightningServices(options?: {
 /**
  * Create ATMServices implementation using the LNbits nostr-transport.
  */
-function createATMServices(
+export function createATMServices(
   onPaymentSuccess: (preimage: string) => void,
   lnbits: LnbitsClient,
-  lnbitsWalletId: string,
+  lnbitsWalletId: string
 ): ATMServices {
   const onPaymentCallback = onPaymentSuccess
 
+  // ── Cash-out settlement watch ───────────────────────────────────────────
+  /**
+   * A watch on one cash-out invoice, armed the moment the invoice exists and
+   * consumed later by the state machine's `displayingInvoice` actor.
+   *
+   * Arming at creation rather than at display closes a race that swallowed
+   * real payments on 2026-09-22 (sintra). Subscribing costs a nostr round
+   * trip — about four seconds against a remote relay — while a one-tap Bolt
+   * Card Complete settles in roughly one. The settlement push is an ephemeral
+   * event with no replay, so it fired before anything was listening and the
+   * machine sat on a paid invoice until it timed out, taking the sats without
+   * dispensing. The old two-tap flow only worked because fumbling with the
+   * card covered the gap.
+   *
+   * Three defences, in order: the invoice is not returned until its watch is
+   * armed; a settlement that still beats the UI is latched and replayed when
+   * the consumer attaches; and a poll runs alongside the subscription so a
+   * lost or unsent push cannot strand a payment either way.
+   */
+  interface InvoiceWatch {
+    paymentHash: string
+    subId: string | null
+    /** Preimage seen before a consumer attached; replayed on attach. */
+    settled: string | null
+    consumer: ((preimage: string) => void) | null
+    poll: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null
+    released: boolean
+  }
+  const invoiceWatches = new Map<string, InvoiceWatch>()
+
+  // Backstop cadence. One cheap RPC; on the money path a little extra relay
+  // traffic is worth far more than a payment that lands with no cash.
+  const SETTLEMENT_POLL_MS = 6_000
+
+  function stopInvoiceWatchPoll(watch: InvoiceWatch): void {
+    if (watch.poll) {
+      clearInterval(watch.poll)
+      watch.poll = null
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** Deliver a settlement exactly once, to the consumer or into the latch. */
+  function settleInvoiceWatch(watch: InvoiceWatch, preimage: string, via: string): void {
+    if (watch.released || watch.settled) return
+    watch.settled = preimage
+    stopInvoiceWatchPoll(watch)
+    console.log(`[ATM Service] Invoice paid (${via})!`)
+    watch.consumer?.(preimage)
+  }
+
+  function startInvoiceWatchPoll(watch: InvoiceWatch): void {
+    let inFlight = false
+    watch.poll = setInterval(() => {
+      if (inFlight || watch.settled || watch.released) return
+      inFlight = true
+      void lnbits
+        .getPayment(watch.paymentHash)
+        .then((payment) => {
+          if (payment?.status === 'success') {
+            settleInvoiceWatch(watch, payment.preimage ?? 'payment-confirmed', 'poll')
+          }
+        })
+        .catch(() => {
+          /* transport blip — the next tick retries */
+        })
+        .finally(() => {
+          inFlight = false
+        })
+    }, SETTLEMENT_POLL_MS)
+  }
+
+  /** Arm the watch for a freshly created invoice. Resolves once it is live. */
+  async function armInvoiceWatch(bolt11: string, paymentHash: string): Promise<void> {
+    const startedAt = Date.now()
+    const watch: InvoiceWatch = {
+      paymentHash,
+      subId: null,
+      settled: null,
+      consumer: null,
+      poll: null,
+      released: false,
+    }
+    invoiceWatches.set(bolt11, watch)
+    try {
+      // walletId omitted: payment_hash is the natural primary key for "wait
+      // for THIS invoice to settle." Under path B
+      // (NOSTR_TRANSPORT_ROSTER_REQUIRED=true) lnbits routes the payment to
+      // the operator's wallet, so a subscription scoped to the ATM's
+      // pre-override wallet_id would AND-filter the settlement out and never
+      // fire. With wallet_id omitted, lnbits resolves the wallet from
+      // get_standalone_payment(payment_hash) and ownership-checks against the
+      // auth'd account — works on both pre/post-override wallets.
+      // Coordination log 2026-05-31T18:50Z (lnbits) for the confirmation,
+      // §18:35Z for the joint smoke that surfaced the bug.
+      watch.subId = await lnbits.subscribePayments(
+        undefined,
+        { payment_hash: paymentHash, max_seconds: 600 },
+        (push) => {
+          if (push.payment_hash !== paymentHash || push.status !== 'success') return
+          settleInvoiceWatch(watch, push.preimage ?? 'payment-confirmed', 'LNbits push')
+        },
+        (reason) => console.log(`[ATM Service] Settlement subscription closed (${reason})`)
+      )
+      console.log(
+        `[ATM Service] Settlement watch armed in ${Date.now() - startedAt} ms ` +
+          `(hash ${paymentHash.slice(0, 12)}…)`
+      )
+    } catch (e) {
+      // The poll below then carries settlement on its own, which is exactly
+      // why it runs whether or not the subscription came up.
+      console.error('[ATM Service] Settlement subscribe failed — polling only:', e)
+    }
+    startInvoiceWatchPoll(watch)
+  }
+
+  /** Tear a watch down: the transaction ended, one way or another. */
+  function releaseInvoiceWatch(bolt11: string): void {
+    const watch = invoiceWatches.get(bolt11)
+    if (!watch) return
+    watch.released = true
+    watch.consumer = null
+    stopInvoiceWatchPoll(watch)
+    invoiceWatches.delete(bolt11)
+    if (watch.subId) {
+      // wallet_id omitted to match the subscribePayments call above.
+      void lnbits.unsubscribe(undefined, watch.subId).catch(() => {})
+    }
+  }
+
   return {
     /**
      * 3b.4: ndebit cash-in path removed. CashInView.vue ignores this
@@ -806,7 +940,7 @@ function createATMServices(
               if (onPaymentCallback) {
                 onPaymentCallback(push.preimage ?? `lnurl-withdraw-${link.link_id}`)
               }
-            },
+            }
           )
           // Wire per-session cleanup so abort/expiry tears it down cleanly.
           const session = lnurlSessions.get(link.link_id)
@@ -849,15 +983,14 @@ function createATMServices(
      *                                            matches machine fiat_code
      *   - `type: "cash_out"` / `source: "bitspire"` — discriminators
      */
+    // (see armInvoiceWatch below — the watch is armed before this resolves)
     generateInvoice: async (context: ATMContext): Promise<string> => {
       const amountSats = context.satsAmount
       // Cash-out: satsAmount = principal + commission. principal is
       // derived from the raw market rate (no commission baked in) so a
       // consumer can independently audit the split.
       const principalSats =
-        context.exchangeRate > 0
-          ? Math.floor((context.fiatCents / 100) * context.exchangeRate)
-          : 0
+        context.exchangeRate > 0 ? Math.floor((context.fiatCents / 100) * context.exchangeRate) : 0
       const feeSats = Math.max(0, amountSats - principalSats)
       console.log(
         '[ATM Service] Generating invoice — gross',
@@ -897,6 +1030,17 @@ function createATMServices(
       if (!payment.payment_request) {
         throw new Error('LNbits createInvoice returned empty payment_request')
       }
+      // Arm the settlement watch BEFORE the invoice reaches the screen, and
+      // take the payment hash from the response we already have rather than
+      // spending a round trip decoding it back off the bolt11. See
+      // armInvoiceWatch for why the timing matters.
+      if (payment.payment_hash) {
+        await armInvoiceWatch(payment.payment_request, payment.payment_hash)
+      } else {
+        console.error(
+          '[ATM Service] createInvoice returned no payment_hash — settlement watch will arm late'
+        )
+      }
       return payment.payment_request
     },
 
@@ -949,7 +1093,7 @@ function createATMServices(
      * Dispense cash (mock for development)
      */
     dispenseCash: async (amounts) => {
-      console.log('[ATM Service] Dispensing cash:', amounts)
+      console.log(`[ATM Service] Dispensing cash: ${formatBays(amounts)}`)
 
       // In production, this would interface with the Rust HAL
       // For now, simulate dispense delay
@@ -1063,15 +1207,30 @@ function createATMServices(
      * push, filtered by payment_hash. Returns a cleanup function.
      */
     watchInvoice: (invoice: string, callback: (preimage: string) => void): (() => void) => {
-      console.log('[ATM Service] Watching invoice for payment:', invoice.slice(0, 32) + '...')
-
       if (!invoice.toLowerCase().startsWith('ln')) {
         console.error('[ATM Service] Invalid invoice format - expected BOLT11')
         return () => {}
       }
+      console.log('[ATM Service] Watching invoice for payment:', invoice.slice(0, 32) + '...')
 
+      const armed = invoiceWatches.get(invoice)
+      if (armed) {
+        armed.consumer = callback
+        // Settled between arming and display (a one-tap card pull can beat the
+        // state transition): replay the latched settlement instead of waiting
+        // on a push that has already come and gone.
+        if (armed.settled) {
+          const preimage = armed.settled
+          queueMicrotask(() => callback(preimage))
+        }
+        return () => releaseInvoiceWatch(invoice)
+      }
+
+      // No armed watch: an invoice this service didn't create. Recover the
+      // hash over the wire and arm now. This is the pre-2026-09-22 behaviour
+      // and carries the race that arming-at-creation fixes, so say so.
+      console.warn('[ATM Service] No armed settlement watch for this invoice — arming late')
       let cancelled = false
-      let subId: string | null = null
       ;(async () => {
         try {
           const decoded = await lnbits.decodePayment(invoice)
@@ -1081,36 +1240,18 @@ function createATMServices(
             return
           }
           if (cancelled) return
-          // walletId omitted: payment_hash is the natural primary key for
-          // "wait for THIS invoice to settle." Under path B
-          // (NOSTR_TRANSPORT_ROSTER_REQUIRED=true) lnbits routes the payment
-          // to the operator's wallet, so a subscription scoped to the ATM's
-          // pre-override wallet_id would AND-filter the settlement out and
-          // never fire. With wallet_id omitted, lnbits resolves the wallet
-          // from get_standalone_payment(payment_hash) and ownership-checks
-          // against the auth'd account — works on both pre/post-override
-          // wallets. Coordination log 2026-05-31T18:50Z (lnbits) for the
-          // confirmation, §18:35Z for the joint smoke that surfaced the bug.
-          subId = await lnbits.subscribePayments(
-            undefined,
-            { payment_hash: paymentHash, max_seconds: 600 },
-            (push) => {
-              if (push.payment_hash !== paymentHash) return
-              if (push.status !== 'success') return
-              console.log('[ATM Service] Invoice paid (LNbits push)!')
-              callback(push.preimage ?? 'payment-confirmed')
-            },
-          )
+          await armInvoiceWatch(invoice, paymentHash)
+          const late = invoiceWatches.get(invoice)
+          if (!late || cancelled) return
+          late.consumer = callback
+          if (late.settled) callback(late.settled)
         } catch (e) {
           console.error('[ATM Service] LNbits watchInvoice failed:', e)
         }
       })()
       return () => {
         cancelled = true
-        if (subId) {
-          // wallet_id omitted to match the subscribePayments call above.
-          void lnbits.unsubscribe(undefined, subId).catch(() => {})
-        }
+        releaseInvoiceWatch(invoice)
       }
     },
 
@@ -1129,7 +1270,7 @@ function createATMServices(
         20: 50, // 50 x $20 bills = $1000 capacity
       }
 
-      console.log('[ATM Service] Inventory:', inventory)
+      console.log(`[ATM Service] Inventory: ${formatInventory(inventory)}`)
       return inventory
     },
   }

apps/machine/src/services/operator-config.ts

@@ -1,25 +1,32 @@
 /**
- * Operator-config consumer (aiolabs/lamassu-next#56).
+ * Operator-config consumer (aiolabs/lamassu-next#56, v2 per bitspire ADR-004).
  *
  * Subscribes to operator-published kind-30078 events carrying cassette
- * config updates, validates + applies them to state.db, and hot-reloads
- * the HAL dispenser. Also publishes a one-shot ATM-state hello-event on
- * first boot so the operator dashboard (satmachineadmin) can auto-populate
- * `cassette_configs` rows for this machine.
+ * OPERATIONS — a refill, an empty, a recount, a denomination change —
+ * applies the ones it has not already seen, and hot-reloads the HAL
+ * dispenser. It also publishes this machine's cassette state, which is
+ * what populates the operator dashboard's bay rows.
+ *
+ * The operator used to publish absolute counts and this machine applied them
+ * outright. Both sides wrote the same value over a transport that never tells
+ * a writer it lost: a dashboard form loaded before a dispense silently
+ * discarded that dispense, and neither side could detect it. This machine now
+ * owns the count — it holds the notes — and the operator says what it did.
  *
  * Architecture (see ~/dev/coordination/log.md entries on 2026-05-30):
  *
  * - Operator → ATM: `kind=30078`, `["d", "bitspire-cassettes:<machine_id>"]`,
  *   `["p", <atm_npub>]`, NIP-44 v2 encrypted content, author = operator pubkey
- * - ATM bootstrap: `kind=30078`, `["d", "bitspire-cassettes-state:<machine_id>"]`,
+ * - ATM state:     `kind=30078`, `["d", "bitspire-cassettes-state:<machine_id>"]`,
  *   `["p", <operator_pubkey>]`, NIP-44 v2 encrypted content, author = ATM pubkey
  *
  * The ATM's hex pubkey serves as `<machine_id>` — globally unique, no
  * extra provisioning step required.
  *
- * v1 only publishes the one-shot bootstrap hello-event. The continuous
- * ATM-state reverse channel (publish on every count change + heartbeat)
- * is v2 territory.
+ * The ATM publishes its state on startup, after every change to the bays, and
+ * on a heartbeat. It was once a single hello-event gated on a one-shot flag,
+ * which left the operator validating against a layout the machine no longer
+ * had (#94), and left a dispense published during a relay outage lost for good.
  */
 
 import {
@@ -34,9 +41,36 @@ import type {} from '@/types/electron'
 
 const KIND_NIP78 = 30078
 
+/** The wire schema this machine speaks. Operations, not counts (ADR-004). */
+const CASSETTE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2
+
+/** One operator-authored operation, as it arrives on the wire. */
+type CassetteOp = {
+  id: string
+  at: number
+  type: 'refill' | 'empty' | 'recount' | 'set_denomination'
+  position: number
+  bills?: number
+  count?: number
+  denomination?: number
+}
+
 /** Accept operator events stamped up to this many seconds in the future. */
 const MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_S = 60
 
+/**
+ * Republish the cassette state on this interval even when nothing changed.
+ *
+ * A publish is a single fire-and-forget event with no retry: if the relay is
+ * unreachable at the moment of a dispense, that update is simply gone and the
+ * operator's view stays wrong until the next customer happens to buy cash. A
+ * relay also acknowledges an event it then discards, so a publish that returns
+ * cleanly is not proof of anything. The heartbeat is what makes the channel
+ * self-healing, and it is also the only way an out-of-band edit to the table
+ * (atm-tui, direct SQL) ever reaches the operator.
+ */
+const STATE_HEARTBEAT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000
+
 const operatorConfigDTag = (machineId: string) => `bitspire-cassettes:${machineId}`
 const atmStateDTag = (machineId: string) => `bitspire-cassettes-state:${machineId}`
 
@@ -45,7 +79,7 @@ const isElectron = typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.electronAPI !== undef
 export interface OperatorConfigServiceConfig {
   /** Connected NostrClient — shared with the Lightning service. */
   nostrClient: NostrClient
-  /** Signer for the ATM identity. Decrypts operator events + signs the bootstrap. */
+  /** Signer for the ATM identity. Decrypts operator events + signs our state. */
   signer: Signer
   /** Operator pubkeys (hex) authorized to publish cassette config. From VITE_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS. */
   operatorPubkeys: string[]
@@ -83,12 +117,15 @@ export async function startOperatorConfigService(
   const api = window.electronAPI
   const machineId = cfg.machineId ?? cfg.signer.pubkey
 
-  // Bootstrap hello-event on first boot (best-effort — failure leaves the
-  // gate null so the next boot retries).
+  // Announce current state on every start. This used to be gated on a
+  // one-shot "have we said hello" flag, so any later change to the layout —
+  // a reseed, an atm-tui edit, direct SQL — was never published and the
+  // operator's dashboard kept validating against a bay set that no longer
+  // existed (#94). Best-effort; the heartbeat below is the safety net.
   try {
-    await maybePublishBootstrap(cfg, api, machineId)
+    await publishCassettesState(cfg, api, machineId)
   } catch (err) {
-    console.warn('[OperatorConfig] Bootstrap publish failed (will retry next boot):', err)
+    console.warn('[OperatorConfig] Startup cassettes-state publish failed:', err)
   }
 
   // Subscribe to operator-published cassette config events.
@@ -110,10 +147,19 @@ export async function startOperatorConfigService(
       },
     }
   )
-  console.log('[OperatorConfig] Subscribed:', { dTag, subscriptionId })
+  console.log(`[OperatorConfig] Subscribed: d=${dTag} sub=${subscriptionId}`)
+
+  const heartbeat = setInterval(() => {
+    publishCassettesState(cfg, api, machineId).catch((err) =>
+      console.warn('[OperatorConfig] cassettes-state heartbeat failed:', err)
+    )
+  }, STATE_HEARTBEAT_MS)
 
   return {
-    stop: () => cfg.nostrClient.unsubscribe(subscriptionId),
+    stop: () => {
+      clearInterval(heartbeat)
+      cfg.nostrClient.unsubscribe(subscriptionId)
+    },
     publishCassettesState: () =>
       publishCassettesState(cfg, api, machineId)
         .then(() => {})
@@ -139,17 +185,13 @@ async function handleOperatorConfigEvent(
     return
   }
 
-  // 2. Replay protection — drop stale events. NIP-78 replaceable events
-  //    DO get re-delivered on reconnect/restart; without this check, the
-  //    ATM would re-apply the same payload on every boot and clobber any
-  //    cash-out decrements that landed between operator publishes.
-  const watermark = await api.getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt()
-  if (event.created_at <= watermark) {
-    console.log(
-      `[OperatorConfig] Stale event dropped (created_at=${event.created_at} <= watermark=${watermark})`
-    )
-    return
-  }
+  // 2. There is deliberately no `created_at` watermark here any more.
+  //    Under absolute counts it was the only replay defence, and it cost us:
+  //    an event re-delivered out of order was dropped whole, operations
+  //    included. Idempotency now rides on the operations themselves — the
+  //    operator mints an id per op and this machine records the ones it
+  //    applied — which is strictly stronger, because it survives an event
+  //    that mixes operations we have seen with ones we have not.
 
   // 3. Clock-skew defense — reject events stamped too far in the future.
   //    Limits damage from a leaked operator nsec future-stamping a fake
@@ -163,7 +205,7 @@ async function handleOperatorConfigEvent(
   }
 
   // 4. Decrypt content (NIP-44 v2).
-  let parsed: { positions: Record<string, { denomination: number; count: number }> }
+  let parsed: { schema_version?: number; ops?: unknown }
   try {
     const plaintext = await cfg.signer.nip44Decrypt(event.pubkey, event.content)
     parsed = JSON.parse(plaintext) as typeof parsed
@@ -171,22 +213,36 @@ async function handleOperatorConfigEvent(
     console.error('[OperatorConfig] Decrypt/parse failed:', err)
     return
   }
-  if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || !parsed.positions) {
-    console.error('[OperatorConfig] Payload missing `positions` field')
+  if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || !Array.isArray(parsed.ops)) {
+    // A v1 operator publishing absolute counts lands here and is ignored.
+    // That direction fails safe: the machine keeps its own counts, which it
+    // is now the only writer of, and simply will not dispense notes it
+    // believes it lacks. The opposite — applying a count from a form loaded
+    // before a dispense — is what ADR-004 exists to stop.
+    console.error('[OperatorConfig] Payload missing `ops` array — dropped')
     return
   }
+  const ops = parsed.ops as CassetteOp[]
 
-  // 5. Atomic apply (cassettes + meta watermark) via IPC. The state-store
-  //    function re-validates watermark + position key-set equality +
-  //    per-entry types inside the SQLite transaction. Duplicate
-  //    denominations across positions are allowed — real machines load
-  //    N cassettes of the same denomination for cash-out throughput.
-  const result = await api.applyOperatorCassettesConfig(
-    { positions: parsed.positions },
-    event.created_at
-  )
-  if (!result.applied) {
-    console.warn('[OperatorConfig] Apply rejected:', result.reason)
+  // 5. Apply the ones we have not seen, in one transaction with the sequence
+  //    bump. No `created_at` watermark: each op carries an operator-minted id
+  //    and the machine records what it applied, so a re-delivered event is a
+  //    no-op on its own merits. The watermark would be strictly weaker and
+  //    actively harmful — an event arriving out of order can still carry an
+  //    operation this machine has never seen.
+  const result = await api.applyOperatorCassetteOps(ops)
+  for (const bad of result.rejected) {
+    console.warn(`[OperatorConfig] Op ${bad.id} rejected: ${bad.reason}`)
+  }
+  if (result.applied.length === 0) {
+    console.log(`[OperatorConfig] No new ops in event ${event.id.slice(0, 12)}…`)
+    // Still republish: the operator learns from our applied_ops echo that
+    // earlier operations landed, and an event carrying nothing new can be the
+    // first one we successfully answer after a relay outage.
+    const machineIdNoop = cfg.machineId ?? cfg.signer.pubkey
+    await publishCassettesState(cfg, api, machineIdNoop).catch((err) =>
+      console.warn('[OperatorConfig] post-apply cassettes-state republish failed:', err)
+    )
     return
   }
 
@@ -194,8 +250,8 @@ async function handleOperatorConfigEvent(
   //    picks up the new per-position mapping. state.db is already updated;
   //    HAL re-init failure means the renderer's persistedInventory may be
   //    ahead of the HAL until next service restart — log loudly but don't
-  //    unwind the state.db apply (the operator wants their config landed;
-  //    HAL can catch up).
+  //    unwind the state.db apply (the operation happened physically; HAL
+  //    can catch up).
   const cassettesAfter = await api.loadCassettes()
   const halResult = await api.halReloadCassettes(
     cassettesAfter.map((c) => ({
@@ -207,9 +263,7 @@ async function handleOperatorConfigEvent(
   if (!halResult.ok) {
     console.error('[OperatorConfig] HAL reload failed:', halResult.error)
   }
-  console.log(
-    `[OperatorConfig] Applied — created_at=${event.created_at}, positions=${Object.keys(parsed.positions).join(',')}`
-  )
+  console.log(`[OperatorConfig] Applied ops: ${result.applied.join(', ')}`)
 
