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Author SHA1 Message Date
0ca8f03a9d fix(bitcoind): accept lnbits/lnbits rpcauth alongside cookie
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The lnbits regtest test harness (tests/regtest/helpers.py) authenticates to
bitcoind with -rpcuser=lnbits -rpcpassword=lnbits, but bitcoind was cookie-only,
so mine_blocks / pay_onchain / create_onchain_address (and any bitcoind-using
regtest test) failed with "Incorrect rpcuser or rpcpassword".

Add -rpcauth for user lnbits (password lnbits). rpcauth does not set
rpcpassword, so the auto-generated .cookie is still produced and the LN nodes'
--bitcoind.rpccookie auth keeps working. Verified: both cookie and
lnbits/lnbits creds authenticate; wrong creds rejected. Surfaced while
validating aiolabs/lnbits#53 (native on-chain receive/send) against real lnd-1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 22:53:16 +02:00
0b3970d0c0 dev compose: drop Secure flag on auth cookies for HTTP LAN-IP dev
Sets LNBITS_AUTH_HTTPS_ONLY=false on the lnbits service so the regtest
stack works when the webapp dev server hits lnbits over a LAN IP
(e.g. http://192.168.0.32:5181http://192.168.0.32:5001) instead of
localhost. Browsers silently discard `Secure` cookies over plain HTTP
from non-loopback origins, which kills the /auth/sign-event double-
submit CSRF flow (the GET succeeds, the cookie never lands, every POST
403s).

aiolabs/lnbits#52 made the lnbits-side gate use settings.auth_https_only
for the XSRF-TOKEN cookie (matching the existing auth_cookie_token
behavior). With that fix on dev + this env var here, the regtest stack
finally lets the bookmark/RSVP flow round-trip from a LAN-IP browser.

Production deploys leave the setting unset (default true) — Secure
stays on, behavior unchanged.
2026-06-09 23:11:34 +02:00
c3c531f1f3 dev compose: wire key master + nsec bunker integration, CORS allowlist, transport roster gate
LNbits now fail-closes at boot without LNBITS_KEY_MASTER (aiolabs/lnbits#9
PR #17), and account provisioning routes through the nsec bunker
(aiolabs/lnbits#18 phase 2.1+2.2) when LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_* are set, so
both wiring blocks are required for the dev stack to boot and serve a
webapp signup. Also covers:

- LNBITS_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS for the standalone webapp dev ports
  (aiolabs/lnbits PR #31; standalone hubs 5173 + 5180-5187 across the
  three browser-distinct origins localhost / 192.168.0.32 / 127.0.0.1).
- NOSTR_TRANSPORT_ROSTER_REQUIRED to reject kind-21000 RPCs from
  unregistered senders rather than the silent-drop-via-auto-create
  failure mode caught 2026-05-30 (aiolabs/lnbits#42, satmachineadmin#20).
- Bunker reliability: restart=unless-stopped so the watchdog's clean
  exit(0) on prolonged relay-disconnect gets auto-recovered, plus
  NSEC_BUNKER_DISABLE_WATCHDOG=1 to keep the bunker idling patiently
  through lnbits rebuilds longer than the 60s grace window, and
  NSEC_BUNKER_AUTOUNLOCK_PASSPHRASE so RemoteBunkerSigner clients don't
  need to drive a per-restart unlock_key RPC (aiolabs/nsecbunkerd#16).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-03 16:28:08 +02:00
2 changed files with 86 additions and 1 deletions

