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Author SHA1 Message Date
a5ab02e4b6 Merge pull request 'fix(pairing): default bunker_relay to the spire's public event relay, not localhost' (#35) from fix/pair-bunker-relay-default into main
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Reviewed-on: #35
2026-06-22 15:21:12 +00:00
b55fc8bc1c fix(pairing): default bunker_relay to the spire's public event relay, not localhost
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ci.yml / fix(pairing): default bunker_relay to the spire's public event relay, not localhost (pull_request) Failing after 0s
The seed minted via the Pair UI baked an unreachable bunker relay into
bunker_url. The UI form has no bunker_relay field, so pair_spire fell back to
its default `settings.lnbits_nsec_bunker_url` — which on a deployed instance is
the INTERNAL relay lnbits uses to reach the co-located bunker (e.g.
ws://127.0.0.1:5000/nostrrelay/demo). The remote ATM can't reach localhost, so
connectNewSeed hangs -> BunkerTimeoutError "Signer Unreachable". (Flagged by
bitspire on the demo; the localhost-relay /pair gotcha the coord thread called out.)

Default bunker_relay to the spire's own public event relay (relays[0]) instead:
the bunker lives on the same operator nostrrelay the spire publishes its events
to, so that URL is machine-reachable. An explicit `bunker_relay` still overrides
for split-relay deploys. An empty override now falls back to the same default
rather than raising.

Regression test: with no (or empty) bunker_relay, bunker_url embeds relays[0]
and contains no 127.0.0.1.

NOTE: relays[0] is a pragmatic default; whether the seed should carry multiple
relays / be sourced from the operator's nostrclient relay is a follow-up.
2026-06-22 17:18:24 +02:00
d0d20b0f94 Merge pull request 'fix: guard every machine_npub deref against unpaired machines (500 + cassette-consumer crash)' (#33) from fix/unpaired-machine-npub-guards into main
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ci.yml / Merge pull request 'fix: guard every machine_npub deref against unpaired machines (500 + cassette-consumer crash)' (#33) from fix/unpaired-machine-npub-guards into main (push) Failing after 0s
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Reviewed-on: #33
2026-06-22 14:58:03 +00:00
8dad72a00d fix: complete the unpaired-machine sweep + regression test
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ci.yml / fix: complete the unpaired-machine sweep + regression test (pull_request) Failing after 0s
Full sweep of every machine_npub deref found one more reachable crash:
_record_rejected (tasks.py) logs machine_npub[:12], and the
assert_nostr_attribution guard now routes an unpaired machine there, so
None[:12] -> TypeError. Fall back to machine.id.

Every other deref is safe by the attribution-gate invariant: a settlement only
flows past assert_nostr_attribution (now rejecting unpaired) for a paired
machine, so the downstream distribution / parse-path / "landed" logs can't see
None; the collision-loop display already uses `(m.machine_npub or m.id)`.

Adds tests/test_unpaired_machine_guards.py: attribution rejects an unpaired
machine with the domain SettlementAttributionError (not AttributeError), and
build_state_d_tags skips it. New tests + every guard-affected suite pass.

(Two pre-existing test_pair_endpoint failures — #29 drift: fake_pair lacks
bunker_relay, and the test DB lacks super_config — are out of scope; filed
separately.)
2026-06-22 16:55:33 +02:00
d52a3bfafe fix: guard every machine_npub deref against unpaired machines (None)
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ci.yml / fix: guard every machine_npub deref against unpaired machines (None) (pull_request) Failing after 0s
machine_npub became nullable in #29/m011 (register-unpaired flow), but
several consumers still assumed it's non-None and crashed
`normalize_public_key(None)` with `AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no
attribute 'startswith'`. On the demo (which had an unpaired machine) this
broke the platform-fee update (500) and spammed the cassette consumer with
errors every 2s. The #29 create/pair paths were guarded; these were missed:

- views_api `api_update_super_config`: the "republish fee to every active
  machine" loop → skip unpaired (they get their config at pairing).
- cassette_transport `build_state_d_tags_for_machines`: skip unpaired (no
  state-beacon d-tag yet) — the cassette-consumer loop crash.
- crud `get_machine_by_atm_pubkey_hex`: its `except (ValueError,
  AssertionError)` didn't catch the AttributeError; skip unpaired before
  normalize — the cassette event-handler crash.
- bitspire `assert_nostr_attribution`: reject (SettlementAttributionError) an
  unpaired machine instead of crashing the payment listener.
- views_api cassettes/publish endpoint: 400 (not paired) instead of crashing
  publish_to_atm.