   // Republish our resulting cassette state so the operator's view reflects the
   // applied config (the "on cassette reload" case). Different d-tag from the
@@ -224,11 +278,11 @@ async function handleOperatorConfigEvent(
  * Publish the ATM's current cassette state as a replaceable kind-30078 event
  * (`bitspire-cassettes-state:<machineId>`), NIP-44-encrypted to the operator.
  * Replaceable → latest wins; the operator consumes every update. Call after a
- * dispense and on a cassette reload so the operator view tracks reality, not
- * the frozen bootstrap snapshot (coord 2026-06-21 / lamassu-next#56).
+ * dispense, on a cassette reload, at startup and on a heartbeat, so the
+ * operator view tracks reality (coord 2026-06-21 / lamassu-next#56).
  *
- * NOT gated on the bootstrap flag — this is the live update. Returns whether an
- * event was published (false when there are no cassettes / no operator).
+ * Returns whether an event was published (false when there are no cassettes /
+ * no operator).
  */
 async function publishCassettesState(
   cfg: OperatorConfigServiceConfig,
@@ -244,7 +298,36 @@ async function publishCassettesState(
   for (const c of cassettes) {
     positions[String(c.position)] = { denomination: c.denomination, count: c.count }
   }
-  const ciphertext = await cfg.signer.nip44Encrypt(operatorPubkey, JSON.stringify({ positions }))
+  // Additive field: an operator on the old consumer reads `positions` and
+  // ignores this, so it needs no coordinated release. When set, the counts
+  // above are the machine's best guess, not a measurement.
+  const countsUncertainSince = await api.getCountsUncertainSince()
+
+  // `applied_ops` is the acknowledgement leg. An addressable event gives its
+  // publisher no failure signal — the relay returns OK for an event it then
+  // discards — so echoing the ids back is the only way the operator can tell
+  // an operation that landed from one that was merely sent. `seq` lets a
+  // reader reject a regression without trusting a clock: `created_at` has
+  // second granularity and ties break on event id, so it cannot order two
+  // reports from the same second.
+  const [appliedOps, seq] = await Promise.all([api.getAppliedOpIds(), api.getCassetteStateSeq()])
+  const payload: Record<string, unknown> = {
+    schema_version: CASSETTE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    positions,
+    seq,
+    applied_ops: appliedOps,
+  }
+  if (countsUncertainSince) payload.counts_uncertain_since = countsUncertainSince
+  const ciphertext = await cfg.signer.nip44Encrypt(operatorPubkey, JSON.stringify(payload))
+
+  // Force the stamp strictly above our last one. Addressable events are ordered
+  // by `created_at` at second granularity, ties broken by lowest event id, and
+  // the relay keeps one and silently drops the other while acknowledging both.
+  // So two publishes inside one second would leave the winner decided by a hash,
+  // permanently — and a clock that stepped backwards would make every report
+  // from this machine disappear. Neither failure is visible from here.
+  const lastPublished = (await api.getLastStatePublishedAt()) ?? 0
+  const createdAt = Math.max(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000), lastPublished + 1)
 
   const dTag = atmStateDTag(machineId)
   const event = await createSignedEvent(cfg.signer, {
@@ -254,34 +337,14 @@ async function publishCassettesState(
       ['d', dTag],
       ['p', operatorPubkey],
     ],
-    created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
+    created_at: createdAt,
   })
 
   await cfg.nostrClient.publish(event)
-  console.log('[OperatorConfig] cassettes-state published:', { dTag, eventId: event.id })
+  await api.markStatePublished(createdAt)
+  console.log(
+    `[OperatorConfig] cassettes-state published: id=${event.id.slice(0, 12)}… ` +
+      `created_at=${createdAt} seq=${seq} applied_ops=${appliedOps.length} d=${dTag}`
+  )
   return true
 }
-
-/**
- * First-boot hello: publish the cassette state once and mark the gate. The
- * gate (lamassu-next#56) prevents re-emitting the *bootstrap* on every boot;
- * live updates after dispenses go through `publishCassettesState` directly.
- */
-async function maybePublishBootstrap(
-  cfg: OperatorConfigServiceConfig,
-  api: NonNullable<typeof window.electronAPI>,
-  machineId: string
-): Promise<void> {
-  const already = await api.getBootstrapPublishedAt()
-  if (already !== null) {
-    console.log('[OperatorConfig] Bootstrap already published at unix', already)
-    return
-  }
-  const published = await publishCassettesState(cfg, api, machineId)
-  if (published) {
-    await api.markBootstrapPublished(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000))
-    console.log('[OperatorConfig] Bootstrap hello-event published')
-  } else {
-    console.log('[OperatorConfig] No cassettes/operator — skipping bootstrap')
-  }
-}

apps/machine/src/services/operator-fees.ts

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ export async function startOperatorFeesService(
       },
     }
   )
-  console.log('[Fees] Subscribed:', { dTag, subscriptionId })
+  console.log(`[Fees] Subscribed: d=${dTag} sub=${subscriptionId}`)
 
   return {
     stop: () => cfg.nostrClient.unsubscribe(subscriptionId),

apps/machine/src/services/signer-resolver.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  *  1. A seed is present whose fingerprint differs from the stored binding
  *     (first pair or re-pair) → generate a fresh NIP-46 transport key, redeem
  *     the one-shot connect secret, persist the binding, and reset the
- *     bootstrap gate so the (possibly new) operator gets a hello-event (#56).
+ *     publish watermark so the (possibly new) operator gets current state (#56).
  *  2. A seed is present matching the stored binding, OR no seed but a stored
  *     binding exists → resume the bunker session with the persisted transport
  *     key (no re-redeem — the binding is server-persistent).
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ export async function resolveSigner(opts: ResolveSignerOptions): Promise<Resolve
       if (binding) {
         console.warn(
           '[Signer] Stored spire seed is unparseable; resuming from existing binding:',
-          (err as Error).message,
+          (err as Error).message
         )
         return { signer: await resume(binding), transport: transportFromBinding(binding) }
       }
@@ -150,7 +150,9 @@ export async function resolveSigner(opts: ResolveSignerOptions): Promise<Resolve
       // first pair (no prior binding) has nothing to reset. Cash accounting is
       // preserved — see resetForRepair; a full wipe is the factory-reset path.
       if (binding) {
-        console.log('[Signer] Re-pair (new seed fingerprint) — clearing prior operator config state')
+        console.log(
+          '[Signer] Re-pair (new seed fingerprint) — clearing prior operator config state'
+        )
         await window.electronAPI.resetForRepair()
       }
       // Persist the seed's transport config alongside the binding so a later
@@ -165,7 +167,7 @@ export async function resolveSigner(opts: ResolveSignerOptions): Promise<Resolve
         lnbitsServerPubkey: seed.lnbitsServerPubkey,
       })
       // Re-pair → re-publish the cassette-state hello to the new operator (#56).
-      await window.electronAPI.resetBootstrapGate()
+      await window.electronAPI.resetStatePublishWatermark()
     }
     return { signer, transport: transportFromSeed(seed) }
   }

apps/machine/src/stores/atm.ts

@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@ import {
   type ActorRefFrom,
   type SnapshotFrom,
   type ATMMachine,
+  type AccessRole,
 } from '@bitSpire/state-machine'
+import type { AccessControlConfig, CardSession } from '@/types/electron'
 import { initializeLightningServices, fetchBtcPrice } from '@/services/lightning'
 import { classifyInitError } from '@/services/init-error'
 import { startOperatorConfigService, type OperatorConfigService } from '@/services/operator-config'
 import { startOperatorFeesService, type OperatorFeesService } from '@/services/operator-fees'
+import { formatBays, formatInventory } from '@/lib/utils'
 import type { HalConfig, HalServices } from '@/services/hal'
 import type { MachineModel } from '@/config'
 import type { LightningBackend } from '@/services/lightning'
@@ -25,6 +28,7 @@ import {
 } from '@bitSpire/clink'
 import type { TransactionRecord } from '@/types/state'
 import { useAvailabilityBroadcast } from '@/composables/useAvailabilityBroadcast'
+import { authorize, parseBoltcardLnurlw, type AccessScan } from '@/services/access'
 
 // Check if we're running in Electron
 const isElectron = typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.electronAPI !== undefined
@@ -69,7 +73,13 @@ async function handleManagementCommand(
   request: ManagementRequest,
   dispenseFn: (amounts: { denomination: number; count: number }[]) => Promise<any>,
   machineIdle: boolean,
-  currency: string
+  currency: string,
+  /**
+   * Called once the dispense has been persisted. Bills left the bays whether or
+   * not the dispense completed, so the caller refreshes its inventory and
+   * republishes the operator's view — this path used to do neither.
+   */
+  onCassettesChanged?: () => Promise<void>
 ): Promise<ManagementResponse | null> {
   if (!isMachineDispenseRequest(request)) return null
 
@@ -127,6 +137,7 @@ async function handleManagementCommand(
       cassettes: result.cassettes,
       error: result.error,
     })
+    await onCassettesChanged?.()
 
     // Only remediate the original tx if ALL requested bills were dispensed
     let refRemediated = false
@@ -158,20 +169,24 @@ async function handleManagementCommand(
 }
 
 /**
- * Load inventory from SQLite via IPC (Electron only).
- * Returns empty object in browser dev mode.
+ * Load inventory from SQLite via IPC.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when the DB could not be asked at all — browser dev mode, or
+ * a failed IPC call — so callers can tell "no answer" from an answer of "the
+ * bays are empty". An empty map is a real, actionable reading: cassettes are
+ * configured and drained, or none are configured.
  */
-async function loadInventoryFromDb(): Promise<Record<number, number>> {
+async function loadInventoryFromDb(): Promise<Record<number, number> | null> {
   if (isElectron && window.electronAPI) {
     try {
       const inv = await window.electronAPI.getInventory()
-      console.log('[ATM] Loaded inventory from DB:', inv)
+      console.log(`[ATM] Loaded inventory from DB: ${formatInventory(inv)}`)
       return inv
     } catch (e) {
       console.warn('[ATM] Failed to load inventory from DB:', e)
     }
   }
-  return {}
+  return null
 }
 
 /**
@@ -231,7 +246,7 @@ const mockServices: ATMServices = {
   },
 
   dispenseCash: async (amounts) => {
-    console.log('[Mock] Dispensing cash:', amounts)
+    console.log(`[Mock] Dispensing cash: ${formatBays(amounts)}`)
     await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 2000))
     return {
       bills: amounts.map((a) => ({
@@ -291,6 +306,69 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
   // is in flight (settlement still arrives via the normal invoice watcher).
   const nfcStatus = ref<{ state: string; message?: string } | null>(null)
   const boltCardProcessing = ref(false)
+  // What a tap handler did with the voucher it was given:
+  //   'skipped'  — a guard bounced it before any server call; the SUN p/c are
+  //                untouched and the lnurlw can still be presented later.
+  //   'accepted' — the card's server took the voucher (payment in flight).
+  //   'declined' — presented and refused, or failed after presentation. The
+  //                boltcards server bumps the SUN counter on the first GET, so
+  //                treat the voucher as spent even when the failure was ours.
+  //   'blocked'  — refused BEFORE anything was presented, because the card
+  //                server withheld that step when the session opened (e.g. the
+  //                card's daily limit is already spent). Nothing was consumed
+  //                and no re-tap can lift it, so the session stays loaded.
+  type BoltCardOutcome = 'skipped' | 'accepted' | 'declined' | 'blocked'
+  // Where a Complete gets its voucher: a card tapped right now on the cash
+  // screen (raw lnurlw, spent by this call) or the session opened at entry
+  // (hit-keyed steps, no p/c).
+  type BoltCardSource = { lnurlw: string } | { session: CardSession }
+  // Electron IPC structured-clones its arguments and rejects Vue reactive
+  // proxies with "An object could not be cloned". `loadedBoltCard` is a ref,
+  // so anything reached through it is a proxy — copy the steps field by field
+  // into plain objects before they cross the bridge.
+  const plainWithdrawStep = (w: NonNullable<CardSession['withdraw']>) => ({
+    callback: w.callback,
+    k1: w.k1,
+    minWithdrawable: w.minWithdrawable,
+    maxWithdrawable: w.maxWithdrawable,
+  })
+  const plainPayStep = (p: CardSession['pay']) => ({
+    callback: p.callback,
+    minSendable: p.minSendable,
+    maxSendable: p.maxSendable,
+    metadata: p.metadata,
+  })
+  // Access-control gate config (ADR-003). Defaults disabled → the machine's
+  // `locked` state bypasses straight to `idle` (behaviour identical to no gate).
+  // Populated from RuntimeConfig.accessControl in initializeForProduction.
+  const accessControl = ref<AccessControlConfig>({
+    enabled: false,
+    devUnlock: false,
+    openEnrollment: false,
+    salt: 'bitspire-access-v1',
+    allowList: [],
+  })
+  // Build/dev bypass — opens the gate even when enabled (browser dev / CI).
+  const accessBypassFlag = import.meta.env.VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE === 'true'
+  // Tap-to-enter (ADR-003): the Bolt Card session opened at the locked screen
+  // is held here for the whole visit so buy/sell just need "Complete" — no
+  // second tap. The tap's SUN was spent opening it; what we hold are the
+  // hit-keyed withdraw/pay steps plus balance + fiat for display. Cleared when
+  // the machine re-locks. Never logged.
+  const loadedBoltCard = ref<CardSession | null>(null)
+  // The card balance is hidden by default on the public screen; the holder
+  // reveals it with the eye toggle. Resets on re-lock.
+  const cardBalanceRevealed = ref(false)
+  // Set when a card accepted a cash-out pull and the machine then left the
+  // invoice screen without ever seeing the payment settle. The customer's
+  // wallet paid and no cash came out, so this must be visible and carry the
+  // reference an operator can reconcile against — never a silent return to
+  // the amount screen. Cleared when the next transaction starts.
+  const settlementError = ref<{ txid: string | null; message: string } | null>(null)
+  // When the card server names a currency but didn't price the balance (its
+  // rate cache was cold — it never blocks the unlock on a rate lookup), price
+  // it here from the ATM's own rate source, in that currency.
+  const cardFiatRate = ref<{ currency: string; btcPrice: number } | null>(null)
   const fiatCode = ref('USD')
   // Defaults are 0 — the operator's fee config (received via Nostr
   // kind-30078 `bitspire-fees:<atm_pubkey>` envelope from satmachineadmin)
@@ -380,12 +458,24 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
    */
   const persistedInventory = ref<Record<number, number>>({})
 
+  /**
+   * The bays moved outside the normal cash-out flow — an operator-command
+   * dispense, a main-process seed. Refresh the renderer's view and push the
+   * operator's. Best-effort: a publish failure must not fail the dispense.
+   */
+  async function refreshAndPublishCassettes() {
+    await reloadPersistedInventory()
+    await operatorConfigSvc?.publishCassettesState()
+  }
+
   async function reloadPersistedInventory() {
     const inv = await loadInventoryFromDb()
-    if (Object.keys(inv).length > 0) {
-      persistedInventory.value = inv
-      console.log('[ATM] Persisted inventory updated:', inv)
-    }
+    // Only a failed read is ignored. An empty map used to be skipped too,
+    // which meant the last bill out of the machine never updated anything and
+    // the availability beacon kept advertising a full cassette.
+    if (inv === null) return
+    persistedInventory.value = inv
+    console.log(`[ATM] Persisted inventory updated: ${formatInventory(inv)}`)
   }
 
   /** Detect Bitcoin network from a BOLT-11 invoice prefix (called once, persisted) */
@@ -421,6 +511,34 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
 
   const isIdle = computed(() => currentState.value === 'idle')
 
+  // ADR-003: the machine is sitting at the access gate. When the gate is
+  // disabled this is never true (the `locked` state bypasses to `idle` on
+  // start), so App.vue's LockedView branch never renders on a non-access machine.
+  const isLocked = computed(() => currentState.value === 'locked')
+
+  /**
+   * Fiat view of the loaded card's balance, the way the LNbits wallet page
+   * prices it: the card server's own currency and rate first (the wallet's
+   * currency, else the instance default); when it priced nothing, the ATM's
+   * fiat at its display rate. Null when neither is available.
+   */
+  const loadedCardFiat = computed<{ amount: number; currency: string } | null>(() => {
+    const card = loadedBoltCard.value
+    if (!card) return null
+    if (card.currency && card.fiat !== null) return { amount: card.fiat, currency: card.currency }
+    const rate = cardFiatRate.value
+    if (card.currency && rate && rate.currency === card.currency) {
+      return { amount: (card.balanceSats / 1e8) * rate.btcPrice, currency: card.currency }
+    }
+    if (btcPrice.value && btcPrice.value > 0) {
+      return { amount: (card.balanceSats / 1e8) * btcPrice.value, currency: fiatCode.value }
+    }
+    return null
+  })
+  function toggleCardBalance() {
+    cardBalanceRevealed.value = !cardBalanceRevealed.value
+  }
+
   const isCashIn = computed(() => {
     const state = snapshot.value?.value
     return typeof state === 'object' && 'cashIn' in state
@@ -448,6 +566,8 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
       currency: fiatCode.value,
       cashInFeeFraction: cashInFeeFraction.value,
       cashOutFeeFraction: cashOutFeeFraction.value,
+      accessControlEnabled: accessControl.value.enabled,
+      accessBypassFlag,
     })
     actor.value = createActor(machine)
 
@@ -473,6 +593,14 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
         lnurlCleanupFn()
       }
 
+      // Drop the tapped-at-entry Bolt Card when the session ends (machine
+      // re-locks) so the next customer starts fresh — never carry a card over.
+      if (state === 'locked' && loadedBoltCard.value) {
+        loadedBoltCard.value = null
+        cardBalanceRevealed.value = false
+        cardFiatRate.value = null
+      }
+
       // Detect network from first invoice we see
       if (newSnapshot.context.invoice) {
         detectNetworkFromInvoice(newSnapshot.context.invoice)
@@ -506,6 +634,19 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
             bills = dr.bills
               .filter((b) => b.dispensed > 0)
               .map((b) => ({ denomination: b.denomination, count: b.dispensed }))
+          } else {
+            // The dispenser threw, or the dispense timed out, so there is no
+            // per-bay report. Bills may well have reached the customer, and
+            // nothing knows how many: neither the cassette rows nor HAL's bays
+            // were debited, so both now read high. Record that the counts are
+            // unverified instead of letting a number we know may be wrong go
+            // on being treated as fact.
+            console.error(
+              `[ATM] Dispense ended with no report — bay counts are unverified (txid=${ctx.txid})`
+            )
+            void window.electronAPI
+              ?.markCountsUncertain(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000))
+              .catch((e) => console.warn('[ATM] Could not flag counts unverified:', e))
           }
 
           persistTransaction({
@@ -569,6 +710,26 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
         (prevNestedState === 'displayingInvoice' && currentNested !== 'displayingInvoice') ||
         (prevNestedState === 'displayingQR' && currentNested !== 'displayingQR')
       if (leftBoltCardScreen) {
+        // The card accepted the pull (that's what leaves processing latched
+        // with an 'accepted' status) but we left the invoice screen for
+        // somewhere other than the dispenser: the payment was taken and no
+        // cash followed. Surface it with the txid instead of dropping the
+        // customer back on the amount screen as if nothing had happened.
+        if (
+          prevNestedState === 'displayingInvoice' &&
+          currentNested !== 'dispensingCash' &&
+          boltCardProcessing.value &&
+          nfcStatus.value?.state === 'accepted'
+        ) {
+          const txid = context.value?.txid ?? null
+          console.error(
+            `[ATM] Settlement never confirmed after the card accepted the pull — txid=${txid}`
+          )
+          settlementError.value = {
+            txid,
+            message: 'Your payment was accepted but the cash was not dispensed.',
+          }
+        }
         boltCardProcessing.value = false
         nfcStatus.value = null
       }
@@ -579,6 +740,7 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
     // Start the machine
     actor.value.start()
     setupNfcListener()
+    setupCassettesChangedListener()
     console.log('[ATM] State machine initialized')
   }
 
@@ -590,26 +752,46 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
    * arrives through the invoice watcher → PAYMENT_RECEIVED → dispensingCash;
    * ok here only means the card accepted the pull.
    */
-  async function handleBoltCardTap(lnurlw: string) {
-    if (nestedState.value !== 'displayingInvoice') return
+  async function handleBoltCardTap(source: BoltCardSource): Promise<BoltCardOutcome> {
+    if (nestedState.value !== 'displayingInvoice') return 'skipped'
     const invoice = context.value?.invoice
-    if (!invoice) return
-    if (boltCardProcessing.value) return // one pull at a time
+    if (!invoice) return 'skipped'
+    if (boltCardProcessing.value) return 'skipped' // one pull at a time
+    // The card server withheld the withdraw step when this session opened, so
+    // there is nothing to present. Say why instead of attempting a payment.
+    if ('session' in source && !source.session.withdraw) {
+      nfcStatus.value = {
+        state: 'declined',
+        message: source.session.withdrawBlockedReason ?? 'This card cannot sell right now',
+      }
+      return 'blocked'
+    }
     boltCardProcessing.value = true
     nfcStatus.value = { state: 'processing', message: 'Reading card…' }
     try {
       const amountMsat = (context.value?.satsAmount ?? 0) * 1000
-      const res = await window.electronAPI!.lnurlWithdraw({ lnurlw, bolt11: invoice, amountMsat })
+      const api = window.electronAPI!
+      const res =
+        'session' in source
+          ? await api.withdrawWithSession({
+              // Non-null: a withheld step is pre-flighted above.
+              withdraw: plainWithdrawStep(source.session.withdraw!),
+              bolt11: invoice,
+              amountMsat,
+            })
+          : await api.lnurlWithdraw({ lnurlw: source.lnurlw, bolt11: invoice, amountMsat })
       if (res.ok) {
         nfcStatus.value = { state: 'accepted', message: 'Card accepted — confirming payment…' }
-      } else {
-        boltCardProcessing.value = false
-        nfcStatus.value = { state: 'declined', message: res.reason ?? 'Card declined' }
+        return 'accepted'
       }
+      boltCardProcessing.value = false
+      nfcStatus.value = { state: 'declined', message: res.reason ?? 'Card declined' }
+      return 'declined'
     } catch (e) {
       console.warn('[ATM] Bolt Card withdraw failed:', e)
       boltCardProcessing.value = false
       nfcStatus.value = { state: 'error', message: 'Card payment failed' }
+      return 'declined'
     }
   }
 
@@ -620,51 +802,192 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
    * over the nostr transport via the normal `payInvoice` → PAYMENT_RECEIVED
    * path. Settlement + completion reuse the tested cash-in flow.
    */
-  async function handleBoltCardReceive(lnurlw: string) {
-    if (!(isCashIn.value && nestedState.value === 'displayingQR')) return
+  async function handleBoltCardReceive(source: BoltCardSource): Promise<BoltCardOutcome> {
+    if (!(isCashIn.value && nestedState.value === 'displayingQR')) return 'skipped'
     const amountSats = context.value?.satsAmount ?? 0
-    if (amountSats <= 0) return
-    if (boltCardProcessing.value) return // one at a time
+    if (amountSats <= 0) return 'skipped'
+    if (boltCardProcessing.value) return 'skipped' // one at a time
     boltCardProcessing.value = true
     nfcStatus.value = { state: 'processing', message: 'Reading card…' }
     try {
       const amountMsat = amountSats * 1000
-      const res = await window.electronAPI!.resolveCardInvoice({ lnurlw, amountMsat })
+      const api = window.electronAPI!
+      const res =
+        'session' in source
+          ? await api.resolveSessionInvoice({ pay: plainPayStep(source.session.pay), amountMsat })
+          : await api.resolveCardInvoice({ lnurlw: source.lnurlw, amountMsat })
       if (!res.ok || !res.bolt11) {
         boltCardProcessing.value = false
         nfcStatus.value = { state: 'declined', message: res.reason ?? 'Card could not receive' }
-        return
+        return 'declined'
       }
       nfcStatus.value = { state: 'accepted', message: 'Card found — sending sats…' }
       const paid = await payInvoice(res.bolt11)
       if (!paid) {
         boltCardProcessing.value = false
         nfcStatus.value = { state: 'error', message: paymentError.value ?? 'Payment failed' }
+        return 'declined'
       }
       // On success payInvoice fires PAYMENT_RECEIVED; state leaves displayingQR
       // and the subscribe-cleanup above resets nfcStatus/boltCardProcessing.
+      return 'accepted'
     } catch (e) {
       console.warn('[ATM] Bolt Card receive failed:', e)
       boltCardProcessing.value = false
       nfcStatus.value = { state: 'error', message: 'Card payment failed' }
+      return 'declined'
     }
   }
 