View file

@ -45,6 +45,55 @@ services:
NOSTR_TRANSPORT_RELAYS: '["ws://localhost:5001/nostrrelay/test"]' NOSTR_TRANSPORT_RELAYS: '["ws://localhost:5001/nostrrelay/test"]'
NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PRIVATE_KEY: ${NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PRIVATE_KEY} NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PRIVATE_KEY: ${NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PRIVATE_KEY}
NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PUBLIC_KEY: ${NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PUBLIC_KEY} NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PUBLIC_KEY: ${NOSTR_TRANSPORT_PUBLIC_KEY}
# Path-B roster gate (aiolabs/lnbits#42 / satmachineadmin#20). When
# true, inbound kind-21000 RPCs from unregistered sender pubkeys are
# rejected + ERROR-logged instead of auto-creating an account-from-
# npub (which was the silent-drop failure mode on 2026-05-30).
# satmachineadmin's resolver routes registered ATMs to the operator's
# wallet directly; under this flag, that's the ONLY routing path.
NOSTR_TRANSPORT_ROSTER_REQUIRED: "true"
# Envelope-encryption master key for user nostr nsecs (aiolabs/lnbits#9
# PR #17). Required — lnbits fail-closes at startup if unset. Sourced
# from .env; rotate via `openssl rand -hex 32` (one-time ops procedure).
LNBITS_KEY_MASTER: ${LNBITS_KEY_MASTER}
# nsec bunker integration (aiolabs/lnbits#18 phase 2.1 + 2.2).
# When set, new accounts get provisioned via the sidecar bunker
# (signer_type=RemoteBunkerSigner) instead of the LocalSigner
# encrypted-blob path. All four must be present together or
# NsecBunkerAdminClient.from_settings raises.
# Bunker container needs NSECBUNKER_ADMIN_NPUBS configured with the
# npub corresponding to LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_ADMIN_NSEC below.
LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_URL: ${LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_URL:-}
LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_PUBKEY: ${LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_PUBKEY:-}
LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_ADMIN_NSEC: ${LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_ADMIN_NSEC:-}
LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE: ${LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE:-}
# CORS allowlist for credentialed cross-origin webapp calls
# (aiolabs/lnbits PR #31). Mirrors the aio-demo wiring from
# server-deploy `b920b79`; covers three hostname flavors browsers
# treat as distinct origins: `localhost`, the LAN IP `192.168.0.32`,
# and the loopback IP `127.0.0.1` (browsers do NOT alias loopback
# to localhost for SOP purposes — `localhost` and `127.0.0.1` are
# different origins as far as CORS is concerned; gotcha caught
# 2026-05-30T11:05Z when a chromium session opened on the loopback
# IP got rejected against an allowlist that only had localhost +
# LAN-IP). Covers every standalone webapp dev port from
# `~/dev/webapp/dev/vite.*.config.ts` plus the umbrella 5173:
# 5173 main, 5180 libra, 5181 activities, 5182 wallet,
# 5183 chat, 5184 forum, 5185 market, 5186 tasks,
# 5187 restaurant.
# Empty allowlist would fall back to `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
# (no credentials); explicit allowlist also covers the
# /auth/sign-event credentialed flow when bucket-B PRs land.
LNBITS_CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS: '["http://localhost:5173","http://192.168.0.32:5173","http://127.0.0.1:5173","http://localhost:5180","http://192.168.0.32:5180","http://127.0.0.1:5180","http://localhost:5181","http://192.168.0.32:5181","http://127.0.0.1:5181","http://localhost:5182","http://192.168.0.32:5182","http://127.0.0.1:5182","http://localhost:5183","http://192.168.0.32:5183","http://127.0.0.1:5183","http://localhost:5184","http://192.168.0.32:5184","http://127.0.0.1:5184","http://localhost:5185","http://192.168.0.32:5185","http://127.0.0.1:5185","http://localhost:5186","http://192.168.0.32:5186","http://127.0.0.1:5186","http://localhost:5187","http://192.168.0.32:5187","http://127.0.0.1:5187"]'
# Drop the `Secure` flag on auth + CSRF cookies so the regtest
# stack works over plain HTTP from a LAN IP (e.g. testing the
# webapp at http://192.168.0.32:5181 against this lnbits at
# http://192.168.0.32:5001). Browsers silently discard `Secure`
# cookies served over `http://` from non-loopback origins, which
# breaks the /auth/sign-event double-submit CSRF flow. Production
# leaves this unset (default `true`) — see aiolabs/lnbits#52.
LNBITS_AUTH_HTTPS_ONLY: "false"