Verified on the dev stack: with an unpaired active machine present, the
cassette consumer registers (skipping it) and runs clean — no AttributeError.
2026-06-22 16:45:29 +02:00
622c1be5d3 Merge pull request 'feat(cash-in): secure create_withdraw nostr-transport RPC (#31)' (#32) from feat/secure-cashin-rpc into main
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ci.yml / Merge pull request 'feat(cash-in): secure `create_withdraw` nostr-transport RPC (#31)' (#32) from feat/secure-cashin-rpc into main (push) Failing after 0s
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Reviewed-on: #32
2026-06-22 13:54:43 +00:00
f67cb49bc3 fix(cash-in): return bech32 LNURL, not the raw URL
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ci.yml / fix(cash-in): return bech32 LNURL, not the raw URL (pull_request) Failing after 0s
`Lnurl.__str__` is the underlying URL, so `str(lnurl)` returned
`http://<baseurl>/withdraw/...` instead of the bech32 `LNURL1…` — wallets
need the encoded LNURL-withdraw (lud01). Use `str(lnurl.bech32)` and add
`lnurl_url` (the raw URL) alongside, mirroring withdraw's _populate_lnurl
field convention. (Note: the encoded URL still derives from LNBITS_BASEURL —
that must be an externally reachable https URL for a real wallet to claim.)
2026-06-22 15:32:44 +02:00
9abf695fd5 feat(cash-in): super_config.max_cash_in_sats per-tx cap + UI (#31)
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ci.yml / feat(cash-in): super_config.max_cash_in_sats per-tx cap + UI (#31) (pull_request) Failing after 0s
Wires the server-side per-transaction cash-in ceiling the `create_withdraw`
handler already enforces (it read the value defensively via getattr; this
makes it a first-class config field).

- migrations.py m012: ADD COLUMN super_config.max_cash_in_sats INTEGER (NULL
  = no cap).
- models.py: SuperConfig.max_cash_in_sats + UpdateSuperConfigData field with a
  >= 0 validator.
- super-fee dialog: a "Max cash-in per transaction (sats)" input; blank sends
  null (the PUT skips null, preserving the current value — set 0 to reject
  every cash-in). crud `update_super_config` and the PUT endpoint flow the
  field through automatically (dynamic dict update; check_super_user gated).

Why a sats cap and not the bunker ACL: the ACL / usage caps (#28) gate call
*rate*, not *sats*, and `principal_sats` is necessarily ATM-attested — so a
single in-rate call could request an arbitrarily large payout. This bounds a
compromised/buggy machine to one capped transaction.

Verified on the dev stack: m012 runs, the model round-trips the column
(GET returns the set value), and a negative value is rejected.
2026-06-22 12:51:59 +02:00
607b71e796 feat(cash-in): secure create_withdraw nostr-transport RPC (#31)
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ci.yml / feat(cash-in): secure `create_withdraw` nostr-transport RPC (#31) (pull_request) Failing after 0s
Adds a server-side cash-in RPC so the ATM no longer supplies the withdraw
amount, fee, or attribution. The ATM sends a bunker-signed kind-21000
`create_withdraw` with just the gross `principal_sats` (the hardware-
attested fiat value); the handler derives everything else SERVER-SIDE:

- attribution = the VERIFIED transport `sender_pubkey` (never read from the
  body), matched to an active machine on the authenticated wallet;
- fee = round(principal × super_cash_in) + round(principal × operator_cash_in),
  per-leg rounding so it matches parse_settlement exactly (fee_mismatch=0);
- net = principal − fee → the withdraw amount the customer receives;
- stamps `extra={source:bitspire, type:cash_in, principal_sats, fee_sats,
  nostr_sender_pubkey:<verified>, nostr_event_id}` onto the link.

The customer claims the NET link; the payout carries the stamped extra
(aiolabs/withdraw#3) and `_handle_payment` records the cash_in settlement
(spirekeeper#30) with cryptographic attribution — closing the vector where
`lnurlw_create_link` let the ATM set amount/fee/attribution freely.

Registered via `register_rpc("create_withdraw", …, AUTH_WALLET)` (extensions
register RPCs directly — withdraw already does). Soft-fails on lnbits without
`register_rpc`. Per-tx cap reads `super_config.max_cash_in_sats` defensively
(getattr) — the config field/UI is a fast-follow.

Wire schema pinned in #31. Depends on #30 (consumer-side settlement fix).
2026-06-22 12:21:23 +02:00
56ac4a69e9 Merge pull request 'fix(settlements): process cash-in (outbound) payments, not just cash-out' (#30) from fix/cash-in-settlement into main
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ci.yml / Merge pull request 'fix(settlements): process cash-in (outbound) payments, not just cash-out' (#30) from fix/cash-in-settlement into main (push) Failing after 0s
Reviewed-on: #30
2026-06-22 10:19:44 +00:00
7b55dc152b fix(settlements): process cash-in (outbound) payments, not just cash-out
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ci.yml / fix(settlements): process cash-in (outbound) payments, not just cash-out (pull_request) Failing after 0s
The `_handle_payment` cash-in branch existed but had never been exercised
end-to-end — bitSpire cash-in payouts only started reaching it once the
withdraw extension learned to stamp `source=bitspire` on an LNURL-withdraw
payout (aiolabs/withdraw#3). With that wired up, the first real cash-in
exposed two bugs:

1. `payment.sat` is signed by protocol direction — negative for an
   outbound (cash-in) payout. It was passed straight to `parse_settlement`
   as `wire_sats`, which enforces `wire_sats >= 0`, so every cash-in was
   rejected ("wire_sats must be >= 0, got -75795"). A settlement's
   `wire_sats` is a magnitude (direction lives in `tx_type`); pass
   `abs(payment.sat)`. Same in `_record_rejected`.