+  /**
+   * A tapped Bolt Card at the locked screen (ADR-003 tap-to-enter). Verified
+   * entry: the tap's single-use SUN is spent ONCE, on the card server's
+   * `/session` (main process), which proves a genuine, non-replayed card and
+   * returns the wallet balance plus the hit-keyed withdraw/pay steps. Then the
+   * card's external_id is authorized locally (open-enrollment or allow-list)
+   * and the session is held for the visit — Complete needs no second tap.
+   */
+  async function handleBoltCardEntry(lnurlw: string) {
+    if (!isLocked.value) return
+    if (boltCardProcessing.value) return
+    // Reject a non-card tag before spending anything or calling anyone.
+    if (!parseBoltcardLnurlw(lnurlw)) {
+      nfcStatus.value = { state: 'declined', message: 'Not a Bolt Card' }
+      denyAccess('not a Bolt Card')
+      return
+    }
+    if (!isElectron || !window.electronAPI?.openCardSession) {
+      nfcStatus.value = { state: 'declined', message: 'Card sessions need the machine build' }
+      denyAccess('card sessions need the machine build')
+      return
+    }
+    boltCardProcessing.value = true
+    nfcStatus.value = { state: 'processing', message: 'Verifying card…' }
+    try {
+      const t0 = Date.now()
+      const opened = await window.electronAPI.openCardSession({ lnurlw })
+      console.info(
+        `[ATM] Card session ${opened.ok ? 'opened' : 'refused'} in ${Date.now() - t0} ms` +
+          (opened.ok
+            ? ` (fiat ${opened.session.fiat === null ? 'not ' : ''}priced by card server; sell ` +
+              (opened.session.withdraw
+                ? 'available)'
+                : `BLOCKED: ${opened.session.withdrawBlockedReason ?? 'withdraw step withheld'})`)
+            : '')
+      )
+      if (!opened.ok) {
+        nfcStatus.value = { state: 'declined', message: opened.reason }
+        denyAccess(opened.reason)
+        return
+      }
+      const scan: AccessScan = { kind: 'boltcard', externalId: opened.session.externalId }
+      const outcome = await authorize(scan, accessControl.value.allowList, {
+        salt: accessControl.value.salt,
+        openEnrollment: accessControl.value.openEnrollment,
+      })
+      if (outcome.status === 'granted') {
+        loadedBoltCard.value = opened.session
+        cardBalanceRevealed.value = false
+        cardFiatRate.value = null
+        nfcStatus.value = { state: 'accepted', message: 'Card accepted' }
+        grantAccess(outcome.role, outcome.credentialIdHash)
+        // Price the balance in the card's currency off the unlock path.
+        const { currency, fiat, externalId } = opened.session
+        if (currency && fiat === null) {
+          void fetchBtcPrice(currency).then((price) => {
+            if (price && loadedBoltCard.value?.externalId === externalId) {
+              cardFiatRate.value = { currency, btcPrice: price }
+            }
+          })
+        }
+      } else {
+        // pin-required can't occur for card-only open-enrollment; treat as denied.
+        const reason = outcome.status === 'denied' ? outcome.reason : 'card not authorized'
+        nfcStatus.value = { state: 'declined', message: reason }
+        denyAccess(reason, outcome.credentialIdHash)
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      console.warn('[ATM] Bolt Card session failed:', e)
+      nfcStatus.value = { state: 'error', message: 'Card verification failed' }
+      denyAccess('card verification failed')
+    } finally {
+      boltCardProcessing.value = false
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Complete a buy/sell using the Bolt Card loaded at entry — no second tap.
+   * Cash-out pulls via the stored lnurlw; cash-in resolves it to the card
+   * wallet's lnurlp and pays. Reuses the tap handlers verbatim.
+   *
+   * The loaded session is SINGLE-SHOT: its withdraw/pay steps are keyed by one
+   * server-side hit that the first use spends, so once a step has been
+   * presented — accepted or declined — it can never succeed again. Drop the
+   * session after the first real attempt and tell the customer to re-tap; a
+   * fresh tap on the cash screen goes straight through the normal
+   * tap-to-pay/receive path. A 'skipped' outcome (guard bounced it, no server
+   * call) keeps the session.
+   */
+  async function completeWithCard() {
+    const card = loadedBoltCard.value
+    if (!card) return
+    const t0 = Date.now()
+    let outcome: BoltCardOutcome = 'skipped'
+    if (isCashOut.value) outcome = await handleBoltCardTap({ session: card })
+    else if (isCashIn.value) outcome = await handleBoltCardReceive({ session: card })
+    console.info(
+      `[ATM] Complete with card: ${outcome} in ${Date.now() - t0} ms` +
+        (outcome === 'accepted' ? '' : ` — ${nfcStatus.value?.message ?? 'no reason given'}`)
+    )
+    if (outcome === 'skipped') return
+    // Blocked is the card server's standing answer for this visit: nothing was
+    // consumed, and re-tapping cannot lift it. Keep the session loaded so the
+    // chip still shows whose card it is, and skip the re-tap advice below.
+    if (outcome === 'blocked') return
+    loadedBoltCard.value = null
+    if (outcome === 'declined') {
+      const reason = nfcStatus.value?.message ?? 'Card declined'
+      nfcStatus.value = {
+        state: nfcStatus.value?.state ?? 'declined',
+        message: `${reason} — tap your card to try again`,
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The main process can move the bays without the renderer knowing — an
+   * operator-command dispense runs entirely there, and boot seeding writes the
+   * table before the store exists. Listen for that and catch up, otherwise the
+   * renderer serves a stale inventory and the operator's view never updates.
+   * Idempotent via preload removeAllListeners.
+   */
+  function setupCassettesChangedListener() {
+    if (!isElectron || !window.electronAPI?.onCassettesChanged) return
+    window.electronAPI.onCassettesChanged(() => {
+      console.log('[ATM] Cassettes changed in the main process — refreshing')
+      void refreshAndPublishCassettes()
+    })
+  }
+
   /** Wire the main-process reader once (idempotent via preload removeAllListeners). */
   function setupNfcListener() {
     if (!isElectron || !window.electronAPI?.onNfcCardTapped) return
     window.electronAPI.onNfcCardTapped((lnurlw) => {
-      // Route the same physical tap by flow: cash-out pulls, cash-in receives.
-      if (isCashOut.value && nestedState.value === 'displayingInvoice') {
-        void handleBoltCardTap(lnurlw)
+      // Route the tap by state: locked → enter + load the card; then cash-out
+      // pulls, cash-in receives (fallback if no card was loaded at entry).
+      if (isLocked.value) {
+        void handleBoltCardEntry(lnurlw)
+      } else if (isCashOut.value && nestedState.value === 'displayingInvoice') {
+        void handleBoltCardTap({ lnurlw })
       } else if (isCashIn.value && nestedState.value === 'displayingQR') {
-        void handleBoltCardReceive(lnurlw)
+        void handleBoltCardReceive({ lnurlw })
       }
     })
     window.electronAPI.onNfcStatus?.((status) => {
-      // Only surface reader status on a tap screen, and don't clobber an
-      // in-flight tap's message.
+      // Surface reader status on a tap screen (locked / invoice / QR); don't
+      // clobber an in-flight tap's message.
       const onTapScreen =
+        isLocked.value ||
         (isCashOut.value && nestedState.value === 'displayingInvoice') ||
         (isCashIn.value && nestedState.value === 'displayingQR')
       if (onTapScreen && !boltCardProcessing.value) {
@@ -675,12 +998,17 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
 
   /** Dev/mock: simulate a cash-out tap with a pasted lnurlw (test without a card). */
   function simulateBoltCardTap(lnurlw: string) {
-    void handleBoltCardTap(lnurlw)
+    void handleBoltCardTap({ lnurlw })
   }
 
   /** Dev/mock: simulate a cash-in (receive) tap with a pasted lnurlw. */
   function simulateBoltCardReceive(lnurlw: string) {
-    void handleBoltCardReceive(lnurlw)
+    void handleBoltCardReceive({ lnurlw })
+  }
+
+  /** Dev/mock: simulate tapping a card at the locked screen (tap-to-enter). */
+  function simulateBoltCardEntry(lnurlw: string) {
+    void handleBoltCardEntry(lnurlw)
   }
 
   /**
@@ -789,7 +1117,8 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
         }),
         getInventory: async () => {
           const fresh = await loadInventoryFromDb()
-          return Object.keys(fresh).length > 0 ? fresh : services.atmServices.getInventory()
+          // null == the DB could not be asked; an empty map is a real reading.
+          return fresh ?? services.atmServices.getInventory()
         },
       }
 
@@ -1037,7 +1366,8 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
           request,
           (amounts) => hal.atmServices.dispenseCash(amounts),
           isIdle.value,
-          fiatCode.value
+          fiatCode.value,
+          refreshAndPublishCassettes
         )
       })
 
@@ -1052,7 +1382,8 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
         // If DB has inventory, use it; otherwise fall back to HAL
         getInventory: async () => {
           const fresh = await loadInventoryFromDb()
-          return Object.keys(fresh).length > 0 ? fresh : hal.atmServices.getInventory()
+          // null == the DB could not be asked; an empty map is a real reading.
+          return fresh ?? hal.atmServices.getInventory()
         },
       }
 
@@ -1183,6 +1514,19 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
     const runtimeFiatCode = runtimeConfig.fiatCode || 'USD'
     fiatCode.value = runtimeFiatCode
 
+    // Access-control gate (ADR-003). Must be set BEFORE the machine is built
+    // (initialize() reads accessControl.value to seed the `locked` state).
+    if (runtimeConfig.accessControl) {
+      accessControl.value = runtimeConfig.accessControl
+      if (runtimeConfig.accessControl.enabled) {
+        console.log(
+          `[ATM] Access control ENABLED (openEnrollment=${runtimeConfig.accessControl.openEnrollment}, ` +
+            `allowList=${runtimeConfig.accessControl.allowList.length} entries, ` +
+            `devUnlock=${runtimeConfig.accessControl.devUnlock})`
+        )
+      }
+    }
+
     // Load persisted operator fee config (aiolabs/lamassu-next#57). If no
     // config has ever been applied (fresh ATM, pre-operator-publish),
     // enter the 'awaiting-fees' maintenance state — UI shows the operator
@@ -1246,7 +1590,7 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
     console.log('[ATM] Fiat currency:', devConfig.fiatCode)
     console.log('[ATM] Validator device:', devConfig.validator.device)
     console.log('[ATM] Dispenser device:', devConfig.dispenser.device)
-    console.log('[ATM] Cassettes:', devConfig.dispenser.cassettes)
+    console.log(`[ATM] Cassettes: ${formatBays(devConfig.dispenser.cassettes)}`)
 
     const halConfig = toHalConfig(devConfig)
     await initializeWithHalIpc(halConfig)
@@ -1319,13 +1663,15 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
       // HAL dispenseCash via IPC
       const halAtmServices: Pick<ATMServices, 'dispenseCash' | 'getInventory'> = {
         dispenseCash: async (amounts) => {
-          console.log('[ATM] Dispensing via IPC:', amounts)
+          console.log(`[ATM] Dispensing via IPC: ${formatBays(amounts)}`)
           return await api.halDispense(amounts)
         },
         getInventory: async () => {
-          // Priority: DB inventory > HAL hardware inventory > empty
+          // Priority: DB inventory > HAL hardware inventory > empty. Only a
+          // null (unreadable) DB defers to HAL — a drained machine reports
+          // drained rather than borrowing the hardware's view.
           const fresh = await loadInventoryFromDb()
-          if (Object.keys(fresh).length > 0) return fresh
+          if (fresh !== null) return fresh
           // Fall back to HAL's cassette-based inventory
           try {
             const halInv = await api.halGetInventory()
@@ -1353,7 +1699,8 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
           request,
           (amounts) => api.halDispense(amounts),
           isIdle.value,
-          fiatCode.value
+          fiatCode.value,
+          refreshAndPublishCassettes
         )
       })
 
@@ -1491,12 +1838,69 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
     actor.value.send(event)
   }
 
+  // === Access control (ADR-003) ===
+
+  /**
+   * Audit stub — records an access decision. PR1 logs only (hashed id, never a
+   * raw credential); a fast-follow persists to state.db and optionally a Nostr
+   * event (see ADR-003).
+   */
+  function recordAccessAudit(outcome: {
+    result: 'granted' | 'denied'
+    role?: AccessRole
+    credentialIdHash: string
+    reason?: string
+  }) {
+    // Truncate the hash — it's already non-reversible, but no need to splash
+    // the full value across the journal. Interpolated rather than passed as an
+    // object: the console bridge would stringify it to `[object Object]` and
+    // this line is the audit trail until #90 persists it to state.db.
+    console.info(
+      `[Access] audit result=${outcome.result} role=${outcome.role ?? 'none'} ` +
+        `hash=${outcome.credentialIdHash.slice(0, 12)} ` +
+        `reason=${outcome.reason ?? 'none'} at=${Date.now()}`
+    )
+  }
+
+  /** Grant terminal access after a credential (and any PIN) is authorized. */
+  function grantAccess(role: AccessRole, credentialIdHash: string) {
+    recordAccessAudit({ result: 'granted', role, credentialIdHash })
+    send({ type: 'ACCESS_GRANTED', role, credentialIdHash })
+  }
+
+  /** Reject an access attempt; the machine stays locked and shows the reason. */
+  function denyAccess(reason: string, credentialIdHash = '') {
+    recordAccessAudit({ result: 'denied', credentialIdHash, reason })
+    send({ type: 'ACCESS_DENIED', reason })
+  }
+
+  /** Runtime dev/operator unlock (gated by the machine's devUnlockAllowed guard). */
+  function devUnlock() {
+    recordAccessAudit({ result: 'granted', role: 'operator', credentialIdHash: 'dev-unlock' })
+    send({ type: 'DEV_UNLOCK' })
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * End the current tap-in session and re-lock immediately (drops the loaded
+   * Bolt Card via `locked`'s entry). Routed through the machine's root-level
+   * END_SESSION so it locks from any unlocked state. Callers: the "End session"
+   * button, the idle-inactivity timer, and the absolute session cap. `reason`
+   * is recorded for the access audit trail — never a raw credential. No-op
+   * unless the gate is active (guarded in the machine).
+   */
+  function endSession(reason: 'user' | 'inactivity' | 'session-cap' = 'user') {
+    console.info(`[ATM] Ending session — reason=${reason}`)
+    send({ type: 'END_SESSION' })
+  }
+
   // Convenience methods for common events
   function selectCashIn() {
+    settlementError.value = null
     send({ type: 'SELECT_CASH_IN' })
   }
 
   function selectCashOut() {
+    settlementError.value = null
     send({ type: 'SELECT_CASH_OUT' })
   }
 
@@ -1640,6 +2044,22 @@ export const useAtmStore = defineStore('atm', () => {
     boltCardProcessing,
     simulateBoltCardTap,
     simulateBoltCardReceive,
+    // Tap-to-enter: card session opened at the locked screen, reused at Complete
+    loadedBoltCard,
+    cardBalanceRevealed,
+    loadedCardFiat,
+    toggleCardBalance,
+    completeWithCard,
+    simulateBoltCardEntry,
+
+    // Access control (ADR-003)
+    settlementError,
+    accessControl,
+    isLocked,
+    grantAccess,
+    denyAccess,
+    devUnlock,
+    endSession,
 
     // Actions
     initialize,

apps/machine/src/types/electron.d.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,57 @@
  * Type declarations for Electron API exposed via preload
  */
 
+import type { AllowListEntry } from '../services/access/authorize'
+
+/**
+ * Access-control config (ADR-003). Loaded by the main process from env +
+ * an optional /var/lib/bitspire/access.json. `enabled` defaults false, so a
+ * machine with no access config behaves exactly as before.
+ */
+export interface AccessControlConfig {
+  /** Master switch for the badge-to-enter gate. */
+  enabled: boolean
+  /** Allow the runtime dev/operator unlock gesture on the locked screen. */
+  devUnlock: boolean
+  /** Prototype: admit any valid npub when the allow-list has no match. */
+  openEnrollment: boolean
+  /** Per-machine salt for hashing credentials/PINs. */
+  salt: string
+  /** Authorized identities (hashed). Empty in open-enrollment prototype mode. */
+  allowList: AllowListEntry[]
+}
+
+/**
+ * A Bolt Card session opened at tap-to-enter (ADR-003). Wire payload from the
+ * main process (electron/boltcard-session.ts) — mirrored here rather than
+ * imported to avoid a cross-project electron↔renderer import. The withdraw and
+ * pay steps are keyed by a single-use server-side hit; no card secret is held.
+ */
+export interface CardSession {
+  externalId: string
+  cardName: string
+  balanceSats: number
+  /** ISO currency the card server priced the balance in; null → no fiat. */
+  currency: string | null
+  /** Balance in `currency` at the card server's rate; null when unknown. */
+  fiat: number | null
+  /** LUD-03 second step, or null when the card server withheld it. */
+  withdraw: {
+    callback: string
+    k1: string
+    minWithdrawable?: number
+    maxWithdrawable?: number
+  } | null
+  /** Why `withdraw` is null (e.g. daily limit spent); safe to show on-screen. */
+  withdrawBlockedReason: string | null
+  /** LUD-06 second step for topping the card wallet up. */
+  pay: { callback: string; minSendable?: number; maxSendable?: number; metadata?: string }
+}
+
+export type OpenCardSessionResult =
+  | { ok: true; session: CardSession }
+  | { ok: false; reason: string }
+
 export interface RuntimeConfig {
   relayUrl: string
   /** LNbits nostr-transport server pubkey (hex, 64 chars). */
@@ -17,6 +68,8 @@ export interface RuntimeConfig {
   maintenanceMode: boolean
   /** Operator branding override loaded from /var/lib/bitspire/branding/. Null when no override. */
   branding: BrandingConfig | null
+  /** Access-control gate config (ADR-003). Always present; `enabled` defaults false. */
+  accessControl: AccessControlConfig
 }
 
 /** Operator branding config. Wire payload from Electron IPC; renderer applies via useBranding(). */
@@ -93,11 +146,14 @@ declare global {
       emptyCashbox: () => Promise<void>
       remediateTransaction: (txid: string, remediatedByTxid: string) => Promise<boolean>
       getLastKnownConfigCreatedAt: () => Promise<number>
-      getBootstrapPublishedAt: () => Promise<number | null>
-      markBootstrapPublished: (unixTimestamp: number) => Promise<void>
+      getLastStatePublishedAt: () => Promise<number | null>
+      /** When the bay counts became unverified (a dispense that reported nothing), or null. */
+      getCountsUncertainSince: () => Promise<number | null>
+      markCountsUncertain: (unixTimestamp: number) => Promise<void>
+      markStatePublished: (unixTimestamp: number) => Promise<void>
       saveBunkerBinding: (binding: BunkerBindingRecord) => Promise<void>
       clearBunkerBinding: () => Promise<void>
-      resetBootstrapGate: () => Promise<void>
+      resetStatePublishWatermark: () => Promise<void>
       resetForRepair: () => Promise<void>
       saveSpireSeed: (seed: string) => Promise<void>
       relaunchApp: () => Promise<void>
@@ -114,10 +170,35 @@ declare global {
         lnurlw: string
         amountMsat: number
       }) => Promise<{ ok: boolean; bolt11?: string; reason?: string }>
-      applyOperatorCassettesConfig: (
-        payload: { positions: Record<string, { denomination: number; count: number }> },
-        eventCreatedAt: number
-      ) => Promise<{ applied: true } | { applied: false; reason: string }>
+      /** Bolt Card tap-to-enter: open one verified session for a tapped card (spends the SUN). */
+      openCardSession: (args: { lnurlw: string }) => Promise<OpenCardSessionResult>
+      /** Cash-out via a session's withdraw step (no tap). */
+      withdrawWithSession: (args: {
+        withdraw: NonNullable<CardSession['withdraw']>
+        bolt11: string
+        amountMsat?: number
+      }) => Promise<{ ok: boolean; reason?: string }>
+      /** Cash-in via a session's pay step (no tap): a BOLT11 to pay. */
+      resolveSessionInvoice: (args: {
+        pay: CardSession['pay']
+        amountMsat: number
+      }) => Promise<{ ok: boolean; bolt11?: string; reason?: string }>
+      applyOperatorCassetteOps: (
+        ops: {
+          id: string
+          at: number
+          type: 'refill' | 'empty' | 'recount' | 'set_denomination'
+          position: number
+          bills?: number
+          count?: number
+          denomination?: number
+        }[]
+      ) => Promise<{
+        applied: string[]
+        rejected: { id: string; reason: string }[]
+      }>
+      getAppliedOpIds: (limit?: number) => Promise<string[]>
+      getCassetteStateSeq: () => Promise<number>
       getFeeConfig: () => Promise<{
         cashInFeeFraction: number
         cashOutFeeFraction: number
@@ -151,6 +232,8 @@ declare global {
       onHalBillInserted: (callback: (denomination: number) => void) => void
       onHalBillRejected: (callback: (reason: string) => void) => void
       onHalError: (callback: (error: string) => void) => void
+      /** The main process mutated the cassettes table; reload + republish. */
+      onCassettesChanged: (callback: () => void) => void
       /** Bolt Card reader: a tapped card's lnurlw voucher. */
       onNfcCardTapped: (callback: (lnurlw: string) => void) => void
       /** Bolt Card reader status (ready / reading / error / unavailable). */

apps/machine/src/views/CashInView.vue

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { watch, computed, ref } from 'vue'
 import { useRouter } from 'vue-router'
 import { useAtmStore } from '@/stores/atm'
 import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
+import CardChip from '@/components/CardChip.vue'
 import { Alert, AlertDescription } from '@/components/ui/alert'
 import { Input } from '@/components/ui/input'
 import QRCode from '@/components/QRCode.vue'
@@ -363,6 +364,22 @@ const isProcessing = computed(() => atmStore.isPayingInvoice)
               </p>
             </div>
 
