Merge pull request 'docs(backend): pin get_public_key as an intentional, load-bearing ACL exception (#26)' (#53) from fix/26-document-get-public-key-ungated into dev
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Reviewed-on: #53
This commit is contained in:
padreug 2026-07-04 13:59:30 +00:00
commit 1f4afbf1c2

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@ -104,6 +104,29 @@ export class Backend {
return ok ? "pong" : undefined;
}
case "get_public_key":
// Intentionally UNGATED — do NOT route through pubkeyAllowed().
// This is a deliberate, documented exception to the "every
// request hits the ACL seam" rule (aiolabs/nsecbunkerd#26), not
// an oversight, and it is load-bearing — gating it breaks the
// live clients:
// 1. The pubkey isn't secret — it's the identity the bunker
// openly signs as; disclosure leaks nothing a relay
// observer couldn't already derive from published events.
// 2. NIP-46 mandates get_public_key as part of session
// establishment (46.md overview step 5: the client requests
// get_public_key to learn user-pubkey), called immediately
// post-connect, before any policy-bearing method.
// 3. lnbits' `_ensure_policy` (remote_bunker.py
// DEFAULT_POLICY_RULES + DEFAULT_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND)
// grants only sign_event(kinds) + nip04/44 encrypt/decrypt
// — there is NO get_public_key rule — so routing it through
// checkIfPubkeyAllowed would return `undefined`, and the
// client's spec-mandated post-connect get_public_key call
// would stall on the admin-approval path → "signer
// unavailable" (the outage class #41 addressed).
// Per-app gating/audit of identity disclosure, if ever wanted,
// must be co-designed with a policy rule the clients actually
// plant. See #26 for the full prior-art survey (NDK vs rust-nostr).
return this.pubkey;
case "sign_event": {
const [eventString] = params;