2. `_record_rejected` hard-coded `tx_type="cash_out"`, so a rejected
   cash-in showed the wrong direction in the operator dashboard. The
   parsed tx_type isn't available on the rejection path, but the
   authenticated protocol direction is — derive it: outbound → cash_in,
   inbound → cash_out.

Verified on the dev stack: a stamped cash-in now lands a `cash_in`
settlement (net 75795, principal 82386, fee 6591), pays the super its 3%
(2472 sats), and correctly skips the DCA leg (principal stays in the
operator's wallet as liquidity from the cash-in customer).
2026-06-21 17:27:58 +02:00
490605333c Merge pull request 'feat(pairing,ui): optional machine_npub + bunker_relay override + fee decimal-input UX' (#29) from feat/optional-machine-npub-pairing-ux into main
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ci.yml / Merge pull request 'feat(pairing,ui): optional machine_npub + bunker_relay override + fee decimal-input UX' (#29) from feat/optional-machine-npub-pairing-ux into main (push) Failing after 0s
Reviewed-on: #29
2026-06-21 13:41:57 +00:00
73bd274979 feat(pairing,ui): optional machine_npub + bunker_relay override + fee decimal-input UX
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ci.yml / feat(pairing,ui): optional machine_npub + bunker_relay override + fee decimal-input UX (pull_request) Failing after 0s
Three changes from the nsecbunkerd#27 bunker-pairing smoke (validated
end-to-end on the Sintra, 2026-06-21); intermingled per-file, so landed
together.

1. Optional machine_npub (model A1) — register UNPAIRED, bunker mints the
   identity at pairing:
   - machine_npub now nullable (migration m011 rebuilds dca_machines for
     sqlite / ALTER ... DROP NOT NULL for postgres; UNIQUE stays, NULLs
     don't collide so any number of unpaired machines coexist).
   - CreateMachineData.machine_npub -> str | None; create skips the
     collision-check + fee publish when blank; api_pair_machine now
     publishes the fee config after minting, so an unpaired machine clears
     its awaiting-fees gate once paired.
   - Supplying an npub up front is the DEVELOPMENT self-key path (a machine
     holding its own signing key) — available to anyone but the form field
     is explicitly marked DEVELOPMENT ONLY.
   - Frontend: npub field optional, required rule dropped, null-safe
     display (shortNpub -> "unpaired", guarded slices), empty -> null.

2. bunker_relay override on POST /machines/{id}/pair: PairMachineData gains
   bunker_relay; api_pair_machine threads it to pair_spire. Lets the seed's
   bunker:// relay differ from the relay lnbits uses to reach the bunker
   (internal docker host vs LAN/public) — needed for split-relay / dev
   deploys. Without it the smoke had to mint via a script.

3. Fees are decimal fractions, not percents: relabel super + operator fee
   inputs ("decimal fraction, 0-0.15") + a shared _assertFeesDecimal()
   guard (super/add/edit submits) so a percent typo (3 instead of 0.03)
   gets a clear toast, not a raw 400.

refs: nsecbunkerd#27/#36; aiolabs/bitspire#52; coordination smoke 2026-06-21

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-21 12:31:55 +02:00
47b7efc53c Merge pull request 'docs(pairing): TTL + token-revoke now enforced post-bind (nsecbunkerd#27)' (#28) from docs/ttl-revoke-enforced-post-bind into main
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ci.yml / Merge pull request 'docs(pairing): TTL + token-revoke now enforced post-bind (nsecbunkerd#27)' (#28) from docs/ttl-revoke-enforced-post-bind into main (push) Failing after 0s
Reviewed-on: #28
2026-06-20 10:05:36 +00:00
b193f6262d docs(pairing): TTL + token-revoke now enforced post-bind (nsecbunkerd#27)
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nsecbunkerd#27 (deployed 2026-06-19) reverses the #24 finding: the
sign-time ACL now evaluates token lifecycle live on every request
(checkIfPubkeyAllowed step 4 joins through a liveWhere filter;
applyToken stopped photocopying grants into SigningConditions). So:

- duration_hours / token expiresAt now bounds an ESTABLISHED binding —
  an expired token stops signing post-bind, not just at connect. The
  prior docstring (connect-window-only, pointing at the now-closed
  nsecbunkerd#24) is corrected.
- Token-revoke is no longer a post-redeem no-op (closes the #22
  mechanism bunker-side). revoke_spire keeps using revoke_key_user
  because that's the subject-level ban cutting the whole binding, not
  just one token's grant — rationale updated, behavior unchanged.