+            <!-- Tap-to-enter: card already loaded → one-press Complete (no re-tap) -->
+            <div
+              v-if="atmStore.loadedBoltCard"
+              class="flex w-full max-w-md flex-col items-center gap-2 pt-2"
+            >
+              <CardChip class="w-full" />
+              <Button
+                class="w-full bg-success text-success-foreground"
+                size="kiosk-lg"
+                :disabled="atmStore.boltCardProcessing"
+                @click="atmStore.completeWithCard()"
+              >
+                {{ atmStore.boltCardProcessing ? 'Completing…' : 'Complete Purchase' }}
+              </Button>
+            </div>
+
             <!-- LNURL URI (web-ui only) -->
             <div v-if="!isElectron && currentQrValue" class="pt-4 text-center space-y-1">
               <p class="text-xs font-medium text-muted-foreground uppercase tracking-wide">

apps/machine/src/views/CashOutView.vue

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { watch, computed, ref } from 'vue'
 import { useRouter } from 'vue-router'
 import { useAtmStore } from '@/stores/atm'
 import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
+import CardChip from '@/components/CardChip.vue'
 import { Badge } from '@/components/ui/badge'
 import { Alert, AlertDescription } from '@/components/ui/alert'
 import QRCode from '@/components/QRCode.vue'
@@ -177,6 +178,24 @@ function formatFiat(cents: number): string {
           key="selectingAmount"
           class="flex flex-1 flex-col justify-center px-4 lg:px-[8vw] py-4 lg:py-6 gap-4 lg:gap-6"
         >
+          <!-- A payment was taken and no cash came out. Say so plainly, with
+               the reference an operator needs; do not let the customer wander
+               back into the amount grid believing nothing happened. -->
+          <div
+            v-if="atmStore.settlementError"
+            class="rounded-lg border-2 border-destructive bg-destructive/10 px-4 py-3 text-center lg:px-6 lg:py-4"
+          >
+            <p class="text-base font-bold text-destructive lg:text-2xl">
+              {{ atmStore.settlementError.message }}
+            </p>
+            <p class="mt-1 text-xs text-muted-foreground lg:text-lg">
+              Please contact the operator<template v-if="atmStore.settlementError.txid">
+                and quote
+                <span class="font-mono-code">{{ atmStore.settlementError.txid }}</span> </template
+              >.
+            </p>
+          </div>
+
           <!-- Denomination grid -->
           <div class="grid grid-cols-2 gap-3 lg:gap-6">
             <div
@@ -328,6 +347,35 @@ function formatFiat(cents: number): string {
               </p>
             </div>
 
+            <!-- Tap-to-enter: card already loaded → one-press Complete (no re-tap) -->
+            <div
+              v-if="atmStore.loadedBoltCard"
+              class="flex w-full max-w-md flex-col items-center gap-2 pt-2"
+            >
+              <CardChip class="w-full" />
+              <!-- The card server withheld this session's withdraw step (e.g.
+                   the card's daily limit is spent). Nothing the customer does
+                   here can lift it, so say so rather than offering a button
+                   that always fails. The QR remains as the way to get paid. -->
+              <p
+                v-if="!atmStore.loadedBoltCard.withdraw"
+                class="w-full text-center text-sm font-medium text-destructive lg:text-lg"
+              >
+                {{
+                  atmStore.loadedBoltCard.withdrawBlockedReason ?? 'This card cannot sell right now'
+                }}
+              </p>
+              <Button
+                v-else
+                class="w-full bg-success text-success-foreground"
+                size="kiosk-lg"
+                :disabled="atmStore.boltCardProcessing"
+                @click="atmStore.completeWithCard()"
+              >
+                {{ atmStore.boltCardProcessing ? 'Completing…' : 'Complete Sale' }}
+              </Button>
+            </div>
+
             <!-- Invoice info with copy button (web-ui only) -->
             <div v-if="context?.invoice && !isElectron" class="pt-4 text-center">
               <p class="font-mono-code mb-2 truncate text-xs text-muted-foreground max-w-[300px]">

apps/machine/src/views/IdleView.vue

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { useAtmStore } from '@/stores/atm'
 import { useBranding } from '@/composables/useBranding'
 import { initialContext } from '@bitSpire/state-machine'
 import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
+import CardChip from '@/components/CardChip.vue'
 import { Badge } from '@/components/ui/badge'
 import BitcoinIcon from '@/components/BitcoinIcon.vue'
 import QRCode from '@/components/QRCode.vue'
@@ -73,16 +74,12 @@ function handleCashOut() {
           >Just Bitcoin</Badge
         >
       </div>
-      <!-- Balance + Commission rates -->
+      <!-- Commission rates. The machine's own balance is NOT repeated here: App.vue
+           already shows it in the top-right status chip, and next to the holder's
+           card chip an "Available: N sats" line reads as *their* balance. -->
       <div
         class="mt-1 flex flex-wrap items-center justify-center gap-2 lg:gap-4 text-[11px] lg:text-[2vh] text-muted-foreground"
       >
-        <span v-if="atmStore.balanceSats !== null">
-          Available:
-          <span class="font-bold text-primary"
-            >{{ atmStore.balanceSats.toLocaleString() }} sats</span
-          >
-        </span>
         <span>
           Buy:
           <span class="font-bold text-bitcoin"
@@ -104,6 +101,8 @@ function handleCashOut() {
           >
         </span>
       </div>
+      <!-- Tap-to-enter: the holder's card session, balance hidden until revealed -->
+      <CardChip v-if="atmStore.loadedBoltCard" class="mt-1 w-full max-w-md" />
     </div>
 
     <!-- Touch Zones -->
@@ -173,15 +172,37 @@ function handleCashOut() {
       </div>
     </div>
 
-    <!-- Help button (top-left) -->
-    <Button
-      variant="outline"
-      size="icon"
-      class="absolute top-4 left-4 lg:top-8 lg:left-8 h-14 w-14 lg:h-20 lg:w-20 rounded-full border-2 border-muted-foreground/30 text-2xl lg:text-4xl text-muted-foreground"
-      @click="$router.push('/support')"
-    >
-      ?
-    </Button>
+    <!-- Top-left utility buttons: Help, plus an End-session "✕" while the access
+         gate is engaged. Kept in the left corner (not top-right) so they never
+         collide with the centered balance/commission chips, which wrap into the
+         top-right on narrower screens (e.g. sintra). A tap-in loads the holder's
+         Bolt Card for the whole session, so the ✕ gives them an explicit way to
+         re-lock the moment they're done rather than waiting out the idle timeout
+         (which would leave the card usable by the next person meanwhile). -->
+    <div class="absolute top-4 left-4 lg:top-8 lg:left-8 flex items-center gap-2 lg:gap-3">
+      <!-- End session first (leftmost): a solid `destructive` swatch so the exit
+           reads as red in every theme (--destructive is theme-scoped). Shown
+           only while the access gate is engaged. -->
+      <Button
+        v-if="atmStore.accessControl.enabled"
+        variant="destructive"
+        size="icon"
+        class="h-14 w-14 lg:h-20 lg:w-20 rounded-full text-2xl lg:text-4xl font-bold"
+        aria-label="End session"
+        @click="atmStore.endSession()"
+      >
+        ✕
+      </Button>
+      <Button
+        variant="outline"
+        size="icon"
+        class="h-14 w-14 lg:h-20 lg:w-20 rounded-full border-2 border-muted-foreground/30 text-2xl lg:text-4xl text-muted-foreground"
+        aria-label="Help"
+        @click="$router.push('/support')"
+      >
+        ?
+      </Button>
+    </div>
 
     <!-- Debug toggle (only visible when debug bar is hidden, never in production) -->
     <Button

apps/machine/src/views/LockedView.vue

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+<script setup lang="ts">
+/**
+ * Access gate — "tap your Bolt Card" screen (ADR-003, tap-to-enter).
+ *
+ * Shown when the machine is healthy but locked (App.vue's `isLocked` branch).
+ * Entry is a single Bolt Card tap: the card is read by the main-process NFC
+ * reader and routed to the store (`handleBoltCardEntry`) which authorizes it
+ * (open-enrollment) and, on grant, loads the card into the session so buy/sell
+ * only need "Complete". This view is presentation-only — it shows the prompt
+ * and live reader status; the store owns the tap handling and machine events.
+ *
+ * Card-only by design: no camera/npub-QR, no PIN. A dev paste-box (debug builds)
+ * and a dev-unlock button remain for testing without hardware.
+ */
+import { computed, ref } from 'vue'
+import { useAtmStore } from '@/stores/atm'
+import { useBranding } from '@/composables/useBranding'
+import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button'
+import ColorModeToggle from '@/components/ColorModeToggle.vue'
+import { Nfc } from 'lucide-vue-next'
+
+const atmStore = useAtmStore()
+const { logoUrl, title } = useBranding()
+
+const denyReason = computed(() => atmStore.snapshot?.context.accessDenyReason ?? null)
+const showDevUnlock = computed(() => atmStore.accessControl.devUnlock)
+const nfc = computed(() => atmStore.nfcStatus)
+const reading = computed(() => atmStore.boltCardProcessing)
+
+// Dev: paste an lnurlw to simulate a tap-to-enter without a card.
+const mockLnurlw = ref('')
+</script>
+
+<template>
+  <div
+    class="relative flex flex-1 flex-col items-center justify-center gap-10 bg-background p-8 text-foreground"
+  >
+    <!-- Light/dark toggle — shared kiosk-sized component -->
+    <ColorModeToggle class="absolute right-4 top-4 z-10" />
+
+    <!-- Brand: logo + title only, colours from the active theme (branding.json) -->
+    <div class="flex flex-col items-center gap-4">
+      <img v-if="logoUrl" :src="logoUrl" alt="" class="h-[16vh] max-h-44 w-auto object-contain" />
+      <h1 class="text-3xl font-bold tracking-tight lg:text-5xl">{{ title }}</h1>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Tap target -->
+    <div class="flex flex-col items-center gap-6">
+      <div
+        class="flex items-center justify-center rounded-full border-4 border-primary bg-card shadow-xl"
+        :class="reading ? 'animate-pulse' : ''"
+        style="width: min(48vw, 15rem); aspect-ratio: 1 / 1"
+      >
+        <Nfc class="size-24 text-primary lg:size-28" />
+      </div>
+
+      <p class="text-2xl font-semibold text-foreground lg:text-4xl">
+        {{ reading ? 'Reading card…' : 'Tap your Bolt Card to begin' }}
+      </p>
+
+      <!-- Reader status / denial reason -->
+      <p v-if="denyReason" class="text-lg font-medium text-destructive lg:text-2xl">
+        {{ denyReason }}
+      </p>
+      <p
+        v-else-if="nfc?.message"
+        class="text-base lg:text-xl"
+        :class="
+          nfc.state === 'declined' || nfc.state === 'error'
+            ? 'text-destructive'
+            : 'text-muted-foreground'
+        "
+      >
+        {{ nfc.message }}
+      </p>
+      <p v-else class="max-w-md text-center text-base text-muted-foreground lg:text-xl">
+        Hold your card flat against the reader
+      </p>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- Dev affordances -->
+    <div class="mt-2 flex flex-col items-center gap-2">
+      <Button
+        v-if="showDevUnlock"
+        variant="ghost"
+        size="sm"
+        class="text-muted-foreground opacity-40 transition-opacity hover:opacity-100"
+        @click="atmStore.devUnlock()"
+      >
+        Dev unlock
+      </Button>
+      <div v-if="atmStore.debugMode" class="flex items-center gap-2">
+        <input
+          v-model="mockLnurlw"
+          placeholder="lnurlw://… (paste to simulate a tap)"
+          class="w-56 rounded border border-input bg-background px-2 py-1 text-xs"
+        />
+        <Button
+          variant="outline"
+          size="sm"
+          :disabled="!mockLnurlw"
+          @click="atmStore.simulateBoltCardEntry(mockLnurlw)"
+        >
+          Tap
+        </Button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</template>

deploy/nixos/README.md

@@ -33,9 +33,19 @@ Each ATM model has two flake outputs:
 | `nixosConfigurations.<model>-installed` | installed | full GPT + systemd-boot install, ext4 root, supports `nixos-rebuild switch` |
 | `packages.x86_64-linux.iso-<model>` | ISO | ISO image of the live variant |
 | `packages.x86_64-linux.disk-image-<model>` | raw image | dd-able full disk image of the installed variant |
+| `nixosConfigurations.<model>-usb` | installed, on a stick | `<model>-installed` hardened to run from a USB stick: `nixos-usb`/`ESP-USB` labels, `nofail` `/boot`, no partition growing, auto-upgrade off (`batm3`, `douro` only) |
+| `packages.x86_64-linux.disk-image-<model>-usb` | raw image | dd-able image of the `-usb` variant — flash, plug in, boot; no installer step |
 
 Models: `douro`, `tejo`, `sintra`, `batm3`.
 
