feat(cash-in): super_config.max_cash_in_sats per-tx cap + UI (#31)
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ci.yml / feat(cash-in): super_config.max_cash_in_sats per-tx cap + UI (#31) (pull_request) Failing after 0s
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ci.yml / feat(cash-in): super_config.max_cash_in_sats per-tx cap + UI (#31) (pull_request) Failing after 0s
Wires the server-side per-transaction cash-in ceiling the `create_withdraw` handler already enforces (it read the value defensively via getattr; this makes it a first-class config field). - migrations.py m012: ADD COLUMN super_config.max_cash_in_sats INTEGER (NULL = no cap). - models.py: SuperConfig.max_cash_in_sats + UpdateSuperConfigData field with a >= 0 validator. - super-fee dialog: a "Max cash-in per transaction (sats)" input; blank sends null (the PUT skips null, preserving the current value — set 0 to reject every cash-in). crud `update_super_config` and the PUT endpoint flow the field through automatically (dynamic dict update; check_super_user gated). Why a sats cap and not the bunker ACL: the ACL / usage caps (#28) gate call *rate*, not *sats*, and `principal_sats` is necessarily ATM-attested — so a single in-rate call could request an arbitrarily large payout. This bounds a compromised/buggy machine to one capped transaction. Verified on the dev stack: m012 runs, the model round-trips the column (GET returns the set value), and a negative value is rejected.
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parent
607b71e796
commit
9abf695fd5
4 changed files with 54 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -845,3 +845,18 @@ async def m011_machine_npub_nullable(db):
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"CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS dca_machines_wallet_id_uq "
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"ON dca_machines (wallet_id)"
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)
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async def m012_add_max_cash_in_sats(db):
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"""Server-side per-transaction cash-in ceiling (aiolabs/spirekeeper#31).
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The secure `create_withdraw` RPC derives fee/net/attribution server-side,
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but `principal_sats` is necessarily ATM-attested (only the hardware knows
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how much cash went in). The bunker ACL / usage caps gate call *rate*, not
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*sats*, so a single in-rate call could request an arbitrarily large payout.
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`max_cash_in_sats` bounds that: the handler rejects a cash-in whose
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principal exceeds it. NULL = no cap.
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"""
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await db.execute(
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"ALTER TABLE spirekeeper.super_config ADD COLUMN max_cash_in_sats INTEGER"
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)
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13
models.py
13
models.py
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@ -482,6 +482,10 @@ class SuperConfig(BaseModel):
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super_cash_in_fee_fraction: float = 0.0
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super_cash_out_fee_fraction: float = 0.0
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super_fee_wallet_id: str | None
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# Per-transaction cash-in ceiling in sats (#31). The bunker ACL gates call
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# rate, not sats, so this bounds a single ATM-attested principal. NULL = no
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# cap.
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max_cash_in_sats: int | None = None
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updated_at: datetime
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@ -489,6 +493,7 @@ class UpdateSuperConfigData(BaseModel):
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super_cash_in_fee_fraction: float | None = None
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super_cash_out_fee_fraction: float | None = None
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super_fee_wallet_id: str | None = None
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max_cash_in_sats: int | None = None
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@validator(
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"super_cash_in_fee_fraction",
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@ -501,6 +506,14 @@ class UpdateSuperConfigData(BaseModel):
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raise ValueError("super fee fraction must be between 0 and 1")
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return round(float(v), 4)
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@validator("max_cash_in_sats")
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def _cap_non_negative(cls, v):
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if v is None:
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return v
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if v < 0:
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raise ValueError("max_cash_in_sats must be >= 0")
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return int(v)
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# =============================================================================
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# Operator UX action carriers — partial-tx and balance-settlement features.
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@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
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data: {
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super_cash_in_fee_fraction: 0,
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super_cash_out_fee_fraction: 0,
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super_fee_wallet_id: ''
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super_fee_wallet_id: '',
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max_cash_in_sats: null
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}
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},
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@ -576,7 +577,8 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
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this.superConfig?.super_cash_in_fee_fraction ?? 0,
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super_cash_out_fee_fraction:
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this.superConfig?.super_cash_out_fee_fraction ?? 0,
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super_fee_wallet_id: this.superConfig?.super_fee_wallet_id || ''
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super_fee_wallet_id: this.superConfig?.super_fee_wallet_id || '',
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max_cash_in_sats: this.superConfig?.max_cash_in_sats ?? null
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}
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this.superFeeDialog.show = true
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},
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@ -604,6 +606,21 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
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Number(d.super_cash_in_fee_fraction),
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Number(d.super_cash_out_fee_fraction)
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)) return
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// Blank cap field -> null (the PUT skips null, so the existing value is
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// preserved rather than cleared — set 0 to reject every cash-in).
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const cap =
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d.max_cash_in_sats === '' ||
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d.max_cash_in_sats === null ||
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d.max_cash_in_sats === undefined
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? null
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: Number(d.max_cash_in_sats)
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if (cap !== null && (!Number.isInteger(cap) || cap < 0)) {
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Quasar.Notify.create({
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type: 'negative',
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message: 'Max cash-in must be a non-negative whole number of sats'
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})
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return
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}
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this.superFeeDialog.saving = true
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try {
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const {data} = await LNbits.api.request(
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@ -611,7 +628,8 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
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{
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super_cash_in_fee_fraction: Number(d.super_cash_in_fee_fraction),
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super_cash_out_fee_fraction: Number(d.super_cash_out_fee_fraction),
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super_fee_wallet_id: (d.super_fee_wallet_id || '').trim() || null
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super_fee_wallet_id: (d.super_fee_wallet_id || '').trim() || null,
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max_cash_in_sats: cap
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}
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)
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this.superConfig = data
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@ -1381,6 +1381,11 @@
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label="Super fee destination wallet_id"
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hint="LNbits wallet that collects the platform fee"
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class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
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<q-input v-model.number="superFeeDialog.data.max_cash_in_sats"
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label="Max cash-in per transaction (sats — blank = no cap)"
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hint="Server-side ceiling on a single cash-in's principal. The ATM attests the amount; this bounds a compromised/buggy machine to one capped tx."
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type="number" step="1" min="0"
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class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
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</q-card-section>
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<q-card-actions align="right">
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<q-btn flat label="Cancel" v-close-popup></q-btn>
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