Doc/comment only; 20 pairing tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 23:23:11 +02:00
cc8d786331 Merge pull request 'fix(fleet-ui): pair-dialog v-else compiler error + TTL docstring correction' (#27) from fix/pair-dialog-and-ttl-doc into main
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Reviewed-on: #27
2026-06-18 23:01:15 +00:00
554b2e2e17 docs(pairing): correct duration_hours TTL docstring
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ci.yml / docs(pairing): correct duration_hours TTL docstring (pull_request) Failing after 0s
duration_hours stamps Token.expiresAt, but nsecbunkerd reads expiresAt
only in validateToken at connect/redeem time — the sign-time ACL never
checks it (materialised SigningConditions carry no expiry; the policy
join filters revokedAt only). So TTL bounds only the un-redeemed connect
window, not an established binding; revoke_key_user is the real post-bind
cutoff. Same ACL-ordering class as the revoke finding (#22). Tracked at
aiolabs/nsecbunkerd#24.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 00:59:29 +02:00
76090ab5da fix(fleet-ui): wrap pair-dialog steps in template v-if/v-else
The Pair dialog had two interleaved v-if/v-else sibling pairs
(q-card-section + q-card-actions per step). Vue requires v-else to
immediately follow its v-if sibling, so the second v-else (actions)
trailed a v-else (section) — illegal, throwing compiler error 30
("v-else has no adjacent v-if") and breaking the entire Vue mount.
Wrap each step's section+actions in one <template v-if> / <template
v-else> so there's exactly one adjacent pair. Verified with
@vue/compiler-dom and a live pair/revoke round-trip against regtest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 00:59:29 +02:00
22678dfb4f feat(pairing): authorize kind-22242 (NIP-42 AUTH) in spire policy (#52)
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ci.yml / feat(pairing): authorize kind-22242 (NIP-42 AUTH) in spire policy (#52) (pull_request) Failing after 0s
ci.yml / feat(pairing): authorize kind-22242 (NIP-42 AUTH) in spire policy (#52) (push) Failing after 0s
bitspire#52 consumer review (2026-06-18) enumerated the kinds the spire
signs as its OWN identity and found NIP-42 relay AUTH (kind 22242) missing
from SPIRE_POLICY_RULES — a silent bunker reject the moment a relay
challenges with AUTH. It must be bunker-signed (AUTH proves control of
spire_pubkey, which only the bunker holds; can't use the local client_nsec).

Adds 22242. Records the confirmed set in the policy comment: live = 21000 +
30078 + 22242; CLINK 21001-21003 dormant but kept; nip04 unused (v1 path is
dead code). New test locks the required-kinds contract so 22242 can't
silently regress.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 17:29:43 +00:00
a18f653ca7 feat(ui): Fleet Pair / Revoke spire UI (#9/#12)
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ci.yml / feat(ui): Fleet Pair / Revoke spire UI (#9/#12) (push) Failing after 0s
Operator-facing front for POST /machines/{id}/pair + /revoke (#21/#23):
  - Pairing chip per machine row (paired / not-paired + paired-at tooltip).
  - 'Pair' (qr_code_2) opens a dialog -> relays + optional duration_hours
    -> POST /pair -> renders the seed_url as <lnbits-qrcode> + copy, shows
    the bunker-minted spire npub. Re-pair relabels.
  - 'Revoke' (link_off, shown when paired) -> confirm -> POST /revoke ->
    updates the row, reports revoked_count (>=1 cut / 0 never-bound).
  - Row reflects the bunker-minted identity immediately (machine_npub <-
    spire_pubkey_hex, paired_at).

Quasar-UMD conventions: explicit close tags, ${ } delimiters, :style.
JS syntax-checked, conforms to .prettierrc; 210 backend tests unaffected.
Needs a manual browser smoke (superuser-gated page).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 17:29:33 +00:00
846d5d9d0f Merge pull request 'feat(pairing): optional token TTL + revoke endpoint (#9/#12, #22)' (#23) from feat/pairing-revoke-ttl into main
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Reviewed-on: #23
2026-06-18 17:09:01 +00:00
4db5c3de4e Merge branch 'main' into feat/pairing-revoke-ttl
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2026-06-18 17:08:44 +00:00
32959d1533 Merge pull request 'feat(pairing): seed-URL pairing — operator-side producer (S0 / #9)' (#21) from feat/seed-url-pairing into main
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Reviewed-on: #21
2026-06-18 17:03:34 +00:00
a5efdf22a1 feat(pairing): optional token TTL + revoke endpoint (#9/#12, #22)
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Builds on the seed-URL pairing in #21 (stacked).

(b) TTL — PairMachineData.duration_hours (validated > 0) threads through
    pair_spire -> create_new_token (lnbits#55). None = non-expiring.

(c) Revoke — POST /machines/{id}/revoke -> revoke_spire ->
    admin_client.revoke_key_user(spire-<id>). Per spirekeeper#22, revoke
    MUST go through KeyUser.revokedAt (revoke_key_user), NOT token revoke:
    lnbits eager-binds (redeems) the connect token at provision, so
    nsecbunkerd has materialised the policy into per-KeyUser grants its
    ACL checks BEFORE the Token.revokedAt filter -> token revoke is a
    silent no-op. Returns RevokeResult{revoked_count}: >=1 = cut, 0 =
    never bound. set_machine_unpaired clears paired_at (keeps npub +
    bunker_spire_key_name for audit / re-pair).