+**Run-from-USB deployments** (`batm3` today, `douro` since the LNbits cutover)
+skip the Alpine + dd-to-internal-disk procedure below entirely: the stick *is*
+the system. Flash `disk-image-<model>-usb` with balenaEtcher (it verifies the
+write — a truncated or bad copy fails stage-1 fsck on first boot) onto a stick
+of 16 GB or more, plug it in, power on. Updates go in-place against the
+`<model>-usb` config (`nix copy` the toplevel + `switch-to-configuration`),
+which keeps pairing and `/var/lib/bitspire`.
+
 ```bash
 # Build a Sintra disk image
 nix build .#disk-image-sintra

deploy/nixos/access.example.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "enabled": true,
+  "openEnrollment": true,
+  "devUnlock": false
+}

deploy/nixos/build-iso.sh

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ esac
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)"
 
-echo "=== Building Lamassu ATM Live USB ISO (model: $MODEL) ==="
+echo "=== Building bitSpire ATM Live USB ISO (model: $MODEL) ==="
 echo ""
 echo "This is a pure Nix build — no local pnpm required."
 echo ""

deploy/nixos/configuration.nix

@@ -3,6 +3,122 @@
 
 { config, lib, pkgs, pkgs-unstable, ... }:
 
+let
+  # ── Firmware pruning (bitspire#70 sizing) ────────────────────────────
+  # hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware installs the entire linux-firmware
+  # tree: 752MB compressed, 16% of the image and its single largest item. The
+  # fleet is four fixed Intel boards. The other ~640MB is firmware for
+  # Qualcomm, Mellanox, NVIDIA, Marvell, AMD and MediaTek parts that will
+  # never appear in one of these machines.
+  #
+  # Keep only what a bitSpire board can plausibly load. Entries are paths
+  # inside lib/firmware; nothing outside this list is copied.
+  firmwareKeep = [
+    # Intel GPU. Gen9 (Apollo Lake) loads DMC from here. Bay Trail and
+    # Haswell load nothing, but 9.6MB is cheap insurance against a board swap.
+    "i915"
+    # Intel WiFi, 89MB and the bulk of what survives, covering every Intel
+    # card since 2008. This is the conservative half of the trade: losing the
+    # network on a deployed ATM is not remotely recoverable. Narrow it to the
+    # specific generation once each machine's card is known, via
+    # `lspci -k | grep -A3 Network` on the box.
+    "intel/iwlwifi"
+    "rtl_nic" # Realtek GbE (r8169) — the UP Board's onboard NIC
+    "rtw88" # Realtek WiFi, the usual M.2 or USB retrofit
+    "rtw89"
+    "brcm" # Broadcom WiFi, the other usual retrofit
+    # Intel Smart Sound Technology DSP, 420KB. Cherry Trail boards (sintra,
+    # tejo) probe intel_sst_acpi at boot whether or not anything will use the
+    # audio, and without the blob every boot logs
+    #   Direct firmware load for intel/fw_sst_22a8.bin failed with error -2
+    # Found by pruning, rebooting sintra and reading dmesg. The audio stack is
+    # gone so this changes no behaviour, but a recurring error in a payment
+    # terminal's boot log is worth 420KB to remove: an error people learn to
+    # ignore is one they will ignore when it matters.
+    "intel/fw_sst_0f28.bin"
+    "intel/fw_sst_0f28_ssp0.bin"
+    "intel/fw_sst_22a8.bin"
+  ];
+
+  # Prune the tree rather than hand-pick files, so a firmware bump can't
+  # silently drop a blob we depend on. Left UNCOMPRESSED on purpose: NixOS
+  # compresses each hardware.firmware entry itself, zstd or xz depending on
+  # what the machine's kernel understands, and douro's 5.15 predates zstd
+  # firmware support. Pre-compressing here would hand douro a tree it cannot
+  # read.
+  bitspireFirmware = pkgs.runCommand "linux-firmware-bitspire"
+    {
+      inherit (pkgs.linux-firmware) version;
+      meta = pkgs.linux-firmware.meta // {
+        description = "linux-firmware pruned to the hardware bitSpire ships on";
+      };
+    }
+    ''
+      src=${pkgs.linux-firmware}/lib/firmware
+      dst=$out/lib/firmware
+      mkdir -p "$dst"
+
+      for p in ${lib.escapeShellArgs firmwareKeep}; do
+        if [ ! -e "$src/$p" ]; then
+          echo "ERROR: firmwareKeep entry '$p' is not in linux-firmware" >&2
+          exit 1
+        fi
+        mkdir -p "$dst/$(dirname "$p")"
+        cp -a "$src/$p" "$dst/$p"
+      done
+
+      # A kept directory can contain symlinks pointing at blobs OUTSIDE it:
+      # brcm/brcmfmac*.bin are links into cypress/, for instance. Left dangling
+      # they fail nixpkgs' firmware compression step, and silently deleting
+      # them would quietly drop firmware a device needs. So pull the targets in
+      # instead. Looped because a resolved target can itself be a link.
+      for _pass in 1 2 3; do
+        _pulled=0
+        while IFS= read -r link; do
+          tgt=$(readlink -m "$link")
+          case "$tgt" in
+            "$dst"/*) rel=''${tgt#"$dst"/} ;;
+            *) continue ;;
+          esac
+          if [ ! -e "$dst/$rel" ] && [ -e "$src/$rel" ]; then
+            mkdir -p "$dst/$(dirname "$rel")"
+            cp -a "$src/$rel" "$dst/$rel"
+            _pulled=1
+          fi
+        done < <(find "$dst" -xtype l)
+        [ "$_pulled" -eq 0 ] && break
+      done
+
+      # Anything still dangling is not in linux-firmware at all. Fail loudly
+      # rather than ship a tree with holes in it.
+      if find "$dst" -xtype l | grep -q .; then
+        echo "ERROR: dangling firmware symlinks after resolution:" >&2
+        find "$dst" -xtype l >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+
+      # linux-firmware stores many blobs under a vendor directory and leaves a
+      # flat top-level symlink pointing at them, e.g.
+      # iwlwifi-cc-a0-77.ucode -> intel/iwlwifi/iwlwifi-cc-a0-77.ucode. The
+      # kernel requests the flat name, so a kept blob is useless without its
+      # link. Recreate every top-level link whose target survived the prune.
+      ( cd "$src"
+        find . -maxdepth 1 -type l -printf '%f\t%l\n' \
+          | while IFS="$(printf '\t')" read -r link target; do
+              # if/then, not `[ ... ] && ln`: the latter makes the loop's exit
+              # status depend on whether the LAST candidate matched, and a
+              # non-match returns 1, which set -e turns into a build failure.
+              # Whether it fails is then a function of readdir order.
+              if [ -e "$dst/$target" ]; then
+                ln -s "$target" "$dst/$link"
+              fi
+            done
+      )
+
+      echo "firmware kept: $(find "$dst" -type f | wc -l) files, \
+        $(find "$dst" -type l | wc -l) links, $(du -sh "$dst" | cut -f1) uncompressed"
+    '';
+in
 {
   # System basics
   system.stateVersion = "24.05";
@@ -13,10 +129,130 @@
   # - speechd: text-to-speech (speech-dispatcher → espeak-ng → mbrola, ~1GB).
   #   An ATM does not talk.
   # - documentation: man/info/NixOS manual — no one reads them on a kiosk.
+  # - pipewire: the audio stack (+ WirePlumber, ALSA, the PulseAudio shim),
+  #   ~353MB. The app has never played a sound — nothing under apps/machine or
+  #   packages/ constructs an Audio element or ships an audio file.
+  #
+  # All three need mkForce, not just an absent/false assignment: enabling
+  # services.xserver pulls in NixOS's `graphical-desktop` module, which
+  # mkDefault-enables speechd AND pipewire (services/misc/graphical-desktop.nix).
+  # Dropping our own `enable = true` simply falls back to that default — the
+  # 353MB stayed until this was forced off. Re-enable pipewire (with alsa +
+  # pulse) and security.rtkit if transaction sounds are ever added.
   services.speechd.enable = lib.mkForce false;
+  services.pipewire.enable = lib.mkForce false;
   documentation.enable = false;
   documentation.nixos.enable = false;
 
+  # Ship the pruned firmware tree instead of all of linux-firmware. mkForce
+  # because every hardware/*.nix sets enableRedistributableFirmware = true;
+  # overriding once here keeps the four machines in step. Turning that option
+  # off also drops the extras it bundles (sof-firmware, libreelec-dvb,
+  # alsa-firmware, intel2200BG, zd1211fw and friends), none of which applies to
+  # a soundless kiosk on a wired Intel board. The regulatory database is
+  # normally implied by the same option, so ask for it explicitly: without it
+  # WiFi is pinned to the most restrictive channel set.
+  hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware = lib.mkForce false;
+  hardware.wirelessRegulatoryDatabase = true;
+  hardware.firmware = [ bitspireFirmware ];
+
+  # Make the prune stick. Without this, a nixpkgs bump or a stray module
+  # setting enableRedistributableFirmware back to true silently re-adds 750MB
+  # and nobody notices until an eMMC runs out of room at 04:00. The regex
+  # matches the upstream package's versioned name (linux-firmware-20260519)
+  # and deliberately not ours (linux-firmware-bitspire), so the pruned tree
+  # passes and the full one fails the build with a readable error.
+  system.forbiddenDependenciesRegexes = [ "linux-firmware-[0-9]" ];
+
+  # Mesa without an LLVM-backed rasterizer.
+  #
+  # nixpkgs builds Mesa with 21 gallium drivers. Two of them, llvmpipe and
+  # radeonsi, link LLVM, and that RPATH pulls llvm-21-lib into the system
+  # closure: 540MB, a ninth of the image, on a kiosk with a soldered Intel GPU.
+  #
+  # The driver list has to span three Intel generations:
+  #   crocus    EVERY machine in the fleet. Surveyed, not assumed: sintra
+  #             and tejo are Braswell [8086:22b0], batm3 is Haswell GT2
+  #             [8086:0412], douro is Bay Trail. sintra and batm3 were read
+  #             straight off their running X logs; both say crocus.
+  #   i915      pre-Gen4, insurance against an older board turning up.
+  #   softpipe  the software rasterizer that does NOT use LLVM. Kept so a
+  #             board whose KMS driver fails still brings up X, slowly,
+  #             rather than dying headless in the field.
+  #
+  # ── IRIS IS DELIBERATELY ABSENT AND RE-ADDING IT COSTS 540MB ────────
+  # iris covers Gen8+ big-core Intel, which nothing here has. Its absence is
+  # what lets -Dllvm=disabled below work: mesa's meson puts
+  # with_gallium_iris in with_driver_using_cl and then
+  #     with_llvm.enable_if(with_clc, 'CLC requires LLVM')
+  # so asking for iris drags in the OpenCL frontend and the whole of
+  # llvm-lib. Mesa's closure is 88MB without iris, 633MB with.
+  #
+  # A newer x86 board — a modern NUC, the "build it from these parts" kiosk
+  # — WILL need iris. Until one exists, such a board falls back to softpipe
+  # and renders in software: it boots, it displays, it looks fine, and it is
+  # very slow. Check `DRI driver:` in /var/log/X.0.log on any new hardware
+  # rather than assuming this list still covers it.
+  #   i915      pre-Gen4, insurance against an older board turning up
+  #   softpipe  the software rasterizer that does NOT use LLVM. Kept so a
+  #             board whose KMS driver fails still brings up X, slowly,
+  #             rather than dying headless in the field. This is the role
+  #             llvmpipe was playing, for 540MB.
+  #
+  # Vulkan is emptied because nothing here uses it, and its software ICD
+  # (lavapipe) is the other LLVM consumer. The VDPAU and VA state trackers
+  # have to go with it: meson refuses to build them unless one of the AMD or
+  # NVIDIA gallium drivers is present. Intel VA-API is unaffected, it comes
+  # from intel-media-driver in hardware/*.nix.
+  hardware.graphics.package =
+    (pkgs.mesa.override {
+      galliumDrivers = [ "crocus" "i915" "softpipe" ];
+      vulkanDrivers = [ ];
+      vulkanLayers = [ ];
+    }).overrideAttrs
+      (old: {
+        mesonFlags = old.mesonFlags ++ [
+          # Severs LLVM outright. Only possible because iris is out of the
+          # driver list above; with iris present meson refuses this flag.
+          # Verified with patchelf: libgallium.so ends up with no libLLVM in
+          # its DT_NEEDED, not merely absent from the closure listing.
+          # Dropping llvmpipe alone never achieved this.
+          (lib.mesonEnable "llvm" false)
+          (lib.mesonBool "gallium-rusticl" false)
+          # nixpkgs builds the asahi/panfrost cross tools and installs
+          # mesa-clc on native builds. Both reference prog_mesa_clc, which
+          # exists only when CLC is on, so they go with LLVM. An x86 kiosk
+          # has no use for either.
+          (lib.mesonOption "tools" "")
+          (lib.mesonBool "install-mesa-clc" false)
+          (lib.mesonBool "install-precomp-compiler" false)
+          (lib.mesonEnable "gallium-vdpau" false)
+          (lib.mesonEnable "gallium-va" false)
+          (lib.mesonEnable "intel-rt" false)
+        ];
+        # Mesa declares spirv2dxil and cross_tools as outputs unconditionally,
+        # but they only receive files when the d3d12, asahi or panfrost gallium
+        # drivers are built, and none of those are in the list above. Nix fails
+        # a build that leaves a declared output unproduced, so create them
+        # empty. (Mesa sets __structuredAttrs, so $outputs is a bash array and
+        # a plain `for o in $outputs` loop silently does nothing here.)
+        postInstall = (old.postInstall or "") + ''
+          mkdir -p "$spirv2dxil" "$cross_tools" "$opencl"
+        '';
+
+        # With rusticl off there is no libRusticlOpenCL.so, and Mesa's
+        # postFixup patchelfs it unconditionally. Drop just that argument.
+        # The assert makes a nixpkgs bump that reshapes this line fail loudly
+        # here rather than silently stop removing LLVM.
+        postFixup =
+          let
+            marker = " $opencl/lib/libRusticlOpenCL.so";
+          in
+          assert lib.assertMsg (lib.hasInfix marker old.postFixup)
+            "mesa postFixup no longer patchelfs libRusticlOpenCL.so; revisit this override";
+          lib.replaceStrings [ marker ] [ "" ] old.postFixup;
+      });
+
   # Networking
   networking = {
     hostName = "bitspire";
@@ -99,38 +335,38 @@
     user = "bitspire";
   };
 
-  # Audio (for transaction sounds)
-  security.rtkit.enable = true;
-  services.pipewire = {
-    enable = true;
-    alsa.enable = true;
-    pulse.enable = true;
-  };
-
   # System packages
+  #
+  # Kept deliberately thin — this is a kiosk, and every entry here is closure
+  # that ships to each ATM and eats eMMC headroom the nightly rebuild needs.
+  # Deliberately absent (see #70 sizing):
+  #   git     70MB. nixos-rebuild fetches the flake with its OWN git-minimal,
+  #           which stays in the closure via unit-nixos-upgrade.service, so
+  #           auto-upgrade is unaffected.
+  #   vim     43MB. Replaced by nano — an on-box editor is worth a few MB for
+  #           field edits to /var/lib/bitspire/.env, vim's bulk is not.
+  #   nodejs_22  94MB. Nothing runs it: the app is Electron (which embeds its
+  #           own node) and fund-atm already pins pkgs-unstable.nodejs itself.
+  #   wget    curl covers it.
   environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
     # System utilities
     htop
-    vim
-    git
+    nano
     curl
-    wget
 
     # Hardware debugging
     usbutils
     pciutils
     lsof
 
-    # Serial port tools
+    # Serial port tools (validator/dispenser live on ttyJ5/ttyJ7 — these are
+    # how a field fault gets diagnosed, and they cost ~2MB between them)
     minicom
     screen
 
     # For the Electron app
     pkgs-unstable.electron
 
-    # Node.js for the application
-    pkgs-unstable.nodejs_22
-
     # Camera support. v4l-utils' default build drags in the whole Qt6 stack
     # for its qv4l2 GUI (~0.5GB) — we only ever use the v4l2-ctl CLI, so drop
     # the GUI.
@@ -159,6 +395,18 @@
   # Auto-updates (optional - disabled by default for stability)
   # system.autoUpgrade.enable = false;
 
+  # Trust the Forgejo host key up front. system.autoUpgrade fetches the flake
+  # over ssh AS ROOT, and a machine whose root has never connected by hand has
+  # no known_hosts entry, so every nightly run dies at
+  # "Host key verification failed" before it reaches authentication. batm3 did
+  # exactly that, silently, from its 2026-08-06 install until 09-22 (#98): it
+  # sat on its install generation for six weeks while reporting a failed unit
+  # nobody was watching. sintra only ever worked because a human had ssh'd as
+  # root once and accepted the key. Declaring it means a freshly flashed ATM
+  # can update from first boot with no manual step.
+  programs.ssh.knownHosts."git.atitlan.io".publicKey =
+    "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIMlo3f05o4+bk0+8x2VG91o9GubshOb46HmBPvND9pJx";
+
   # pragma: allowlist secret
   # Ensure WireGuard private key directory exists with correct permissions
   system.activationScripts.wireguard-key = ''
@@ -169,6 +417,40 @@
     fi
   '';
 
+  # The tunnel is operator-provisioned: wg0.key is written per machine after
+  # flashing, and until it is, `wg set … private-key` exits 1 with
+  # "fopen: No such file or directory". One failed unit makes
+  # switch-to-configuration exit 4, which marks the entire nightly
+  # system.autoUpgrade run as failed — so an ATM that simply never had its
+  # tunnel provisioned reports a broken updater for the life of the machine
+  # (sintra, #98). Skip the unit when there is no key instead of failing
+  # activation over an interface that was never set up; a provisioned machine
+  # is unaffected. Guarded on wg0 still being declared so the live image,
+  # which mkForce's the interfaces away, doesn't get a unit with no ExecStart.
+  systemd.services = lib.mkIf (config.networking.wireguard.interfaces ? wg0) (
+    let
+      iface = config.networking.wireguard.interfaces.wg0;
+      guard = { unitConfig.ConditionPathExists = "/var/lib/wireguard/wg0.key"; };
+      # The module emits one unit per peer alongside the interface unit, and a
+      # skipped interface is NOT a failed dependency, so the peer units still
+      # run and die on "Unable to modify interface: No such device" — same
+      # exit 4, different unit. Guard them too. Names come from the module's
+      # own `peers.*.name` option (whose default is the escaped public key)
+      # rather than re-deriving the escaping here; the `-refresh` suffix
+      # follows nixpkgs' peerUnitServiceName, where a peer's null refresh
+      # interval falls back to the interface's.
+      refreshes = peer:
+        (if peer.dynamicEndpointRefreshSeconds != null then
+          peer.dynamicEndpointRefreshSeconds
+        else
+          iface.dynamicEndpointRefreshSeconds) != 0;
+      peerUnit = peer:
+        "wireguard-wg0-peer-${peer.name}" + lib.optionalString (refreshes peer) "-refresh";
+    in
+    { wireguard-wg0 = guard; }
+    // lib.listToAttrs (map (peer: lib.nameValuePair (peerUnit peer) guard) iface.peers)
+  );
+
   # In-place rename migration: lamassu user → bitspire user.
   # Runs after `users` activation so the bitspire user exists with its UID.
   # Idempotent: re-running on an already-migrated system is a chown no-op.

deploy/nixos/hardware/douro.nix

@@ -20,12 +20,24 @@
     initrd.availableKernelModules = [
       "xhci_pci"
       "ahci"
+      # USB mass-storage: required to boot the dd'd image from a USB stick
+      # (stage-1 must bind the flash drive as a SCSI disk so
+      # /dev/disk/by-label/* appears). Harmless on the internal install.
+      #
+      # NOTE: deliberately NO "uas" here. Many USB sticks/bridges advertise
+      # UAS but drop off the bus ("device offline error, dev sdb") under
+      # sustained write load. Blacklisting uas below forces the slower-but-
+      # reliable usb-storage (Bulk-Only Transport) path. SATA/mSATA installs
+      # don't use uas anyway. (Same hardening as batm3.nix.)
       "usb_storage"
       "sd_mod"
       "sdhci_pci"
       "i915"
     ];
 
+    # Keep the USB flash drive off the flaky UAS driver (see note above).
+    blacklistedKernelModules = [ "uas" ];
+
     kernelModules = [
       "kvm-intel"
       "i2c-dev"
@@ -37,6 +49,9 @@
       "vt.handoff=7" # Bay Trail: preserve BIOS display init
       "quiet"
       "splash"
+      # Disable USB autosuspend so the boot medium (and kiosk peripherals)
+      # aren't power-suspended mid-I/O — another cause of "device offline".
+      "usbcore.autosuspend=-1"
     ];
   };
 

deploy/nixos/hardware/upboard.nix

@@ -91,6 +91,27 @@
     cpuFreqGovernor = "performance";
   };
 
+  # PC/SC daemon for the HID Global OMNIKEY 5022 contactless reader
+  # (076b:5022, a CCID smart-card reader) used for Bolt Card tap-to-enter
+  # (ADR-003). pcscd binds the CCID driver; the app talks to pcscd's socket
+  # (via nfc-pcsc) rather than the USB device directly. Device-agnostic —
+  # same wiring as batm3's Feitian KP382; harmless if no reader is attached,
+  # pcscd just idles. Shared by every upboard machine (sintra, tejo).
+  services.pcscd.enable = true;
+
+  # pcscd gates client access via polkit; without a rule the sandboxed
+  # `bitspire` service user is "Rejected unauthorized PC/SC client". Authorize
+  # it to talk to the daemon and the card.
+  security.polkit.extraConfig = ''
+    polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
+      if ((action.id == "org.debian.pcsc-lite.access_pcsc" ||
+           action.id == "org.debian.pcsc-lite.access_card") &&
+          subject.user == "bitspire") {
+        return polkit.Result.YES;
+      }
+    });
+  '';
+
   # Disable suspend/hibernate for kiosk
   systemd.targets = {
     sleep.enable = false;

deploy/nixos/live.nix

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Lamassu ATM Live USB Configuration
+# bitSpire ATM Live USB Configuration
 # Bootable ISO for testing on physical hardware without installing to disk.
 #
 # Parameterized by machineModel (passed via specialArgs from flake.nix):
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # Does NOT import hardware/upboard.nix (its fileSystems conflict with live boot).
 # Instead, duplicates only the hardware-relevant kernel modules and GPU config.
 
-{ config, lib, pkgs, pkgs-unstable, nixpkgs, machineModel ? "douro", atm-app, ... }:
+{ config, lib, pkgs, pkgs-unstable, nixpkgs, machineModel ? "douro", atm-app, kioskLauncher, ... }:
 
 let
   # Fiat code per machine model (for envTemplate display only)
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ in
       Environment = "LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${pkgs.stdenv.cc.cc.lib}/lib";
       # Electron needs --no-sandbox in the live/testing environment
       # --enable-logging makes renderer console.log visible in journalctl
-      ExecStart = lib.mkForce "${pkgs-unstable.electron}/bin/electron --no-sandbox --disable-gpu-sandbox --disable-gpu --disable-software-rasterizer --enable-logging ${atm-app}";
+      ExecStart = lib.mkForce "${kioskLauncher}";
       # Prevent Electron from consuming all RAM on memory-constrained ATMs
       MemoryMax = lib.mkForce "1G";
       # Disable all security hardening that conflicts with Electron

deploy/nixos/provision-access.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Provision the access-control gate (ADR-003) to a deployed bitSpire ATM.
+# Pushes an access.json to /var/lib/bitspire/ and restarts the service, so the
+# gate can be toggled on a machine without an image rebuild (mirrors
+# provision-branding.sh). Env defaults are overridden by whatever this file sets.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   bash provision-access.sh <access.json>                    # SSH to localhost:2222 (QEMU)
+#   bash provision-access.sh <access.json> 192.168.1.50       # a real ATM on the LAN
+#   bash provision-access.sh <access.json> 192.168.1.50 22    # custom SSH port
+#
+# access.json schema (all keys optional; omitted keys fall back to env/defaults):
+#   {
+#     "enabled": true,           // master switch for the gate
+#     "openEnrollment": true,    // admit any Bolt Card (gate is not a security boundary)
+#     "devUnlock": false,        // on-screen dev/operator unlock (bypasses the gate; default off)
+#     "salt": "per-machine",     // hashing salt (provision a real one for prod)
+#     "allowList": [             // authorized identities (hashed); empty in open mode
+#       { "idHash": "<hashId(external_id,salt)>", "role": "user", "pinHash": "<hashPin(pin,salt)>" }
+#     ]
+#   }
+#
+# To DISABLE the gate again: push a file with {"enabled": false} (or delete
+# /var/lib/bitspire/access.json on the machine) and restart.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ACCESS_FILE="${1:-}"
+ATM_HOST="${2:-localhost}"
+ATM_SSH_PORT="${3:-2222}"
+ATM_USER="bitspire"
+REMOTE_FILE="/var/lib/bitspire/access.json"
+
+if [ -z "$ACCESS_FILE" ]; then
+    echo "Usage: $0 <access.json> [host] [port]" >&2
+    echo "       $0 ./access.json                       (QEMU on localhost:2222)" >&2
+    echo "       $0 ./access.json 192.168.1.50          (real ATM)" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "$ACCESS_FILE" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: access file not found: $ACCESS_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Fail fast on malformed JSON before touching the machine.
+if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    jq empty "$ACCESS_FILE" || { echo "ERROR: $ACCESS_FILE is not valid JSON" >&2; exit 1; }
+fi
+
+echo "=== Provisioning access gate to $ATM_HOST:$ATM_SSH_PORT ==="
+echo "Local file : $ACCESS_FILE"
+echo "Remote file: $REMOTE_FILE"
+cat "$ACCESS_FILE"
+echo ""
+
+# Copy over SSH. --rsync-path=sudo because /var/lib/bitspire is owned by the
+# bitspire service user, not the SSH user.
+rsync -avz \
+    --rsync-path="sudo rsync" \
+    -e "ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -p $ATM_SSH_PORT" \
+    "$ACCESS_FILE" \
+    "$ATM_USER@$ATM_HOST:$REMOTE_FILE"
+
+# Restart so loadAccessControl() re-reads the file.
+ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -p "$ATM_SSH_PORT" "$ATM_USER@$ATM_HOST" \
+    "sudo systemctl restart bitspire"
+
+echo ""
+echo "=== Access gate provisioned. Service restarted. ==="

deploy/nixos/udev/99-bitspire-hardware.rules

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Lamassu ATM Hardware udev Rules
+# bitSpire ATM Hardware udev Rules
 # Place in /etc/udev/rules.d/ or use services.udev.extraRules in NixOS
 
 # ============================================

docs/adr/003-nfc-access-control-layer.md

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+# ADR-003: NFC Access-Control Layer (badge-to-enter) + Developer Bypass
+
+**Status:** Accepted — amended 2026-09-20 (see [Amendment](#amendment-2026-09-20-what-shipped) below; the original text follows it unchanged)
+**Date:** 2026-07-29
+**Context:** batm3 gaining a physical access layer — an NFC card must be presented to unlock the machine before anyone can transact. Reader hardware is not yet on hand; this ADR defines the direction and a non-breaking skeleton that is fully testable without it.
+
+## Amendment (2026-09-20): what shipped
+
+The gate landed in aiolabs/bitspire#86 as **Bolt Card tap-to-enter**, not the npub-QR → UID → serial-reader path planned below. The decisions still stand (opt-in `locked` state, operator-owned authorization, hashed identities, fail-closed, audited); the mechanism differs:
+
+- **Reader.** The batm3 / upboard reader is a USB CCID contactless reader (Feitian KP382, OMNIKEY 5022) driven by `pcscd` + `nfc-pcsc` in the **main process** (`electron/nfc-service.ts`, from #83), not the serial `/dev/ttyNFC` device or Web NFC. Taps reach the renderer over the existing `nfc:card-tapped` IPC and the store routes them by state (`locked` → enter; the cash screens → pay / receive). The renderer-side `AccessReader` abstraction, the camera npub-QR reader and the mock reader were never wired to anything and have been removed; `services/access/` now holds only `authorize`, the Bolt Card parser and the credential types.