# Lowered from the 40_000 default just to make sharding easy to # Lowered from the 40_000 default just to make sharding easy to
# exercise in local tests without seeding hundreds of payments. # exercise in local tests without seeding hundreds of payments.
# Production runs should leave this unset (defaults to 40_000). # Production runs should leave this unset (defaults to 40_000).
@ -124,7 +173,17 @@ services:
# nsecbunkerd dev branch and ~/dev/coordination/log.md 2026-05-27. # nsecbunkerd dev branch and ~/dev/coordination/log.md 2026-05-27.
build: ${NSECBUNKER_SRC:-/home/padreug/dev/nsecbunkerd/dev} build: ${NSECBUNKER_SRC:-/home/padreug/dev/nsecbunkerd/dev}
hostname: nsecbunker hostname: nsecbunker
restart: on-failure # Use `unless-stopped` (not `on-failure`) so the watchdog's deliberate
# exit(0) on prolonged relay-disconnect gets auto-recovered. The
# bunker's relay-watchdog is designed to exit-and-let-supervisor-
# restart; `on-failure` is half-implementing that contract (catches
# crashes but not the clean exit-as-restart-signal). See the watchdog
# comment in src/daemon/admin/index.ts and the routine-rebuild
# gotcha: any restart of the lnbits container that takes >60s knocks
# the bunker's WebSocket out beyond the grace window, which under
# `on-failure` left the bunker silently dead after every
# `regtest-lnbits-rebuild` until manually started.
restart: unless-stopped
pids_limit: 100 pids_limit: 100
mem_limit: 256mb mem_limit: 256mb
memswap_limit: 256mb memswap_limit: 256mb
@ -135,6 +194,27 @@ services:
# Set to '1' in .env or shell to enable REQUEST_IN / RESPONSE_SENT / # Set to '1' in .env or shell to enable REQUEST_IN / RESPONSE_SENT /
# PUBLISHED / PUBLISH_FAILED instrumentation. Default off. # PUBLISHED / PUBLISH_FAILED instrumentation. Default off.
NSEC_BUNKER_DEBUG_TRANSPORT: ${NSEC_BUNKER_DEBUG_TRANSPORT:-0} NSEC_BUNKER_DEBUG_TRANSPORT: ${NSEC_BUNKER_DEBUG_TRANSPORT:-0}
# Disable the relay-connection watchdog in the regtest stack.
# The watchdog calls process.exit(0) if the relay pool reports
# no connected relays for >60s; in dev that fires routinely
# during lnbits rebuilds (regtest-lnbits-rebuild takes more
# than 60s, the bunker's WebSocket drops, watchdog exits the
# process). With this set to '1' the bunker idles patiently
# instead — NDK's relay-reconnect loop attaches once lnbits is
# back up, and the in-memory unlocked-keys state from autounlock
# persists across the disconnect. Production deployments should
# leave this unset so external liveness checking gets the
# exit-as-restart-signal it expects.
NSEC_BUNKER_DISABLE_WATCHDOG: "1"
# Boot-time autounlock per aiolabs/nsecbunkerd#16 — every encrypted
# key in the Key table is unlocked at startup using this passphrase
# so RemoteBunkerSigner clients (lnbits, future webapp NIP-46) don't
# need to drive an admin unlock_key RPC per restart. Same passphrase
# the operator-side LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE uses to
# provision keys. See docs/AUTOUNLOCK.md in the bunker repo for the
# security trade. Leave unset to keep autounlock off (manual unlock
# per key per restart, the pre-#16 default).
NSEC_BUNKER_AUTOUNLOCK_PASSPHRASE: ${LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE:-}
volumes: volumes:
- ./data/nsecbunker:/app/config - ./data/nsecbunker:/app/config

View file

@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ services:
image: boltz/bitcoin-core:25.0 image: boltz/bitcoin-core:25.0
command: command:
- -regtest - -regtest
# creds for the lnbits regtest test harness (tests/regtest/helpers.py uses
# -rpcuser=lnbits -rpcpassword=lnbits). rpcauth keeps the auto-generated
# cookie working too, so the LN nodes' --bitcoind.rpccookie auth is intact.
# $$ escapes compose interpolation. (user=lnbits, password=lnbits)
- -rpcauth=lnbits:a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90$$64c29b7500c0e20b7917aa7f6dc6ce3eec896dd8f0bd3834f98c5ee489ef233f
- -fallbackfee=0.00000253 - -fallbackfee=0.00000253
- -zmqpubrawtx=tcp://0.0.0.0:29000 - -zmqpubrawtx=tcp://0.0.0.0:29000
- -zmqpubrawblock=tcp://0.0.0.0:29001 - -zmqpubrawblock=tcp://0.0.0.0:29001