7 new tests (duration threading + default-None; revoke routes to
revoke_key_user and never token-revoke + error mapping; endpoint wiring
revoke happy/zero/502). 210 green; new code black/ruff-clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 18:51:54 +02:00
9c5f07c72e refactor(pairing): use lnbits' public ensure_policy, drop fork duplicate (#9)
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Adopts aiolabs/lnbits#55 (merged b5fba561): pair_spire now calls the
public ensure_policy(client, name='spirekeeper-spire', rules=...,
methods_no_kind=...) instead of spirekeeper's cache-free
_ensure_spire_policy copy. #55 re-keyed _POLICY_ID_CACHE on
(admin_pubkey, policy_name), so the shared helper no longer returns the
wrong (lnbits-default) id for a non-default policy name — the exact
reason the duplicate existed. Net -45 LOC, one less fork-divergent
reimplementation to keep in sync.

Requires lnbits >= the #55 merge (ensure_policy importable) — already
true on dev/demo.

Tests: FakeBunker gains admin_pubkey; an autouse fixture clears lnbits'
_POLICY_ID_CACHE between tests (the shared helper caches, unlike the old
local one). 203 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 18:31:21 +02:00
761f078053 feat(pairing): POST /machines/{id}/pair endpoint (#9)
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Wires the pairing service into the operator API. api_pair_machine:
  - _machine_owned_by ownership guard (404 on miss)
  - opens NsecBunkerAdminClient.from_settings() and runs pair_spire
  - maps bunker failures: not-configured -> 503, PairingError/NsecBunkerError
    -> 502 (nothing persisted on failure)
  - runs _assert_no_pubkey_collision on the bunker-minted hex, then
    set_machine_pairing persists machine_npub (= minted spire identity, so
    path-B roster routes it), bunker_spire_key_name, paired_at.

Re-pair supported; revoke/expiry gated on aiolabs/lnbits#54.

Adds Create... PairMachineData {relays} body, set_machine_pairing CRUD,
and 3 endpoint wiring tests (persist+collision, empty-relays 400, failure
502). 203 tests green. Pre-existing black/ruff debt in crud/views_api left
untouched (version-drift churn avoided); new code is lint-clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 23:39:18 +02:00
a77f5bcb5c feat(pairing): bunker pairing service — mint per-spire key + seed URL (#9)
Operator-side producer for seed-URL pairing (S0/#9, model A1). pair_spire()
orchestrates the nsecbunkerd admin chain via lnbits' NsecBunkerAdminClient:
  create_new_key(spire-<id>) -> _ensure_spire_policy -> create_new_token ->
  get_key_tokens -> package the <npub>#secret token into a bunker:// URL +
  base64url seed URL {spire_npub, spire_pubkey, bunker_url, relays}.

The spire later self-signs all its events as that bunker-held key; lnbits'
path-B roster maps the npub to the operator wallet — no nsec on the spire.
spirekeeper does steps 1-4 only; the NIP-46 connect/bind happens spire-side
(bitspire#52) with the spire's own client keypair.

Scoped policy 'spirekeeper-spire': sign_event 21000/21001-3/30078 + nip44
(kind-less via add_policy_rule). Local _ensure_spire_policy (no cache)
avoids lnbits' admin-pubkey-keyed _ensure_policy cache (policy-name-blind).

9 unit tests with a fake bunker (orchestration, policy reconcile, seed/
bunker:// wire shape, error paths); npub<->hex via lnbits' real helpers.
200 tests green.

Known gaps (lnbits NsecBunkerAdminClient): no token-expiry param, no revoke
RPC — re-pair works; 'revoke spire access' deferred to a bunker follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 23:17:48 +02:00
bb473f5385 feat(pairing): m010 schema — bunker pairing columns on dca_machines
Schema checkpoint for seed-URL pairing (S0 / #9; spire-side bitspire#52),
model A1 — the spire's signing key lives in the operator's nsecbunkerd,
not on the spire's disk.

dca_machines gains:
  - bunker_spire_key_name — the spire's key name in the bunker
    (spire-<machine_id>); used to re-issue connect tokens on re-pair.
  - paired_at — last successful pair; NULL = never paired.

Both nullable, idempotent column-probe add (m009 pattern). Machine model
gains the matching optional fields. Validated on the regtest dev db
(columns present, migrations clean); 191 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 22:47:42 +02:00
c651d53419 assets: replace extension logo with AIO mark (256x256)
Some checks failed
ci.yml / assets: replace extension logo with AIO mark (256x256) (push) Failing after 0s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-16 18:10:29 +02:00
16 changed files with 1641 additions and 40 deletions

View file

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter
from lnbits.tasks import create_permanent_unique_task
from loguru import logger
from .cashin_transport import register_create_withdraw_rpc
from .crud import db
from .nostr_transport_roster import register_with_lnbits as register_roster_with_lnbits
from .tasks import wait_for_cassette_state_events, wait_for_paid_invoices
@ -13,9 +14,7 @@ from .views_api import spirekeeper_api_router
logger.info("spirekeeper v2 loaded")
spirekeeper_ext: APIRouter = APIRouter(
prefix="/spirekeeper", tags=["DCA Admin"]
)
spirekeeper_ext: APIRouter = APIRouter(prefix="/spirekeeper", tags=["DCA Admin"])
spirekeeper_ext.include_router(spirekeeper_generic_router)
spirekeeper_ext.include_router(spirekeeper_api_router)
@ -57,6 +56,12 @@ def spirekeeper_start():
# wallet, not an auto-created machine wallet. Soft-fails on lnbits
# versions that don't yet expose `register_roster_resolver`.
register_roster_with_lnbits()
# Secure cash-in (#31): register the `create_withdraw` nostr-transport RPC
# so the ATM requests a server-priced, server-stamped cash-in withdraw link
# over the bunker-signed transport — amount/fee/attribution derived
# server-side, never client-supplied. Soft-fails if `register_rpc` isn't
# exposed by this lnbits.
register_create_withdraw_rpc()
__all__ = [