+- **Credential.** Identity is the card's boltcards `external_id`, parsed **locally** from the tapped `lnurlw` (`AccessScan` kind `boltcard`), not the NFC UID. Only `hashId(external_id, salt)` is compared or logged. The `npub` variant (with its PIN second factor) stays in `authorize()` and its tests for a future non-card credential; `challenge` remains the v2 seam; the planned `uid` variant is gone.
+- **Verified entry via `/session`** (superseding #86's soft entry). A tap yields a single-use SUN `p`/`c`, and verifying it at entry would have spent the voucher Complete needed, so #86 made no server call at entry. The fork now exposes `/session/<id>?p=&c=` (`docs/boltcard-session.md`): it spends the SUN **once**, proves a genuine non-replayed card, returns the card wallet's balance + fiat, and hands back the hit-keyed LUD-03 / LUD-06 second steps so Complete still needs no second tap. The session is single-shot — after the first Complete attempt, accepted or declined, the store drops it and the customer re-taps. The balance is shown on the idle menu and cash screens **hidden by default** behind an eye toggle (`CardChip.vue`), priced the way the LNbits wallet page prices it (wallet currency, else instance default, else the ATM's fiat at its own rate).
+- **Open enrollment is still not a security boundary.** `/session` proves the card is genuine *to the server the card names*: the session URL is derived from the tapped `lnurlw`'s host, so with `openEnrollment` on a forged NDEF tag pointing at a server that answers `authenticated: true` still unlocks the terminal. Money is unaffected (cash-out never dispenses without `PAYMENT_RECEIVED`; cash-in pays where the holder pointed). Closing the gate means pinning the accepted card-server host(s) and/or a provisioned allow-list — tracked in aiolabs/bitspire#91.
+- **Session semantics.** One tap = one session; every transaction terminal state returns to `locked`. Inactivity (60 s on the idle menu) and the absolute cap (10 min) are measured at the DOM layer (`useSessionSecurity`) because an XState `after` cannot observe touches. Both send `END_SESSION`, which the machine accepts **from `idle` only**, so a timer can never abandon stacked bills or an in-flight dispense. An explicit End Session button re-locks immediately.
+- **Config.** `ACCESS_CONTROL_ENABLED` / `ACCESS_OPEN_ENROLLMENT` / `ACCESS_DEV_UNLOCK` / `ACCESS_SALT` from env, overridden by `/var/lib/bitspire/access.json` (pushed with `deploy/nixos/provision-access.sh`, no rebuild). `devUnlock` defaults **off**.
+- **Audit** is still a console stub; the state.db write promised in decision 7 is tracked in aiolabs/bitspire#90.
+- **Phased plan superseded.** PR3 (Web NFC) and PR4 (serial HAL) will not happen — the pcscd reader covers real hardware and there is no laptop dev path beyond the debug paste-box on `LockedView`. PR5's challenge-response idea survives as the `challenge` seam.
+
+---
+
+## Decision
+
+1. **Add a top-level `locked` state to the ATM state machine, and make it the initial state.** It sits *below* the existing initialization gates (`unpaired` / `awaiting-fees` / `maintenance` / `signer-unreachable`, which live in `App.vue`). A healthy, paired machine boots into `locked` and only reveals `idle` (Buy/Sell) after an access grant.
+
+2. **Access control is opt-in via runtime config (`accessControl.enabled`, default `false`).** When disabled, the machine behaves exactly as today (boots straight to `idle`). This makes the whole feature non-breaking for the current test unit and for production ATMs, and lets a half-built access layer never brick a working box. This is the single most important constraint on the design.
+
+3. **The reader lives behind an `AccessReader` abstraction that mirrors the existing `PairingSource` seam.** First implementation is a `MockAccessReader` (dev button / hotkey), so the locked→idle→transaction path is exercisable today with zero hardware. Web NFC and serial-NFC implementations follow.
+
+4. **Credential model is a discriminated union with an explicit upgrade path.** v1 = card UID matched against a hashed allow-list. v2 = challenge-response (card-held key signs a machine nonce), verified against an operator-authorized set. Ship v1; design the types so v2 is additive.
+
+5. **Three-tier developer bypass**, following existing conventions: a build flag (`VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE`), the config disable (`accessControl.enabled=false`), and a runtime operator/dev unlock gesture that dispatches a synthetic grant.
+
+6. **Authorization is owned by the machine operator, not the SaaS operator** — consistent with [ADR-002](./002-remote-access-and-fleet-management.md). The card allow-list is authorized by the operator key (the [#42](https://git.atitlan.io/aiolabs/bitspire/issues/42) allow-list mechanism), local first, operator-synced later. When access control is *enabled* and the reader is absent/broken, the machine **fails closed** (with the operator/dev unlock as the escape hatch); when *disabled*, reader state is irrelevant.
+
+7. **Every grant/deny is audited** to `state.db` (hashed credential + timestamp + role + outcome), with optional later publication as a Nostr event. No PII, consistent with the KYC-free principle.
+
+## Context
+
+### What this is (and what it is not)
+
+This is the **end-user physical access plane**: a person must badge in to use the machine. It is distinct from the three planes in [ADR-002](./002-remote-access-and-fleet-management.md) — it is *not* the operator's SSH/NetBird recovery plane, and *not* the SaaS payment plane. It shares one idea with ADR-002: **the machine operator owns who is authorized**, expressed through the operator key / #42 allow-list.
+
+### Why the codebase is well-shaped for this
+
+Three seams already exist; we extend them rather than invent:
+
+- **The idle→transaction transition is unguarded.** `packages/state-machine/src/machine.ts` starts at `initial: 'idle'` (~L431) and `idle` moves to `cashIn`/`cashOut` via plain `SELECT_CASH_IN` / `SELECT_CASH_OUT` transitions with no guards (~L457-464). Inserting a `locked` predecessor state is a localized change.
+- **`PairingSource` is a reader abstraction designed to grow.** Its doc (`apps/machine/src/services/pairing/types.ts`) explicitly anticipates *"an NFC reader or a HAL barcode scanner… a HAL-scanner source can be added the same way without touching the wizard."* `AccessReader` mirrors it: `qr-source.ts` / `nfc-source.ts` → `mock-reader.ts` / `web-nfc-reader.ts` / `serial-reader.ts`.
+- **Dev-flag and config conventions are established.** `import.meta.env.VITE_* === 'true'` (e.g. `VITE_MAINTENANCE_MODE`, `VITE_FORCE_MOCK`), plus Electron `get-config` fields that the renderer reads (`electron/main.ts` L280–312: `maintenanceMode`, `branding`). A new `accessControl` config field and a `VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE` flag follow the same shape.
+
+### Hardware reality check (important)
+
+The batm3 already exposes an NFC device, but it is **serial**: `deploy/nixos/hardware/batm3.nix` L154 maps udev serial `A9ZF8ELY` → `/dev/ttyNFC`. The *existing* `pairing/nfc-source.ts` uses **Web NFC** (`NDEFReader`), which drives a phone/laptop NFC radio, **not** a serial reader. So the real batm3 access reader needs a **main-process serial driver** (HAL-style, per [ADR-001](./001-hal-architecture.md)) exposing card events to the renderer over IPC — the Web NFC path is only useful for laptop/phone dev. This ADR keeps that driver as a clearly-scoped later PR so the skeleton doesn't pretend the scaffold "just works" on the panel.
+
+## Architecture
+
+### Boot / render layering
+
+```
+Electron get-config ─┐
+                     ▼
+App.vue init gates (unchanged):
+  unpaired? → PairingWizard
+  initError (maintenance / awaiting-fees / signer-unreachable)? → maintenance screen
+  else ▼
+State machine (paired + healthy):
+  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+  │  locked  ──ACCESS_GRANTED──▶  idle             │  ← NEW initial state
+  │    ▲                          │  SELECT_CASH_* │
+  │    │ re-lock (session end /    ▼               │
+  │    │ inactivity / complete)   cashIn / cashOut │
+  │    └──────────────────────────┘               │
+  └───────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+        (when accessControl.enabled === false,
+         `locked` immediately `always`-bypasses to `idle`)
+```
+
+The access gate is strictly below App.vue's init gates: a machine that is unpaired or in maintenance never reaches `locked`.
+
+### 1. State machine (`packages/state-machine`)
+
+- New top-level state `locked`, `initial: 'locked'`.
+- New events on the machine's event union: `ACCESS_GRANTED` (carries an authorized `CardCredential` + resolved role), `ACCESS_DENIED` (carries a reason), `DEV_UNLOCK`.
+- `locked` transitions:
+  - `always: [{ guard: 'accessBypass', target: 'idle' }]` — instant pass-through when disabled/bypassed (no UI flicker; the view is gated on the same predicate).
+  - `on: { ACCESS_GRANTED: { target: 'idle', actions: ['startSession', 'recordAccessGrant'] }, ACCESS_DENIED: { actions: 'recordAccessDeny' }, DEV_UNLOCK: { guard: 'devUnlockAllowed', target: 'idle', actions: 'startDevSession' } }`.
+- Re-lock: the existing `complete` auto-return (currently 60s → `idle`) and the inactivity timeouts (`INACTIVITY_TIMEOUT`/`TIMEOUT_MS`, ~L422-429) target `locked` instead of `idle`. Because `locked` `always`-bypasses when disabled, this is one code path for both modes.
+- Purity: the state-machine package must not read Vite env. `accessControl.enabled` and the bypass boolean are passed in as **actor input → context** (`context.accessControlEnabled`, `context.accessBypass`); guard `accessBypass` reads context only. New context fields: `accessControlEnabled`, `accessBypass`, `session` (`{ role, grantedAt, credentialIdHash } | null`).
+- Guards: `accessBypass`, `devUnlockAllowed`. Actions: `startSession`, `startDevSession`, `recordAccessGrant`, `recordAccessDeny`, and `resetContext` extended to clear `session`.
+
+### 2. Config plumbing
+
+- `apps/machine/src/types/electron.d.ts` — extend `RuntimeConfig` (L5) with:
+  ```ts
+  accessControl: {
+    enabled: boolean            // default false
+    devUnlock: boolean          // allow the runtime operator/dev unlock gesture
+    // v2: allowListSource, challengeRequired, …
+  }
+  ```
+- `apps/machine/electron/main.ts` — the `get-config` handler (L280) returns `accessControl`, sourced from env for now (`ACCESS_CONTROL_ENABLED === 'true'`, `VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE` → forces `enabled:false`), later from a provisioned file under `/var/lib/bitspire/` alongside branding.
+- `apps/machine/.env.example` — document `VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE=true` (browser/dev straight to idle) and `ACCESS_CONTROL_ENABLED`.
+
+### 3. Reader abstraction (`apps/machine/src/services/access/`)
+
+Mirrors `services/pairing/`:
+
+```
+services/access/
+  types.ts          # AccessReader, CardCredential (union), AccessRole, StopCapture
+  mock-reader.ts    # PR1 — fires a card event on demand (dev button / hotkey)
+  web-nfc-reader.ts # PR3 — NDEFReader, dev on laptop/phone
+  serial-reader.ts  # PR4 — /dev/ttyNFC via main-process HAL + IPC
+  authorize.ts      # allow-list check + role resolution (hashed UID v1)
+  index.ts          # availableAccessReaders(): AccessReader[]
+  __tests__/
+```
+
+```ts
+export type AccessRole = 'user' | 'operator'
+
+export type CardCredential =
+  | { kind: 'uid'; uidHash: string }                                  // v1
+  | { kind: 'challenge'; pubkey: string; nonce: string; sig: string } // v2 (seam)
+
+export interface AccessReader {
+  readonly kind: 'mock' | 'nfc-web' | 'nfc-serial'
+  readonly label: string
+  isAvailable(): Promise<boolean>
+  start(opts: {
+    onCard: (cred: CardCredential) => void
+    onError?: (e: unknown) => void
+  }): Promise<StopCapture>
+}
+```
+
+### 4. Renderer wiring
+
+- `apps/machine/src/views/LockedView.vue` (new) — the badge-in screen. Shows brand/logo + "Present your card", a live reader status, and (when `accessControl.devUnlock`) a discreet operator/dev unlock affordance (hidden long-press corner, or a button on the existing debug bar).
+- `apps/machine/src/App.vue` — add a `locked` render branch mirroring the `PairingWizard` branch (L179) and the `initError` branch (L183): `<LockedView v-else-if="atmStore.isLocked" />`, then the existing `<router-view>` only when unlocked. Keeps rendering state-driven and matches the current shape.
+- `apps/machine/src/stores/atm.ts` —
+  - `createActor(machine, { input: { accessControlEnabled, accessBypass } })` at the existing `createActor(machine)` site (L452), seeded from `RuntimeConfig`.
+  - `isLocked` computed off the snapshot (peer of `isIdle`, ~L422).
+  - `grantAccess(cred, role)` / `denyAccess(reason)` / `devUnlock()` that `send({ type: 'ACCESS_GRANTED' | 'ACCESS_DENIED' | 'DEV_UNLOCK', … })` (peers of `selectCashIn` at L1382, using the existing `send` at L1378).
+  - On init, when `accessControl.enabled`, subscribe to `availableAccessReaders()[0]`; on `onCard`, run `authorize()` → `grantAccess`/`denyAccess`. When disabled, do nothing (machine `always`-bypasses).
+
+### 5. Audit
+
+- Add `recordAccessEvent({ credentialIdHash, role, outcome, at })` alongside the existing state.db handlers (`state:record-transaction` etc. in `electron/main.ts`, exposed via `preload.ts`). v1 writes locally; a later PR can mirror to a replaceable Nostr event.
+
+### Session semantics (decided)
+
+**One badge = one transaction-scoped session.** A grant unlocks `idle`, the user runs a single transaction (Buy or Sell), and the machine re-locks on `complete`, on inactivity, or on an explicit "Done". The `session` context field is deliberately shaped as a general access session (`{ role, grantedAt, credentialIdHash }`), not a transaction handle, because this terminal may later handle **non-transaction functions** — so "unlock the terminal" and "authorize a transaction" stay separate concepts.
+
+**Step-up authorization (future seam, not in PR1).** The badge tap grants *terminal access*; a specific sensitive action can independently *request re-authorization* — e.g. "tap your phone" or "enter a PIN" — without conflating the two. This is why the credential model is a union and the machine carries a `session` rather than a boolean "unlocked": a later `REQUIRE_STEPUP` event can gate an individual action against a fresh credential/PIN while the terminal session stays open. PR1 ships only the entry gate; step-up is a documented extension.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+- **Gate between `idle` and the transaction** (idle visible, tap requires a card). Rejected: the requirement is "gain access to the exchange" — the whole machine should be locked, not just the transact button. A `locked` predecessor matches the mental model and gives a clean re-lock boundary.
+- **Web NFC only** (reuse `nfc-source.ts` as-is). Rejected: the batm3 reader is serial (`ttyNFC`); Web NFC can't drive it. Web NFC stays a dev-only convenience.
+- **Fail-open by default** (no card → allow). Rejected for an access-control feature; but note the *disabled* default sidesteps this — access is simply off until an operator turns it on, at which point it fails **closed**.
+- **OS/kiosk-level lock** (lock the desktop, not the app). Rejected: too coarse, no per-transaction audit, no role model, and it fights the existing state-driven UI.
+- **UID allow-list as the permanent model.** Rejected as an endpoint (UIDs clone trivially) but accepted as v1 behind a union type, so challenge-response is additive.
+
+## Security considerations
+
+- **UID cloning** — card UIDs are not secret and are cloneable; v1 is "better than nothing" and is explicitly labeled upgradeable. The v2 challenge-response path (card signs a machine nonce) is the real security boundary; design the credential union and the `authorize()` seam for it now.
+- **Data at rest** — store only a salted hash of the credential id; never raw UIDs or any PII (KYC-free). Never log a card secret or nsec (repo security priority #1).
+- **Fail-closed when enabled** — reader absent/broken + `enabled` ⇒ locked, escape hatch = operator/dev unlock. Reader problems on a *disabled* machine are inert.
+- **Operator ownership** — authorization derives from the operator key / #42 allow-list, not the SaaS operator (ADR-002 boundary). Local allow-list first; operator-published (NIP-51-style) sync later.
+- **Dev bypass blast radius** — `VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE` is build-time and never set in a production image; `devUnlock` is gated by `accessControl.devUnlock` (off in a locked-down deployment) and every dev unlock is audited with role `operator`/`dev`.
+
+## Resolved decisions (2026-07-29)
+
+1. **Session model** — ✅ one badge = one **transaction-scoped session**, with the `session` context modeled generally (terminal access, not a transaction handle) to allow non-transaction functions and per-action **step-up auth** (tap phone / PIN) later. See *Session semantics* above.
+2. **v1 credential** — ✅ **UID allow-list first** (hashed), behind a `CardCredential` union so challenge-response is additive (PR5).
+3. **Allow-list home** — ✅ **local first** (`state.db` / provisioned `access.json`, peer of `branding/`); operator-Nostr sync is a later PR.
+
+Still open (cosmetic, decide during PR2):
+
+4. **Dev unlock affordance** — hidden long-press corner vs a labeled button on the existing debug bar.
+
+---
+
+## Implementation plan (phased PRs)
+
+Each PR is independently mergeable. **PR1 changes nothing observable while `accessControl.enabled=false` (the default).**
+
+### PR1 — Non-breaking skeleton (state + config + mock reader + dev bypass + audit stub)
+**Goal:** the locked→idle→transaction path is exercisable on the batm3 today, and the flag-off machine is byte-for-byte behavior-identical.
+- `packages/state-machine`: add `locked` state (`initial`), `ACCESS_GRANTED`/`ACCESS_DENIED`/`DEV_UNLOCK` events, `accessBypass`/`devUnlockAllowed` guards, `startSession`/`recordAccess*` actions, context fields + actor `input`. Re-point `complete`/inactivity re-lock targets to `locked`.
+- `apps/machine/src/types/electron.d.ts`: `RuntimeConfig.accessControl`.
+- `apps/machine/electron/main.ts`: `get-config` returns `accessControl` (env-sourced); `.env.example` documents `VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE` + `ACCESS_CONTROL_ENABLED`.
+- `apps/machine/src/services/access/`: `types.ts`, `mock-reader.ts`, `authorize.ts` (UID allow-list, hashed), `index.ts`.
+- `apps/machine/src/stores/atm.ts`: actor `input`, `isLocked`, `grantAccess`/`denyAccess`/`devUnlock`, reader subscription (only when enabled).
+- `apps/machine/src/views/LockedView.vue` + `App.vue` `locked` render branch.
+- Audit stub: `recordAccessEvent` handler + preload exposure (local write only).
+- **Tests:** state-machine `locked → idle` on grant; `always`-bypass when disabled; re-lock from `complete`; `authorize()` allow/deny; `devUnlock` gated by config. 
+- **Flag state on merge:** `enabled=false`. CI green = no behavior change.
+
+### PR2 — Locked UX polish
+- Reader status/animation, brand-aware LockedView, denied-flash + reason, inactivity copy, operator/dev unlock affordance per open-question #4. Pure renderer.
+
+### PR3 — Web NFC reader (dev)
+- `web-nfc-reader.ts` (`NDEFReader`), registered in `availableAccessReaders()` behind availability check. Lets a laptop/phone drive the gate for demos/dev. No hardware dependency.
+
+### PR4 — Serial NFC HAL driver (real batm3 hardware)
+- Main-process serial driver for `/dev/ttyNFC` (HAL-style per ADR-001), IPC channel `access:watch-card` + `preload.ts` exposure; `serial-reader.ts` renderer client. Requires the physical reader to validate. Document the reader's protocol/baud in `docs/device-configuration.md`.
+
+### PR5 — Challenge-response credential + operator allow-list sync
+- Extend `CardCredential` with the `challenge` variant; `authorize.ts` verifies a signature over a machine nonce against the operator-authorized set; allow-list synced from an operator-published event (#42 mechanism). This is the real security upgrade; v1 UID path stays as a fallback/dev mode.
+
+### Cross-cutting
+- **Docs:** update `docs/machine-installation.md` (enabling access control, enrolling cards) and `deploy/nixos/README.md` (the `accessControl` config + `/dev/ttyNFC`) as PR4/PR5 land.
+- **Provisioning:** a later change can add an `access.json` under `/var/lib/bitspire/` (peer of `branding/`) with the allow-list + `enabled`, plus a `provision-access.sh` mirroring `provision-branding.sh`.

docs/adr/004-cassette-state-synchronization.md

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+# ADR-004: Cassette-State Synchronization
+
+**Status:** Accepted
+**Date:** 2026-09-22
+**Context:** Cassette counts exist on two machines that both write them, over a transport
+that cannot report a losing write. This has been load-bearing since #56 shipped, and until
+now its only specification was a closed issue and a chat log — which is how four separate
+divergence bugs went unnoticed.
+
+## The problem
+
+The ATM holds per-bay rows in `state.db` (`position` → `denomination`, `count`). spirekeeper
+holds its own `cassette_configs` view for the operator dashboard. They are kept in step over
+Nostr kind-30078, one addressable document per direction:
+
+| d-tag                                   | Direction             | Author   |
+| --------------------------------------- | --------------------- | -------- |
+| `bitspire-cassettes-state:<atm_pubkey>` | ATM reports counts up | ATM      |
+| `bitspire-cassettes:<atm_pubkey>`       | operator pushes down  | operator |
+
+Counts drive cash dispensing and the public availability beacon, so a wrong number either
+strands a customer at a machine that will not pay out or advertises cash that is not there.
+
+The transport shapes everything else. Per NIP-01, an addressable event is identified by
+`kind:pubkey:d` and ordered by `created_at` at **second granularity**, ties broken by lowest
+event id. Relays MAY discard the loser, and a relay returns `OK` for an event it then
+discards — so **acceptance is not persistence, and a losing writer is never told**. That
+single fact rules out the obvious design.
+
+## Decisions
+
+### 1. The ATM owns `count`. The operator publishes operations, not counts.
+
+A value with one writer cannot be clobbered. Compare-and-swap was considered and rejected:
+CAS works because the writer learns it failed and retries, and every standard implementation
+of it — HTTP `412`, Kubernetes `409`, a zero rowcount, `CMPXCHG` returning false — delivers
+that signal. A kind-30078 publish cannot. Bolting a version onto the current design would let
+the ATM refuse a stale push but leave the operator believing they set a count they did not,
+trading a wrong number for a phantom edit.
+
+So the operator publishes `refill`, `empty`, `recount` and `set_denomination` operations. The
+vocabulary mirrors lamassu-server's `cash_unit_operation_type`, which is the same shape the
+ancestor of this HAL arrived at. Absolute writes survive only as `recount`, which is what an
+operator opening a bay and counting actually does.
+
+`denomination` stays operator-authoritative: the machine cannot know what was physically
+loaded into a bay.
+
+### 2. Idempotency is explicit, because deltas are not idempotent.
+
+Addressable events are re-delivered on reconnect, so a naive delta would be applied twice.
+Every operation carries an operator-minted `id`; the ATM records applied ids and ignores
+duplicates. This is lamassu-server's `pullNewBills` pattern — a client-minted UUID per unit of
+work, making resend free and ordering irrelevant — rather than a sequence number.
+
+### 3. The operator publishes a window of recent operations, not one.
+
+An event the ATM missed self-heals on the next publish, because the next event still carries
+the earlier operations. This is the same trick as Lightning.Pub piggybacking `latest_balance`
+on every incremental message so a client that missed events corrects itself.
+
+### 4. The ATM echoes applied ids back, which is the acknowledgement.
+
+The state document carries `applied_ops`, so the dashboard can render each published operation
+as applied or pending. This supplies the feedback leg a replaceable event cannot, without
+needing the transport to report failures.
+
+### 4a. Superseded. Before decisions 1 to 4 shipped, the overwrite was warned about.
+
+The dashboard's publish dialog stated the failure plainly — that the publish would overwrite
+the ATM's tracked counts, that decrements since the last baseline would be lost, and that it
+should follow a physical refill rather than a mid-day tweak.
+
+Kept here rather than deleted, because it is the calibration for how much a warning is worth.
+It was a known, deliberately accepted risk carrying a human-factors mitigation, not an
+oversight, and the product had already reached the same conclusion these decisions formalise.
+It was also the weakest control available: it depended on an operator reading a dialog at the
+end of a refill round, and it could not help at all when the stale value was the one already
+in the form. Confirmed live on 2026-09-22 — a dispense moved a bay from 54 to 53 while a form
+loaded at 54 stayed open, and nothing but that dialog stood between the operator and
+discarding the decrement.
+
+The dialog and the endpoint behind it are both gone. The operator dashboard no longer has a
+field that accepts a count, which is a stronger guarantee than any wording could be.
+
+### 5. Ordering is decided by `created_at`, never by arrival order, on both sides.
+
+The ATM forces each stamp strictly above its last published one, so a same-second publish or a
+clock stepping backwards cannot silently discard a report. spirekeeper applies an event only
+when strictly newer than the **oldest** stamp on file for that machine.
+
+Oldest, not newest, because LNbits' `Connection.execute` commits per call: a multi-row apply
+cannot be made atomic through that data layer, so a crash mid-apply leaves some rows advanced.
+Gating on the oldest means a partial apply is re-applied rather than mistaken for a complete
+one, and the ATM's heartbeat makes it converge.
+
+### 6. The machine's bay set is authoritative for layout.
+
+Bay count is hardware-determined. spirekeeper deletes positions absent from a report rather
+than leaving them; the operator cannot add or remove bays.
+
+### 7. Unverified counts are declared, not guessed.
+
+When a dispense ends with no per-bay report — a driver throw, or the dispense timeout — bills
+may have reached the customer with nothing knowing how many. The ATM flags
+`counts_uncertain_since` and carries it in the state document rather than letting a number
+known to read high stand as measurement. An operator `recount` clears it.
+
+### 8. State is published on every change and on a heartbeat.
+
+A publish is one fire-and-forget event with no retry. The heartbeat is what makes the channel
+self-healing after a relay outage, and the only way an out-of-band edit to the table ever
+reaches the operator.
+
+## What this replaces
+
