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1 changed files with 23 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -104,6 +104,29 @@ export class Backend {
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return ok ? "pong" : undefined;
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}
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case "get_public_key":
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// Intentionally UNGATED — do NOT route through pubkeyAllowed().
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// This is a deliberate, documented exception to the "every
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// request hits the ACL seam" rule (aiolabs/nsecbunkerd#26), not
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// an oversight, and it is load-bearing — gating it breaks the
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// live clients:
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// 1. The pubkey isn't secret — it's the identity the bunker
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// openly signs as; disclosure leaks nothing a relay
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// observer couldn't already derive from published events.
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// 2. NIP-46 mandates get_public_key as part of session
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// establishment (46.md overview step 5: the client requests
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// get_public_key to learn user-pubkey), called immediately
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// post-connect, before any policy-bearing method.
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// 3. lnbits' `_ensure_policy` (remote_bunker.py
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// DEFAULT_POLICY_RULES + DEFAULT_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND)
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// grants only sign_event(kinds) + nip04/44 encrypt/decrypt
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// — there is NO get_public_key rule — so routing it through
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// checkIfPubkeyAllowed would return `undefined`, and the
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// client's spec-mandated post-connect get_public_key call
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// would stall on the admin-approval path → "signer
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// unavailable" (the outage class #41 addressed).
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// Per-app gating/audit of identity disclosure, if ever wanted,
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// must be co-designed with a policy rule the clients actually
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// plant. See #26 for the full prior-art survey (NDK vs rust-nostr).
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return this.pubkey;
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case "sign_event": {
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const [eventString] = params;
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