View file

@ -126,6 +126,14 @@ def assert_nostr_attribution(machine: Machine, extra: dict) -> None:
"missing nostr_sender_pubkey on Payment.extra — invoice was not "
"issued through the nostr-transport path"
)
if not machine.machine_npub:
# Unpaired machine (machine_npub None — nullable since #29/m011). It has
# no identity to attribute a settlement to; reject cleanly rather than
# let normalize_public_key(None) raise an uncaught AttributeError.
raise SettlementAttributionError(
f"machine {machine.id} is unpaired (no machine_npub); "
"a settlement cannot be attributed to it"
)
from lnbits.utils.nostr import normalize_public_key
try:

135
cashin_transport.py Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
"""
Secure cash-in: a `create_withdraw` nostr-transport RPC (aiolabs/spirekeeper#31).
Mirrors withdraw's `lnurlw_create_link`, but cash-in-semantic. The ATM sends the
gross `principal_sats` (the hardware-attested fiat value) over the bunker-signed
kind-21000 transport; the operator side derives the fee, the NET withdraw
amount, and the attribution **server-side** none of it client-supplied. The
customer claims the NET link; the payout carries the stamped `extra`
(aiolabs/withdraw#3) so `_handle_payment` records the `cash_in` settlement with
cryptographic attribution (the verified transport sender), exactly like the
cash-out path.
Why this exists: `lnurlw_create_link` takes `min/max_withdrawable` and `extra`
straight from the client body, so an authenticated-but-malicious/buggy ATM could
set the gross amount (no fee), forge `nostr_sender_pubkey`, or request an
arbitrary amount. This RPC closes that by computing everything server-side.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from loguru import logger
from .crud import get_machine_by_atm_pubkey_hex, get_super_config
_RPC_NAME = "create_withdraw"
async def handle_create_withdraw(auth, request) -> dict:
"""nostr-transport RPC handler. `auth` is a WalletTypeInfo (the operator
wallet, roster-resolved from the verified sender); `request` is a
NostrRpcRequest with `body`, `sender_pubkey` (verified), and `event_id`."""
# Import withdraw lazily so registration never hard-depends on the withdraw
# extension being importable at startup; a missing dep fails the request,
# not the daemon.
try:
from withdraw.crud import create_withdraw_link
from withdraw.helpers import create_lnurl_from_baseurl
from withdraw.models import CreateWithdrawData
except ImportError as exc:
raise ValueError(
"withdraw extension unavailable; cannot mint a cash-in link"
) from exc
body = request.body or {}
principal_sats = body.get("principal_sats")
if not isinstance(principal_sats, int) or principal_sats <= 0:
raise ValueError("principal_sats must be a positive integer")
# Attribution is the VERIFIED transport sender — never read it from the body.
sender = (request.sender_pubkey or "").lower()
if not sender:
raise ValueError("missing verified sender_pubkey")
machine = await get_machine_by_atm_pubkey_hex(sender)
if machine is None:
raise ValueError("no active machine for this signer")
# Defence in depth: the roster already resolved `auth.wallet` from `sender`;
# confirm it's the machine's own wallet before minting a payout link on it.
if machine.wallet_id != auth.wallet.id:
raise ValueError("machine wallet does not match the authenticated wallet")
super_config = await get_super_config()
if super_config is None:
raise ValueError("super_config not initialised")
# Per-tx cap (server-side; the bunker ACL / usage caps cannot see sats).
cap = getattr(super_config, "max_cash_in_sats", None)
if cap is not None and principal_sats > cap:
raise ValueError(
f"principal_sats {principal_sats} exceeds max_cash_in_sats {cap}"
)
# Round each leg independently so the split matches parse_settlement exactly
# (platform_fee + operator_fee == fee_sats → fee_mismatch_sats = 0).
platform_fee = round(
principal_sats * float(super_config.super_cash_in_fee_fraction)
)
operator_fee = round(principal_sats * float(machine.operator_cash_in_fee_fraction))
fee_sats = platform_fee + operator_fee
net_sats = principal_sats - fee_sats
if net_sats <= 0:
raise ValueError("fee >= principal; nothing to withdraw")
data = CreateWithdrawData(
title=body.get("title") or f"bitSpire Cash-In {machine.id}",
min_withdrawable=net_sats,
max_withdrawable=net_sats,
uses=1,
wait_time=int(body.get("wait_time") or 1),
is_unique=False,
extra={
"source": "bitspire",
"type": "cash_in",
"principal_sats": principal_sats,
"fee_sats": fee_sats,
"nostr_sender_pubkey": sender,
"nostr_event_id": body.get("client_ref") or request.event_id,
},
)
link = await create_withdraw_link(data, auth.wallet.id)
lnurl = create_lnurl_from_baseurl(link)
logger.info(
f"spirekeeper: create_withdraw machine={machine.id} "
f"principal={principal_sats} fee={fee_sats} (super={platform_fee} "
f"op={operator_fee}) net={net_sats} link={link.id}"
)
return {
"link_id": link.id,
# `Lnurl.__str__` is the raw URL — wallets need the bech32 LNURL1…
# (lud01). Mirror withdraw's `_populate_lnurl` field convention.
"lnurl": str(lnurl.bech32),
"lnurl_url": str(lnurl.url),
"net_sats": net_sats,
"principal_sats": principal_sats,
"fee_sats": fee_sats,
}
def register_create_withdraw_rpc() -> None:
"""Register `create_withdraw` with the lnbits nostr transport. Soft-fails if
the transport doesn't expose `register_rpc` (older lnbits)."""
try:
from lnbits.core.services.nostr_transport.dispatcher import ( # type: ignore
AUTH_WALLET,
register_rpc,
)
except ImportError:
logger.warning(
"spirekeeper: nostr-transport register_rpc unavailable; "
"'create_withdraw' not registered (secure cash-in over RPC disabled)"
)
return
register_rpc(_RPC_NAME, handle_create_withdraw, AUTH_WALLET)
logger.info("spirekeeper: registered nostr-transport RPC 'create_withdraw'")