+The original design published a single hello-event gated on a one-shot flag, deduplicated on
+one remembered event id, and never compared `created_at` at all. In practice that produced:
+
+| Failure                                                         | Issue          |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------- |
+| Layout changes after first boot never published                 | bitspire#94    |
+| Remediation dispenses debited HAL but not the rows              | bitspire#76    |
+| Absent positions never deleted; publishes then rejected forever | spirekeeper#43 |
+| A stale dashboard publish overwriting a newer report            | spirekeeper#43 |
+| A drained machine advertising bills it had already dispensed    | found in audit |
+| A re-delivered A, B, A applied three times                      | found in audit |
+
+The last of these is the only one decisions 5 to 8 do not close, because it is not a defect
+in the mechanism: the operator is permitted to write the count, so a stale write is
+indistinguishable from an intended one. Only decisions 1 to 4 remove it, by removing the
+operator's ability to write counts at all.
+
+## Status of implementation
+
+Decisions 5 through 8 shipped in bitspire#104 and spirekeeper#44, on the existing wire format,
+and were verified against the deployed code on sintra on 2026-09-22: a zeroed machine reported
+drained rather than freezing its beacon, a re-delivered operator config was dropped as stale on
+eight consecutive restarts, three heartbeat republishes carried strictly increasing stamps read
+back off the relay, and the machine, the relay and the operator dashboard agreed on the counts
+with timestamps correlated to the second.
+
+Decisions 1 through 4 are the v2 operations wire and shipped in spirekeeper#46 and
+bitspire#106.
+
+On the operator side there is no longer any endpoint that accepts a count: the absolute
+publish, its CRUD write and its request model were removed rather than deprecated. The
+dashboard records operations and renders each as applied or pending from the machine's
+`applied_ops` echo. On the machine side, schema v13 adds a `cassette_ops` dedup ledger, the
+`created_at` watermark on this path is retired in favour of per-op ids, and the state document
+carries `schema_version`, `seq` and `applied_ops`.
+
+The wire shapes are those given under decisions 1 and 4 above.
+
+Cutover for v2 is strict, no compatibility code: spirekeeper deploys first, machines follow on
+their nightly pull. During that window a not-yet-updated ATM ignores an ops payload, so an
+operator refill does not land until it updates — which fails safe, since the machine
+under-counts and will not dispense bills it believes it lacks. In the other direction an
+updated machine drops a v1 absolute-count payload on the missing `ops` array, which is the
+same safe direction: the machine keeps the counts it is now the only writer of.
+
+One gap stays open deliberately. An operation recorded while the relay is unreachable waits
+for the operator's next action to be published, because only an operator action triggers a
+publish. The window makes that self-healing once anything is published, but nothing on the
+operator side republishes on its own. An operator-side heartbeat is the fix; it is not built.
+
+## Alternatives considered
+
+- **Compare-and-swap on absolute writes.** Rejected: see decision 1. Viable only with a
+  feedback leg the transport cannot provide, and decision 4 gets the same benefit without
+  pretending the transport is something it is not.
+- **NIP-77 negentropy for reconciliation.** Rejected: it reconciles sets of event ids and
+  still requires a separate fetch. For a single mutable document it costs more than
+  re-reading it.
+- **One envelope carrying all operator config.** Rejected earlier and still right: a fee edit
+  that republished a stale cassette inventory is a real failure mode. One d-tag per lifecycle.
+- **Publishing the operation log as kind-78.** Deferred. The operator authors the operations
+  and the ATM records what it applied, so both sides already hold an audit trail.

docs/boltcard-receive-resolver.md

@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ wallet …".
 
 ## Notes
 
+- **Tap-to-enter uses `/session` instead.** When the access gate is on, the
+  card was already verified at entry and the ATM holds the LUD-06 second step
+  from `/session` (see `boltcard-session.md`), so Complete calls `pay.callback`
+  directly and never touches `/pay`. `/pay` remains the path for a card tapped
+  directly on the cash-in screen (gate off, or a second card).
+
 - **Double-payout:** the cash-in screen still shows the LNURL-withdraw QR as a
   fallback (customer _pulls_). A tap _pays_ instead. The ATM gates re-entry
   while a tap is in flight and leaves `displayingQR` on success; the withdraw

docs/boltcard-session.md

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# Bolt Card session — one verified tap for a terminal visit
+
+Wire contract for the `/session` endpoint the ATM's access gate (ADR-003
+tap-to-enter) uses on the LNbits `boltcards` extension. Implemented in the
+aiolabs fork (`git.atitlan.io/aiolabs/boltcards`, `v1.1.1-aio.3`+); consumed by
+`apps/machine/electron/boltcard-session.ts`.
+
+## Why a session
+
+A Bolt Card tap yields a single-use SUN `p`/`c`: the card server verifies it
+and advances the card's read counter, so any endpoint that checks it — `/scan`,
+`/pay`, `/verify` — spends it. The gate wants two things from one tap:
+
+1. **Verify at entry** — a genuine, non-replayed card unlocks the terminal and
+   we can show the holder their balance.
+2. **Complete without a second tap** — the buy or sell later in the visit
+   moves sats with the same card.
+
+`/session` does the verification once and hands back the _second steps_ of
+both LNURL flows, keyed by a single-use server-side `hit` — the same bearer
+`/scan` (as `k1`) and `/pay` already issue. The terminal holds no `p`/`c`
+afterwards.
+
+## Endpoint
+
+```
+GET /boltcards/api/v1/session/{external_id}?p={p}&c={c}
+```
+
+Same URL shape as `/scan/{external_id}?p=&c=` with `scan` → `session`; the ATM
+derives it by string substitution on the tapped `lnurlw`
+(`scanUrlToSessionUrl()`). SUN verification is byte-for-byte `/scan`'s (shared
+helper in the fork): unknown / disabled card, UID mismatch, bad CMAC, replayed
+counter all reject with `/scan`'s reasons. On success the counter advances and
+one `hit` is recorded.
+
+## Response
+
+```json
+{
+  "authenticated": true,
+  "external_id": "abc123",
+  "card_name": "Alice",
+  "balance_msat": 123456000,
+  "currency": "USD",
+  "fiat": 98.76,
+  "withdraw": {
+    "callback": "https://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/lnurl/cb/<hit>",
+    "k1": "<hit>",
+    "minWithdrawable": 1000,
+    "maxWithdrawable": 50000000
+  },
+  "withdraw_blocked_reason": null,
+  "pay": {
+    "callback": "https://lnbits.l484.com/boltcards/api/v1/pay/cb/<hit>",
+    "minSendable": 1000,
+    "maxSendable": 50000000,
+    "metadata": "[[\"text/plain\",\"Bolt Card top-up\"]]"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+- `balance_msat` — the card wallet's balance. Display only.
+- `currency` / `fiat` — the balance priced the way the LNbits wallet page does
+  it: the wallet's own currency (per-wallet setting) first, else the instance's
+  default accounting currency. `fiat` is filled **only from the server's
+  already-warm rate cache** — this response gates the unlock, and a cold rate
+  lookup queries external exchanges (~1 s). On a cache miss it is `null` and
+  the ATM prices the sats itself: in `currency` from its own rate source, else
+  in its own fiat at its display rate. No rate lookup ever blocks the session.
+- `withdraw` — the LUD-03 second step. The ATM calls
+  `callback?k1=<hit>&pr=<bolt11>` at cash-out Complete. `null` with
+  `withdraw_blocked_reason` set when `/scan` would have refused (daily limit
+  spent); cash-in stays possible.
+- `pay` — the LUD-06 second step. The ATM calls `callback?amount=<msat>` at
+  cash-in Complete and pays the returned BOLT11 over its own nostr transport.
+- Limits are the card's `tx_limit`, as on `/scan` and `/pay`.
+
+Rejection:
+
+```json
+{ "authenticated": false, "reason": "This link is already used." }
+```
+
+`reason` is surfaced verbatim on the locked screen — terse, non-sensitive.
+
+## Semantics of the hit
+
+- The first withdraw that uses the hit spends it (`spent = true`), exactly as
+  after a `/scan`; a second withdraw is refused with "Payment already claimed."
+- A top-up does not mark the hit spent (as `/pay` today).
+- The ATM treats the whole session as single-shot regardless: after the first
+  Complete attempt, accepted or declined, it drops the session and asks for a
+  re-tap (`completeWithCard` in `stores/atm.ts`).
+- Hits do not expire server-side. The ATM's session security (60 s idle,
+  10 min cap, End Session) bounds how long one is held.
+
+## Flow
+
+```
+locked ── tap ─▶ GET /session/<id>?p=&c=  (spends the SUN)
+   ├─ authenticated:false → stay locked, show reason
+   └─ authenticated:true  → authorize(external_id) → idle, session held
+                            CardChip: "Alice · ••c123  ••••••  [eye]"
+sell: pick amount → Complete Sale     → withdraw.callback?k1&pr   → PAYMENT_RECEIVED → dispense
+buy:  insert cash → Complete Purchase → pay.callback?amount → BOLT11 → ATM pays → complete
+… re-lock (End Session / idle / complete) drops the session
+```
+
+## Trust boundary (read this)
+
+The ATM derives the session URL from the **card's own `lnurlw` host**. With
+`openEnrollment` on, a forged NDEF tag pointing at an attacker's server that
+answers `{"authenticated": true, …}` still unlocks the terminal. Money is not
+at risk — a fake server can only make the ATM pay an invoice the holder chose
+(cash-in) or accept a pull it never honours (cash-out never dispenses without
+`PAYMENT_RECEIVED`) — but the _gate_ is only as trustworthy as the host it was
+told to ask. Closing that means pinning the card-server host(s) the gate
+accepts; tracked in aiolabs/bitspire#91.

flake.nix

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  description = "Lamassu Next - Nostr-Native Lightning ATM";
+  description = "bitSpire - Nostr-Native Lightning ATM";
 
   inputs = {
     # Stable NixOS for the ATM OS base
@@ -53,6 +53,55 @@
         overlays = [ (import rust-overlay) ];
       };
 
+      # Kiosk launcher. The GPU-related Electron flags sit in a shell variable
+      # rather than being baked into ExecStart, so they can be changed on a
+      # running machine by editing /var/lib/bitspire/.env and restarting the
+      # unit. No rebuild, no reboot, and a bad value is one edit away from
+      # being undone — which matters on a box whose screen nobody can see.
+      #
+      # THE DEFAULT IS NOW HARDWARE ACCELERATION.
+      #
+      # From the first ISO commit (19d43c2) until today the kiosk launched with
+      # --disable-gpu AND --disable-software-rasterizer, which turns off GPU
+      # compositing and the SwiftShader fallback together and leaves Chromium
+      # rasterising every pixel on the CPU. Nothing in git ever justified the
+      # pair: no comment, no issue, no commit message. Meanwhile the
+      # descriptive config at /etc/bitspire/config.env claimed
+      # ELECTRON_DISABLE_GPU=false, contradicting the actual command line.
+      #
+      # Tested on sintra 2026-09-24. With the flags removed the GPU process is
+      # stable (zero crashes, zero service restarts) and genuinely on hardware
+      # — /proc/<gpu-pid>/maps shows libgallium, libGLX_mesa and dri_gbm, with
+      # no swrast and no SwiftShader — rendering through crocus on Braswell.
+      # Confirmed by eye on the panel.
+      #
+      # DOURO IS EXEMPT. It keeps the old flags. Bay Trail carries three
+      # separate display workarounds already — a 5.15 kernel pin for an i915
+      # eDP regression, i915.enable_psr=0, and vt.handoff=7 to preserve the
+      # BIOS display init — so it is the most plausible machine for the
+      # original flags to have been a real fix rather than scaffolding. It is
+      # also down pending a reflash, so it cannot be tested. Drop this
+      # exemption once douro is back and accelerates cleanly.
+      #
+      # To override per machine, in /var/lib/bitspire/.env:
+      #   BITSPIRE_ELECTRON_GPU_FLAGS=                             acceleration
+      #   BITSPIRE_ELECTRON_GPU_FLAGS=--disable-gpu                no GPU
+      #   BITSPIRE_ELECTRON_GPU_FLAGS=--use-gl=egl                 force EGL
+      #   (line absent)                                            model default
+      #
+      # Note `-` and not `:-`: an explicitly EMPTY value means "no GPU flags at
+      # all", and must not fall back to the default. Unquoted on purpose so the
+      # value word-splits into argv.
+      mkKioskLauncher = machineModel: atm-app: pkgs.writeShellScript "bitspire-kiosk" ''
+        default_gpu_flags="${
+          if machineModel == "douro" then "--disable-gpu --disable-software-rasterizer" else ""
+        }"
+        exec ${pkgs-unstable.electron}/bin/electron \
+          --no-sandbox --disable-gpu-sandbox --enable-logging \
+          ''${BITSPIRE_ELECTRON_GPU_FLAGS-$default_gpu_flags} \
+          ${atm-app}
+      '';
+
       # Pure ATM app builder (no --impure needed)
       mkAtmApp = import ./nix/mkAtmApp.nix {
         inherit pkgs pkgs-unstable;
@@ -67,6 +116,34 @@
         batm3 = "USD";
       };
 
+      # Nightly auto-upgrade window per machine model, as a systemd calendar
+      # spec. An upgrade restarts the app, and the Fujitsu dispenser runs an
+      # audible init routine when it does, so this wants to land in the middle
+      # of the machine's own night rather than its business hours.
+      #
+      # The timezone suffix (systemd 252+) is what makes that work WITHOUT
+      # setting the system clock: the timer follows the named zone and its DST,
+      # while time.timeZone stays a fleet-wide default nobody has to maintain
+      # per host. Verified on sintra with systemd-analyze — `04:00
+      # Europe/Paris` resolves to 02:00 UTC in summer, `04:00
+      # America/Guatemala` to 10:00 UTC.
+      #
+      # Do NOT check a spec like this under `nix-shell -p systemd`. The sandbox
+      # cannot resolve named zones and silently computes EVERY one of them as
+      # UTC, while still echoing the zone back in its "Normalized form" line.
+      # It looks accepted and is wrong. Test on a real system.
+      #
+      # Keyed on model like fiatCodeForModel above, and inheriting the same
+      # limitation: model is a hardware model, and it only doubles as host
+      # identity while there is one machine of each. A second sintra in another
+      # country needs this keyed on host instead, along with the fiat code and
+      # the app build that bakes it in.
+      #
+      # Unlisted models get 04:00 in whatever time.timeZone says, unchanged.
+      upgradeWindowForModel = {
+        sintra = "04:00 Europe/Paris";
+      };
+
       lib = nixpkgs.lib;
 
       # Helper to create a live USB NixOS config for a specific machine model
@@ -81,6 +158,7 @@
           inherit system;
           specialArgs = {
             inherit pkgs-unstable nixpkgs machineModel atm-app;
+            kioskLauncher = mkKioskLauncher machineModel atm-app;
           };
           modules = [
             ./deploy/nixos/live.nix
@@ -182,7 +260,9 @@
                 enable = true;
                 flake = "git+ssh://forgejo@git.atitlan.io/aiolabs/bitspire.git?ref=dev#${machineModel}-installed";
                 flags = [ "--refresh" ];
-                dates = "04:00"; # daily at 4am
+                # Daily at 4am in the machine's own zone; see
+                # upgradeWindowForModel above.
+                dates = upgradeWindowForModel.${machineModel} or "04:00";
                 allowReboot = false;
               };
 
@@ -209,6 +289,14 @@
                     VITE_SPIRE_SEED=
                     ELECTRON_FORCE_PROD=1
                     DISPLAY=:0
+                    # Uncomment to change Electron's GPU flags without a
+                    # rebuild, then `systemctl restart bitspire`. An empty
+                    # value means full GPU acceleration; the line being absent
+                    # means the shipped default (GPU and software rasterizer
+                    # both off). Commented rather than set, because a present
+                    # -but-empty value here would silently enable the GPU on
+                    # every machine that regenerates its .env.
+                    # BITSPIRE_ELECTRON_GPU_FLAGS=
                   '' + pkgs.lib.optionalString (config.services.bitspire.relayUrl != "") ''
                     VITE_RELAY_URL=${config.services.bitspire.relayUrl}
                   '' + pkgs.lib.optionalString (config.services.bitspire.lnbitsServerPubkey != "") ''
@@ -224,7 +312,7 @@
                 serviceConfig = {
                   EnvironmentFile = lib.mkForce "/var/lib/bitspire/.env";
                   Environment = "LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${pkgs.stdenv.cc.cc.lib}/lib";
-                  ExecStart = lib.mkForce "${pkgs-unstable.electron}/bin/electron --no-sandbox --disable-gpu-sandbox --disable-gpu --disable-software-rasterizer --enable-logging ${atm-app}";
+                  ExecStart = lib.mkForce "${mkKioskLauncher machineModel atm-app}";
                   MemoryMax = lib.mkForce "1G";
                   NoNewPrivileges = lib.mkForce false;
                   ProtectSystem = lib.mkForce false;
@@ -261,6 +349,61 @@
             })
           ];
         };
+
+      # Module that turns an <model>-installed config into the one a dd'd USB
+      # stick actually runs. Shared by every *-usb variant so the USB-boot
+      # hazards are solved once:
+      # - distinct fs labels (nixos-usb / ESP-USB) so stage-1 can't latch an
+      #   internal drive that already holds a generic nixos/ESP-labelled install;
+      # - nofail /boot: the firmware already loaded the bootloader before Linux;
+      #   without nofail a slow/late ESP-USB enumeration (BOT is slower than UAS)
+      #   blows past systemd's 90s device-timeout into emergency mode with root
+      #   locked — a dead end. nofail + short timeout lets the already-mounted
+      #   root carry the boot; /boot mounts if/when it shows;
+      # - NO growPartition/autoResize: sfdisk rewriting the partition table on
+      #   first boot is the single most bus-stressing write, and flaky USB
+      #   bridges drop off the bus mid-rewrite (sfdisk wedges in D-state and
+      #   ESP-USB vanishes with the device). Persistent state is a few MB and
+      #   the image ships ~2GB free. The internal-disk images keep it;
+      # - autoUpgrade off: no scheduled nix-store churn or bootloader writes on
+      #   the stick. Updates go in-place via `nix copy` + switch-to-configuration
+      #   against the named <model>-usb config (preserves pairing + /var/lib).
+      usbBootModule = { lib, ... }: {
+        fileSystems."/".device = lib.mkForce "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos-usb";
+        fileSystems."/boot".device = lib.mkForce "/dev/disk/by-label/ESP-USB";
+        fileSystems."/boot".options = [ "nofail" "x-systemd.device-timeout=10s" ];
+        system.autoUpgrade.enable = lib.mkForce false;
+      };
+
+      # dd-able USB image of a <model>-usb config. make-disk-image gives the
+      # ext4 root the nixos-usb label directly (-L) but hardcodes the ESP FAT
+      # label to "ESP", so the volume is relabelled to ESP-USB afterwards —
+      # volume label only; bootloader files are untouched and UEFI loads
+      # /EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI regardless. Keeps systemd-boot: both the batm3
+      # and douro firmware UEFI-USB-boot fine via that removable fallback.
+      mkUsbDiskImage = machineModel: usbConfig:
+        let
+          baseImage = import (nixpkgs + "/nixos/lib/make-disk-image.nix") {
+            inherit pkgs lib;
+            config = usbConfig.config;
+            format = "raw";
+            partitionTableType = "efi";
+            diskSize = "auto";
+            label = "nixos-usb"; # ext4 root label (make-disk-image -L)
+          };
+        in
+        pkgs.runCommand "nixos-disk-image-${machineModel}-usb"
+          { nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.parted pkgs.mtools ]; }
+          ''
+            mkdir -p $out
+            cp --sparse=always ${baseImage}/nixos.img $out/nixos.img
+            chmod +w $out/nixos.img
+            espStart=$(parted -sm "$out/nixos.img" unit B print | awk -F: '$1==1 {gsub("B","",$2); print $2}')
+            echo "ESP partition starts at byte $espStart — relabelling to ESP-USB"
+            export MTOOLS_SKIP_CHECK=1
+            mlabel -i "$out/nixos.img@@$espStart" ::ESP-USB
+            printf 'verify ESP label: '; mlabel -i "$out/nixos.img@@$espStart" -s :: || true
+          '';
     in
     {
       # ── NixOS Configurations (top-level, not per-system) ──────────
@@ -293,35 +436,22 @@
         sintra-installed = mkInstalledConfig "sintra" ./deploy/nixos/hardware/upboard.nix;
         batm3-installed = mkInstalledConfig "batm3" ./deploy/nixos/hardware/batm3.nix;
 
-        # USB-bootable variant of batm3-installed. This is the config the
-        # flashed USB stick actually runs — distinct fs labels so stage-1 can't
-        # latch the internal drive, nofail /boot, no growPartition, autoUpgrade
-        # off. Exposed as a named config (not just inline in the disk-image
-        # target) so its system closure can be built here and deployed in-place
-        # with `nix copy` + `switch-to-configuration` — updating the app on a
-        # running stick WITHOUT reflashing (preserves pairing + /var/lib state).
-        # disk-image-batm3-usb builds its filesystem image from this same config.
+        # USB-bootable variants of <model>-installed (see usbBootModule for
+        # what changes). These are the configs a flashed stick actually runs.
+        # Exposed as named configs (not just inline in the disk-image targets)
+        # so their system closures can be built here and deployed in-place with
+        # `nix copy` + `switch-to-configuration` — updating the app on a running
+        # stick WITHOUT reflashing (preserves pairing + /var/lib state).
+        # disk-image-<model>-usb builds its filesystem image from the same config.
         batm3-usb = self.nixosConfigurations.batm3-installed.extendModules {
-          modules = [
-            ({ lib, ... }: {
-              fileSystems."/".device = lib.mkForce "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos-usb";
-              fileSystems."/boot".device = lib.mkForce "/dev/disk/by-label/ESP-USB";
-              # /boot must NOT be a hard boot dependency on the USB image. The
-              # firmware already loaded the bootloader before Linux; without
-              # nofail, a slow/late ESP-USB enumeration (BOT is slower than UAS)
-              # blows past systemd's 90s device-timeout into emergency mode with
-              # root locked — a dead end. nofail + short timeout lets the
-              # already-mounted root carry the boot; /boot mounts if/when it shows.
-              fileSystems."/boot".options = [ "nofail" "x-systemd.device-timeout=10s" ];
-              # NO growPartition/autoResize: sfdisk rewriting the partition table
-              # on first boot is the single most bus-stressing write, and flaky
-              # USB bridges drop off the bus mid-rewrite (sfdisk wedges in D-state
-              # and ESP-USB vanishes with the device). Persistent state is a few
-              # MB and the image ships ~2GB free. The internal-SATA disk-image-
-              # batm3 keeps growPartition (a real AHCI SSD won't drop the bus).
-              system.autoUpgrade.enable = lib.mkForce false;
-            })
-          ];
+          modules = [ usbBootModule ];
+        };
+        # douro: the production unit's internal drive is not NixOS, so the
+        # label disambiguation is moot today, but the nofail /boot and the
+        # uas/autosuspend hardening in douro.nix are what make a stick a
+        # reliable boot medium on the Bay Trail box. Same in-place update flow.
+        douro-usb = self.nixosConfigurations.douro-installed.extendModules {
+          modules = [ usbBootModule ];
         };
       };
 
@@ -455,53 +585,16 @@
               printf 'verify ESP label: '; mlabel -i "$out/nixos.img@@$espStart" -s :: || true
             '';
 
-        # USB-bootable BATM3 TEST image with DISTINCT partition labels
-        # (nixos-usb / ESP-USB). The plain disk-image-batm3 reuses the generic
-        # nixos/ESP labels, so a USB stick carrying it, booted on a batm3 whose
-        # internal SATA drive ALREADY holds a nixos/ESP-labelled install, makes
-        # stage-1's by-label/nixos resolve to the internal drive (larger fs,
-        # journal recovers) instead of the stick — the stage-2 init path baked
-        # into the USB's boot entry isn't on that root, so stage 1 aborts.
-        # Distinct labels make stage-1 pick the stick unambiguously WITHOUT
-        # touching the internal drive. Unlike disk-image-sintra-usb this keeps
-        # systemd-boot: the batm3 firmware UEFI-USB-boots fine via the ESP's
-        # /EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI removable fallback, so no GRUB/hybrid-table
-        # change is needed — only the label disambiguation here plus the
-        # usb_storage/uas initrd modules (in batm3.nix). Does NOT grow to fill
-        # the stick (see the growPartition note below — sfdisk on first boot
-        # wedges flaky USB bridges); auto-upgrade off (test image, not a managed
-        # fleet member — also stops scheduled bootloader writes landing on the
-        # internal drive's ESP).
-        disk-image-batm3-usb =
-          let
-            # Filesystem image of the batm3-usb config (defined in
-            # nixosConfigurations). Same config that in-place deploys target, so
-            # a reflash and a `switch-to-configuration` converge on one system.
-            baseImage = import (nixpkgs + "/nixos/lib/make-disk-image.nix") {
-              inherit pkgs lib;
-              config = self.nixosConfigurations.batm3-usb.config;
-              format = "raw";
-              partitionTableType = "efi";
-              diskSize = "auto";
-              label = "nixos-usb"; # ext4 root label (make-disk-image -L)
-            };
-          in
-          pkgs.runCommand "nixos-disk-image-batm3-usb"
-            { nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.parted pkgs.mtools ]; }
-            ''
-              mkdir -p $out
-              cp --sparse=always ${baseImage}/nixos.img $out/nixos.img
-              chmod +w $out/nixos.img
-              # make-disk-image hardcodes the ESP FAT label to "ESP"; relabel the
-              # volume to ESP-USB so /boot (by-label/ESP-USB) can't resolve to an
-              # internal drive's ESP. Volume label only — bootloader files are
-              # untouched, and UEFI loads /EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI regardless.
-              espStart=$(parted -sm "$out/nixos.img" unit B print | awk -F: '$1==1 {gsub("B","",$2); print $2}')
-              echo "ESP partition starts at byte $espStart — relabelling to ESP-USB"
-              export MTOOLS_SKIP_CHECK=1
-              mlabel -i "$out/nixos.img@@$espStart" ::ESP-USB