View file

@ -141,8 +141,10 @@ def _state_d_tag(atm_pubkey_hex: str) -> str:
def build_state_d_tags_for_machines(machines: list[Machine]) -> list[str]:
"""Bootstrap-consumer subscription filter helper: returns the full
`#d=[...]` list for all known ATMs an operator subscribes to."""
return [_state_d_tag(_atm_hex_pubkey(m)) for m in machines]
`#d=[...]` list for all known PAIRED ATMs an operator subscribes to.
Unpaired machines (machine_npub is None nullable since #29/m011) have no
state-beacon d-tag yet, so skip them rather than crash `_atm_hex_pubkey`."""
return [_state_d_tag(_atm_hex_pubkey(m)) for m in machines if m.machine_npub]
# =============================================================================

54
crud.py
View file

@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ async def get_machine_by_atm_pubkey_hex(atm_pubkey_hex: str) -> Machine | None:
target = atm_pubkey_hex.lower()
machines = await list_all_active_machines()
for m in machines:
# Unpaired machines (machine_npub is None — nullable since #29/m011)
# have no identity to match and would raise AttributeError in
# normalize_public_key (not caught below); skip them.
if not m.machine_npub:
continue
try:
if normalize_public_key(m.machine_npub).lower() == target:
return m
@ -202,6 +207,55 @@ async def update_machine(machine_id: str, data: UpdateMachineData) -> Machine |
return await get_machine(machine_id)
async def set_machine_pairing(
machine_id: str,
*,
machine_npub: str,
bunker_spire_key_name: str,
paired_at: datetime,
) -> Machine | None:
"""Persist the result of a (re-)pair: the bunker-minted spire identity
becomes the machine's npub (so lnbits' path-B roster routes it), and we
record the bunker key name + pair time. Stored as lowercase hex the
roster + collision guard normalise either form, hex is canonical."""
await db.execute(
"""
UPDATE spirekeeper.dca_machines
SET machine_npub = :npub,
bunker_spire_key_name = :key_name,
paired_at = :paired_at,
updated_at = :updated_at
WHERE id = :id
""",
{
"npub": machine_npub.lower(),
"key_name": bunker_spire_key_name,
"paired_at": paired_at,
"updated_at": datetime.now(),
"id": machine_id,
},
)
return await get_machine(machine_id)
async def set_machine_unpaired(machine_id: str) -> Machine | None:
"""Mark a machine unpaired after revoking its spire's bunker access
(POST /revoke). Clears `paired_at`; keeps `machine_npub` +
`bunker_spire_key_name` for audit / re-pair. The bunker-side
`KeyUser.revokedAt` (set by `revoke_spire`) is what actually stops the
spire signing this just records the operator-visible state."""
await db.execute(
"""
UPDATE spirekeeper.dca_machines
SET paired_at = NULL,
updated_at = :updated_at
WHERE id = :id
""",
{"updated_at": datetime.now(), "id": machine_id},
)
return await get_machine(machine_id)
async def delete_machine(machine_id: str) -> None:
await db.execute(
"DELETE FROM spirekeeper.dca_machines WHERE id = :id",