-              printf 'verify ESP label: '; mlabel -i "$out/nixos.img@@$espStart" -s :: || true
-            '';
+        # USB-bootable images (see usbBootModule / mkUsbDiskImage in the let
+        # block). Flash with dd or balenaEtcher, boot the stick, done — no
+        # installer step. The plain disk-image-<model> reuses the generic
+        # nixos/ESP labels, so a stick carrying it, booted on a machine whose
+        # internal drive ALREADY holds a nixos/ESP-labelled install, makes
+        # stage-1's by-label/nixos resolve to the internal drive instead of the
+        # stick — the stage-2 init path baked into the USB's boot entry isn't on
+        # that root, so stage 1 aborts. These variants can't hit that.
+        disk-image-batm3-usb = mkUsbDiskImage "batm3" self.nixosConfigurations.batm3-usb;
+        disk-image-douro-usb = mkUsbDiskImage "douro" self.nixosConfigurations.douro-usb;
 
         # Backwards compat
         iso = self.nixosConfigurations.douro.config.system.build.isoImage;

nix/mkAtmApp.nix

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Pure Nix derivation for the Lamassu ATM Electron app.
+# Pure Nix derivation for the bitSpire ATM Electron app.
 #
 # Uses fetchPnpmDeps + pnpmConfigHook to build entirely inside the Nix sandbox,
 # eliminating the need for --impure or a local pnpm install.
@@ -190,6 +190,33 @@ pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation (finalAttrs: {
       copy_pnpm_pkg "@serialport/$parser" "$out/node_modules/@serialport/$parser"
     done
 
+    # ── Strip node-gyp build detritus ──────────────────────────────────
+    # node-gyp leaves its scaffolding beside the compiled addons, and several
+    # of those files embed absolute /nix/store paths to the BUILD toolchain:
+    #   build/node_gyp_bins/python3  an ELF copy of python3 with an RPATH
+    #   build/config.gypi            python3 + nodejs + npm paths
+    #   build/Release/.deps/**.o.d   pcsclite.dev include paths
+    # Nix scans $out for store hashes, so each becomes a RUNTIME reference and
+    # drags python311 + nodejs + npm + pcsclite.dev (~212MB of closure) onto
+    # every ATM. Nothing reads them at runtime — only build/Release/*.node is
+    # loaded, via `bindings` / `node-gyp-build`. Keep the addons, drop the
+    # scaffolding. obj.target/*.node is node-gyp's pre-copy of the same addon;
+    # the loaded one at build/Release/*.node is untouched.
+    find $out/node_modules -type d \
+      \( -name node_gyp_bins -o -name .deps -o -name obj.target -o -name obj \) \
+      -prune -exec rm -rf {} +
+    find $out/node_modules -path '*/build/*' -type f \
+      \( -name config.gypi -o -name '*.mk' -o -name Makefile \
+         -o -name binding.Makefile -o -name '*.a' -o -name '*.o' \) -delete
+
+    # pnpm/node-gyp rewrote these CLI helpers' shebangs to the build nodejs,
+    # which alone retains the full nodejs (not the slim one Electron needs).
+    # They are build-time utilities — the runtime entry of each package
+    # (index.js) carries no shebang — so point them at PATH instead of
+    # deleting files a package might still require.
+    find $out/node_modules -type f -name '*.js' \
+      -exec sed -i '1s|^#!/nix/store/[^ ]*/bin/node$|#!/usr/bin/env node|' {} +
+
     runHook postInstall
   '';
 

packages/hal/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@bitSpire/hal",
   "version": "0.1.0",
-  "description": "Hardware Abstraction Layer for Lamassu ATM devices",
+  "description": "Hardware Abstraction Layer for bitSpire ATM devices",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "types": "dist/index.d.ts",
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
     "src"
   ],
   "keywords": [
-    "lamassu",
+    "bitspire",
     "atm",
     "hardware",
     "bill-validator",

packages/hal/src/index.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * @bitSpire/hal - Hardware Abstraction Layer
  *
- * Provides drivers for Lamassu ATM hardware devices:
+ * Provides drivers for bitSpire ATM hardware devices:
  * - Bill validators (JCM iVIZION via ID003 protocol)
  * - Bill dispensers (Fujitsu F53/F56)
  *

packages/nostr-client/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@bitSpire/nostr-client",
   "version": "0.1.0",
-  "description": "Nostr client library for Lamassu ATM",
+  "description": "Nostr client library for bitSpire ATM",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
   "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",

packages/nostr-client/src/client.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Nostr client for Lamassu ATM
+ * Nostr client for bitSpire ATM
  *
  * Manages connections to Nostr relays with support for:
  * - NIP-42 authentication

packages/nostr-client/src/events.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Event creation utilities for Lamassu ATM
+ * Event creation utilities for bitSpire ATM
  */
 
 import { type Event, type EventTemplate, type VerifiedEvent, getEventHash } from 'nostr-tools'

packages/nostr-client/src/index.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * @bitSpire/nostr-client
  *
- * Nostr client library for Lamassu ATM communication.
+ * Nostr client library for bitSpire ATM communication.
  *
  * Features:
  * - NIP-42 authentication for private relays

packages/nostr-client/src/types.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Nostr client type definitions for Lamassu ATM
+ * Nostr client type definitions for bitSpire ATM
  */
 
 import type { Event } from 'nostr-tools'

packages/state-machine/src/__tests__/access-control.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
+import { createActor } from 'xstate'
+import { createATMMachine } from '../machine.js'
+
+// ADR-003 access gate. Key invariant: with the gate DISABLED (the default),
+// the machine is behaviourally identical to the pre-access machine — it
+// settles into `idle` on start via the `locked` state's `always` bypass.
+describe('ATM access control (ADR-003)', () => {
+  describe('gate disabled (default)', () => {
+    it('settles into idle on start (non-breaking)', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine())
+      actor.start()
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('idle')
+    })
+
+    it('settles into idle even with accessControlEnabled:false explicit', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: false }))
+      actor.start()
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('idle')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('gate enabled', () => {
+    it('stays locked on start', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: true }))
+      actor.start()
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('locked')
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().context.accessSession).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('ACCESS_GRANTED unlocks to idle and records the session', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: true }))
+      actor.start()
+      actor.send({ type: 'ACCESS_GRANTED', role: 'user', credentialIdHash: 'abc123' })
+
+      const snap = actor.getSnapshot()
+      expect(snap.value).toBe('idle')
+      expect(snap.context.accessSession).toMatchObject({ role: 'user', credentialIdHash: 'abc123' })
+      expect(typeof snap.context.accessSession?.grantedAt).toBe('number')
+    })
+
+    it('ACCESS_DENIED stays locked and surfaces the reason', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: true }))
+      actor.start()
+      actor.send({ type: 'ACCESS_DENIED', reason: 'card not authorized' })
+
+      const snap = actor.getSnapshot()
+      expect(snap.value).toBe('locked')
+      expect(snap.context.accessDenyReason).toBe('card not authorized')
+    })
+
+    it('DEV_UNLOCK unlocks to idle (operator session)', () => {
+      const actor = createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: true })
+      const running = createActor(actor)
+      running.start()
+      running.send({ type: 'DEV_UNLOCK' })
+
+      const snap = running.getSnapshot()
+      expect(snap.value).toBe('idle')
+      expect(snap.context.accessSession?.role).toBe('operator')
+    })
+  })
+
+  // NOTE: idle inactivity re-lock is no longer an XState `after` delay — an
+  // entry-anchored timer can't measure inactivity (it never resets on screen
+  // touches). It's enforced at the DOM layer (useSessionSecurity), which sends
+  // END_SESSION on true idleness / at the hard cap. The machine's contract is
+  // just: END_SESSION re-locks from idle when the gate is active, and is
+  // ignored mid-transaction (a transaction re-locks on its own when it ends).
+  describe('session end (button / inactivity / hard cap all route here)', () => {
+    it('END_SESSION re-locks immediately from idle when the gate is active', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: true }))
+      actor.start()
+      actor.send({ type: 'ACCESS_GRANTED', role: 'user', credentialIdHash: 'abc' })
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('idle')
+      actor.send({ type: 'END_SESSION' })
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('locked')
+    })
+
+    it('END_SESSION is ignored mid-transaction (never strands funds in flight)', () => {
+      // A root-level END_SESSION would bypass confirmAbandon / an in-flight
+      // dispense. The transition lives on `idle` only; a transaction's own
+      // terminal states return to `locked` when it ends.
+      const rateServices = {
+        getExchangeRate: () => Promise.resolve(2500),
+        getAvailableBalance: () => Promise.resolve(1_000_000),
+      }
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine(rateServices, { accessControlEnabled: true }))
+      actor.start()
+      actor.send({ type: 'ACCESS_GRANTED', role: 'user', credentialIdHash: 'abc' })
+      actor.send({ type: 'SELECT_CASH_OUT' })
+      const before = actor.getSnapshot().value
+      expect(before).not.toBe('locked') // now inside cashOut
+      actor.send({ type: 'END_SESSION' })
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toEqual(before)
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().context.accessSession).not.toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('END_SESSION is a no-op when the gate is disabled (stays at idle)', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(createATMMachine()) // gate off → rests at idle
+      actor.start()
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('idle')
+      actor.send({ type: 'END_SESSION' })
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('idle')
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('build/dev bypass', () => {
+    it('accessBypassFlag opens the gate even when enabled', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(
+        createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: true, accessBypassFlag: true })
+      )
+      actor.start()
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('idle')
+    })
+
+    it('DEV_UNLOCK is a no-op while bypassing (already idle)', () => {
+      const actor = createActor(
+        createATMMachine({}, { accessControlEnabled: true, accessBypassFlag: true })
+      )
+      actor.start()
+      // already idle; DEV_UNLOCK guard is false, so no throw / no change
+      actor.send({ type: 'DEV_UNLOCK' })
+      expect(actor.getSnapshot().value).toBe('idle')
+    })
+  })
+})

packages/state-machine/src/index.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ export {
   type PaymentMethod,
   type DispenseCashResult,
   type CassetteBillResult,
+  type AccessRole,
+  type AccessSession,
   initialContext,
 } from './types.js'
 

packages/state-machine/src/machine.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@ export interface ATMMachineOptions {
   currency?: string
   cashInFeeFraction?: number
   cashOutFeeFraction?: number
+  /**
+   * ADR-003 access gate. When true, the machine boots into `locked` and
+   * waits for an ACCESS_GRANTED (or DEV_UNLOCK) before reaching `idle`.
+   * Defaults false → `locked` immediately bypasses to `idle` (no gate).
+   */
+  accessControlEnabled?: boolean
+  /** Build/dev bypass (VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE) — opens the gate even when enabled. */
+  accessBypassFlag?: boolean
 }
 
 export function createATMMachine(
@@ -167,9 +175,41 @@ export function createATMMachine(
         inventory: context.inventory,
         cashInFeeFraction: context.cashInFeeFraction,
         cashOutFeeFraction: context.cashOutFeeFraction,
+        // Preserve the access-gate config across resets — it comes from
+        // machine options, not the transaction, and must survive re-lock.
+        accessControlEnabled: context.accessControlEnabled,
+        accessBypassFlag: context.accessBypassFlag,
+        // Preserve the active access session: `idle`'s entry runs resetContext
+        // AFTER the locked→idle transition action that set the session, so
+        // without this the just-granted session would be wiped. The session is
+        // cleared instead on re-lock (locked's entry), i.e. when access ends.
+        accessSession: context.accessSession,
         cashInSessionId: null,
         dispenseResult: null,
       })),
+      // ADR-003 access-control actions
+      startAccessSession: assign({
+        accessSession: ({ event }) => {
+          if (event.type !== 'ACCESS_GRANTED') return null
+          return { role: event.role, grantedAt: Date.now(), credentialIdHash: event.credentialIdHash }
+        },
+        accessDenyReason: null,
+      }),
+      startDevAccessSession: assign({
+        accessSession: () => ({
+          role: 'operator' as const,
+          grantedAt: Date.now(),
+          credentialIdHash: 'dev-unlock',
+        }),
+        accessDenyReason: null,
+      }),
+      setAccessDenyReason: assign({
+        accessDenyReason: ({ event }) => (event.type === 'ACCESS_DENIED' ? event.reason : null),
+      }),
+      clearAccessDenyReason: assign({ accessDenyReason: null }),
+      // On (re-)entering `locked`, access has ended: drop any prior session so a
+      // stale grant can't leak across the gate.
+      clearAccessSession: assign({ accessSession: null }),
       setStartTime: assign({
         startedAt: () => Date.now(),
         txid: () => generateTxId(),
@@ -376,6 +416,18 @@ export function createATMMachine(
       }),
     },
     guards: {
+      // ADR-003: gate is open when access control is off, or the build/dev
+      // bypass is set. Used by `locked`'s eventless `always` transition so a
+      // machine with the gate disabled settles straight into `idle`.
+      accessBypass: ({ context }) => !context.accessControlEnabled || context.accessBypassFlag,
+      // The dev unlock is only meaningful when the gate is actually engaged.
+      devUnlockAllowed: ({ context }) => context.accessControlEnabled && !context.accessBypassFlag,
+      // Gate is actively engaged (enabled + not bypassed) — used to auto re-lock
+      // the `idle` menu on inactivity so an unattended unlocked session (a tapped
+      // card left behind) can't be used by the next person. Same condition as
+      // devUnlockAllowed; named for the lock-timeout intent.
+      accessGateActive: ({ context }) =>
+        context.accessControlEnabled && !context.accessBypassFlag,
       hasInsertedBills: ({ context }) => context.billsInserted.length > 0,
       // Legacy brain.js parity: "send coins" is a no-op while a bill is
       // between the stack command and the validator's stacked-confirmation.
@@ -426,10 +478,16 @@ export function createATMMachine(
       COMPLETE_DELAY: 60000,
       DISPENSE_TIMEOUT: 120000, // 2 min max for hardware to respond
       DISPENSE_ERROR_TIMEOUT: 30000, // 30s like brain.js _timedState
+      // NOTE: idle inactivity re-lock + hard session cap are enforced at the
+      // DOM layer (useSessionSecurity), not as XState `after` delays — see the
+      // idle state comment. No IDLE_LOCK_TIMEOUT delay here by design.
     },
   }).createMachine({
     id: 'atm',
-    initial: 'idle',
+    // ADR-003: `locked` is the resting state. With the gate disabled (the
+    // default), its `always` transition bypasses straight to `idle` on start,
+    // so behavior is identical to the pre-access machine.
+    initial: 'locked',
     context: {
       ...initialContext,
       ...(options?.currency ? { currency: options.currency } : {}),
@@ -437,6 +495,12 @@ export function createATMMachine(
       ...(options?.cashOutFeeFraction !== undefined
         ? { cashOutFeeFraction: options.cashOutFeeFraction }
         : {}),
+      ...(options?.accessControlEnabled !== undefined
+        ? { accessControlEnabled: options.accessControlEnabled }
+        : {}),
+      ...(options?.accessBypassFlag !== undefined
+        ? { accessBypassFlag: options.accessBypassFlag }
+        : {}),
     },
     // Root-level handler: lets the operator-fees subscriber update the
     // active fee fractions reactively. Next cashIn/cashOut entry will
@@ -451,9 +515,43 @@ export function createATMMachine(
       },
     },
     states: {
+      // === ACCESS GATE (ADR-003) ===
+      // Resting/locked state. A paired, healthy machine sits here until a
+      // valid credential is presented. When the gate is disabled (default)
+      // the eventless `always` transition immediately hands off to `idle`,
+      // so a non-access machine never dwells here.
+      locked: {
+        entry: ['clearAccessDenyReason', 'clearAccessSession'],
+        always: [{ guard: 'accessBypass', target: 'idle' }],
+        on: {
+          ACCESS_GRANTED: { target: 'idle', actions: 'startAccessSession' },
+          DEV_UNLOCK: { guard: 'devUnlockAllowed', target: 'idle', actions: 'startDevAccessSession' },
+          // A denied tap keeps us locked; record the reason for the screen.
+          ACCESS_DENIED: { actions: 'setAccessDenyReason' },
+        },
+      },
+
       idle: {
         entry: 'resetContext',
+        // Idle inactivity re-lock is NOT modeled here as an XState `after`:
+        // that timer is anchored to state ENTRY and never resets on screen
+        // touches (the machine can't see raw pointer events), so it would fire
+        // a fixed countdown regardless of activity. Inactivity is measured at
+        // the DOM layer (useSessionSecurity) and drives END_SESSION on true
+        // idleness. The hard session cap is handled the same way.
         on: {
+          // Session kill switch (ADR-003): the "End session" button, the
+          // idle-inactivity timer, and the absolute session cap all route here.
+          // Deliberately handled ONLY from `idle`, not at the machine root: a
+          // root-level END_SESSION would bypass the money-path protections
+          // (`confirmAbandon` with bills stacked, an in-flight dispense, an
+          // outbound payment) and strand the customer's funds. Every
+          // transaction terminal state already returns to `locked` on its own,
+          // so a cap that fires mid-transaction has nothing to gain — the
+          // DOM-layer timers defer until the machine is back at idle. Guarded to
+          // the active gate so a gate-disabled machine (which rests at idle)
+          // can't be knocked out of it. `locked`'s entry clears the session.
+          END_SESSION: { guard: 'accessGateActive', target: '#atm.locked' },
           SELECT_CASH_IN: {
             target: 'cashIn',
             actions: ['setStartTime', 'setCashInFee'],
@@ -491,7 +589,7 @@ export function createATMMachine(
               INACTIVITY_TIMEOUT: [
                 {
                   guard: ({ context }) => context.billsInserted.length === 0,
-                  target: '#atm.idle',
+                  target: '#atm.locked',
                 },
                 {
                   target: 'confirmAbandon',
@@ -524,7 +622,7 @@ export function createATMMachine(
                 {
                   // No bills inserted yet: safe to cancel
                   guard: ({ context }) => context.billsInserted.length === 0,
-                  target: '#atm.idle',
+                  target: '#atm.locked',
                 },
                 {
                   // Bills already stacked: warn user before abandoning
@@ -534,7 +632,7 @@ export function createATMMachine(
               TIMEOUT: [
                 {
                   guard: ({ context }) => context.billsInserted.length === 0,
-                  target: '#atm.idle',
+                  target: '#atm.locked',
                 },
                 {
                   target: 'confirmAbandon',
@@ -586,10 +684,10 @@ export function createATMMachine(
             // like the rest — clear the marker so nothing blocks on it.
             entry: 'clearBillPending',
             after: {
-              60000: '#atm.idle',
+              60000: '#atm.locked',
             },
             on: {
-              CANCEL: '#atm.idle', // User confirms they want to leave
+              CANCEL: '#atm.locked', // User confirms they want to leave
               RETRY: 'generatingNdebit', // Go back and try again
             },
           },
@@ -614,10 +712,10 @@ export function createATMMachine(
           },
           complete: {
             after: {
-              COMPLETE_DELAY: '#atm.idle',
+              COMPLETE_DELAY: '#atm.locked',
             },
             on: {
-              CANCEL: '#atm.idle',
+              CANCEL: '#atm.locked',
             },
           },
           error: {
@@ -646,7 +744,7 @@ export function createATMMachine(
                 {
                   // No bills inserted: safe to cancel
                   guard: ({ context }) => context.billsInserted.length === 0,
-                  target: '#atm.idle',
+                  target: '#atm.locked',
                 },
                 {
                   // Bills inserted: show abandon warning first
@@ -689,7 +787,7 @@ export function createATMMachine(
             // User selects denomination buttons to build up the cash amount
             // UI shows: available denominations, running total, sats equivalent
             after: {
-              INACTIVITY_TIMEOUT: '#atm.idle',
+              INACTIVITY_TIMEOUT: '#atm.locked',
             },
             entry: 'clearCashOutSelection',
             on: {
@@ -709,8 +807,8 @@ export function createATMMachine(
                 target: 'generatingInvoice',
                 actions: 'calculateDispenseFromSelection',
               },
-              CANCEL: '#atm.idle',
-              TIMEOUT: '#atm.idle',
+              CANCEL: '#atm.locked',
+              TIMEOUT: '#atm.locked',
             },
           },
           generatingInvoice: {
@@ -758,7 +856,7 @@ export function createATMMachine(
               TIMEOUT: {
                 target: 'selectingAmount',
               },
-              CANCEL: '#atm.idle',
+              CANCEL: '#atm.locked',
             },
           },
           dispensingCash: {
@@ -826,20 +924,20 @@ export function createATMMachine(
           },
           complete: {
             after: {
-              COMPLETE_DELAY: '#atm.idle',
+              COMPLETE_DELAY: '#atm.locked',
             },
             on: {
-              CANCEL: '#atm.idle',
+              CANCEL: '#atm.locked',
             },
           },
           dispenseError: {
             // Payment received but cash not (fully) dispensed.
             // Show error + txid for 30s, then auto-idle (matches brain.js _timedState).
             after: {
-              DISPENSE_ERROR_TIMEOUT: '#atm.idle',
+              DISPENSE_ERROR_TIMEOUT: '#atm.locked',
             },
             on: {
-              CANCEL: '#atm.idle',
+              CANCEL: '#atm.locked',
             },
           },
           error: {
@@ -849,7 +947,7 @@ export function createATMMachine(
                 target: 'fetchingRate',
                 actions: 'incrementRetry',
               },
-              CANCEL: '#atm.idle',
+              CANCEL: '#atm.locked',
             },
           },
         },

packages/state-machine/src/types.ts

@@ -48,8 +48,47 @@ export interface OfferRequestEvent {
   description?: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * Access-control role resolved from a presented credential.
+ * `user` may transact; `operator` may additionally reach operator
+ * functions (config/maintenance/enrollment) — reserved for later PRs.
+ * See ADR-003.
+ */
+export type AccessRole = 'user' | 'operator'
+
+/**
+ * An active access session, created when a valid credential is presented
+ * (or via the dev unlock). Modeled as general *terminal access*, not a
+ * transaction handle, so the terminal can later gate non-transaction
+ * functions and per-action step-up auth (ADR-003).
+ */
+export interface AccessSession {
+  role: AccessRole
+  /** ms epoch when access was granted */
+  grantedAt: number
+  /** salted hash of the presented credential id — never the raw UID (KYC-free) */
+  credentialIdHash: string
+}
+
 /** ATM machine context */
 export interface ATMContext {
+  // Access control (ADR-003)
+  /**
+   * Whether the badge-to-enter access gate is active. When false (the
+   * default), the machine's `locked` initial state immediately bypasses
+   * to `idle` — behavior is identical to a machine with no access layer.
+   */
+  accessControlEnabled: boolean
+  /**
+   * Build/dev bypass (VITE_SKIP_ACCESS_GATE). Forces the gate open even
+   * when accessControlEnabled is true — for browser dev / CI.
+   */
+  accessBypassFlag: boolean
+  /** Active access session, or null while locked. */
+  accessSession: AccessSession | null
+  /** Reason for the last denied access attempt (for the locked screen). */
+  accessDenyReason: string | null
+
   // Transaction details
   /** Fiat amount in cents */
   fiatCents: number
@@ -136,6 +175,14 @@ export type ATMEvent =
   | { type: 'SELECT_CASH_IN' }
   | { type: 'SELECT_CASH_OUT' }
   | { type: 'CANCEL' }
+  // Access control (ADR-003)
+  | { type: 'ACCESS_GRANTED'; role: AccessRole; credentialIdHash: string }
+  | { type: 'ACCESS_DENIED'; reason: string }
+  | { type: 'DEV_UNLOCK' }
+  // User-initiated end of a tap-in session: re-lock immediately instead of
+  // waiting out IDLE_LOCK_TIMEOUT, so a loaded Bolt Card can't be reused by
+  // the next person the moment its holder steps away.
+  | { type: 'END_SESSION' }
   | { type: 'SELECT_AMOUNT'; amount: number }
   | { type: 'FINISH_INSERTING' }
   | { type: 'USER_SCANNED_NPUB'; npub: string }
@@ -173,6 +220,12 @@ export type ATMEvent =
 
 /** Initial context values */
 export const initialContext: ATMContext = {
+  // Access control defaults OFF — a machine built without the access
+  // options behaves exactly as before (locked → bypass → idle). See ADR-003.
+  accessControlEnabled: false,
+  accessBypassFlag: false,
+  accessSession: null,
+  accessDenyReason: null,
   fiatCents: 0,
   satsAmount: 0,
   currency: 'USD',

packages/ui-shared/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@bitSpire/ui-shared",
   "version": "0.1.0",
-  "description": "Shared Vue 3 components for Lamassu ATM and dashboard",
+  "description": "Shared Vue 3 components for bitSpire ATM and dashboard",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
   "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",

packages/ui-shared/src/index.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * @bitSpire/ui-shared
  *
- * Shared Vue 3 components for Lamassu ATM and dashboard.
+ * Shared Vue 3 components for bitSpire ATM and dashboard.
  * This package will contain common UI components like:
  * - QR code display
  * - Number pad