View file

@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ async def m001_satmachine_v2_initial(db):
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS spirekeeper.dca_machines (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
operator_user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
machine_npub TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
machine_npub TEXT UNIQUE,
wallet_id TEXT NOT NULL,
name TEXT,
location TEXT,
@ -735,3 +735,128 @@ async def m009_split_fee_fractions_by_direction(db):
await db.execute(
"ALTER TABLE spirekeeper.super_config DROP COLUMN super_fee_fraction"
)
async def m010_add_machine_bunker_pairing(db):
"""Add NIP-46 bunker-pairing columns to dca_machines for seed-URL
pairing (S0 / aiolabs/spirekeeper#9; spire-side aiolabs/bitspire#52).
Under the chosen model (A1, decided 2026-06-16), the spire's signing
key lives inside the operator's nsecbunkerd rather than on the spire's
disk. `pair_machine` mints a per-spire key in the bunker, issues a
scoped NIP-46 connect token, and hands the spire a one-shot seed URL
embedding a `bunker://` connection. The spire then self-signs all its
events (kind-21000 RPC, kind-30078 beacon/cassette-state) as its own
bunker-held key; lnbits' path-B roster routes that npub to the
operator's wallet.
("spire" = a bitSpire machine; the legacy Lamassu term was "ATM".)
- bunker_spire_key_name the spire's key name inside the bunker
(`spire-<machine_id>`). Used to re-issue a connect token on
re-pair and (once the admin client grows a revoke RPC) to revoke
spire access.
- paired_at timestamp of the last successful pair. NULL = the
machine row exists but no bunker key has been minted yet.
Both nullable: machines created before this migration, and registered
-but-never-paired machines, carry NULL until first pair. Idempotent
column-probe pattern (same shape as m009).
"""
additions = [
("dca_machines", "bunker_spire_key_name", "TEXT"),
("dca_machines", "paired_at", "TIMESTAMP"),
]
for table, col, coltype in additions:
try:
await db.fetchone(f"SELECT {col} FROM spirekeeper.{table} LIMIT 1")
continue
except Exception:
pass
await db.execute(
f"ALTER TABLE spirekeeper.{table} ADD COLUMN {col} {coltype}"
)
async def m011_machine_npub_nullable(db):
"""Make dca_machines.machine_npub nullable so an operator can register a
machine *unpaired* (no npub) and have its identity minted by the bunker
at pairing time (model A1, aiolabs/spirekeeper#9). The npub is only
supplied up front on the development self-key path (a machine that holds
its own signing key). UNIQUE stays NULLs don't collide, so any number
of unpaired machines coexist.
Pre-public-launch: no back-compat shim. Existing rows are preserved by
the rebuild; the column simply loses NOT NULL.
"""
if db.type != "SQLITE":
# Postgres / Cockroach can drop the constraint in place.
await db.execute(
"ALTER TABLE spirekeeper.dca_machines "
"ALTER COLUMN machine_npub DROP NOT NULL"
)
return
# SQLite can't drop NOT NULL in place — rebuild the table (same pattern
# as m008/m009), preserving every row + the indexes.
await db.execute(
f"""
CREATE TABLE spirekeeper.dca_machines_new (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
operator_user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
machine_npub TEXT UNIQUE,
wallet_id TEXT NOT NULL,
name TEXT,
location TEXT,
fiat_code TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'GTQ',
is_active BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT {db.timestamp_now},
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT {db.timestamp_now},
operator_cash_in_fee_fraction DECIMAL(10,4) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0.0000,
operator_cash_out_fee_fraction DECIMAL(10,4) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0.0000,
bunker_spire_key_name TEXT,
paired_at TIMESTAMP
)
"""
)
await db.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO spirekeeper.dca_machines_new
(id, operator_user_id, machine_npub, wallet_id, name, location,
fiat_code, is_active, created_at, updated_at,
operator_cash_in_fee_fraction, operator_cash_out_fee_fraction,
bunker_spire_key_name, paired_at)
SELECT id, operator_user_id, machine_npub, wallet_id, name, location,
fiat_code, is_active, created_at, updated_at,
operator_cash_in_fee_fraction, operator_cash_out_fee_fraction,
bunker_spire_key_name, paired_at
FROM spirekeeper.dca_machines
"""
)
await db.execute("DROP TABLE spirekeeper.dca_machines")
await db.execute(
"ALTER TABLE spirekeeper.dca_machines_new RENAME TO dca_machines"
)
await db.execute(
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS dca_machines_operator_idx "
"ON dca_machines (operator_user_id)"
)
await db.execute(
"CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS dca_machines_wallet_id_uq "
"ON dca_machines (wallet_id)"
)
async def m012_add_max_cash_in_sats(db):
"""Server-side per-transaction cash-in ceiling (aiolabs/spirekeeper#31).
The secure `create_withdraw` RPC derives fee/net/attribution server-side,
but `principal_sats` is necessarily ATM-attested (only the hardware knows
how much cash went in). The bunker ACL / usage caps gate call *rate*, not
*sats*, so a single in-rate call could request an arbitrarily large payout.
`max_cash_in_sats` bounds that: the handler rejects a cash-in whose
principal exceeds it. NULL = no cap.
"""
await db.execute(
"ALTER TABLE spirekeeper.super_config ADD COLUMN max_cash_in_sats INTEGER"
)

View file

@ -28,7 +28,11 @@ class CreateMachineData(BaseModel):
not against any fee total. See aiolabs/satmachineadmin#37 / #38.
"""
machine_npub: str
# Optional: blank = register the machine UNPAIRED — the bunker mints its
# identity at pairing (model A1, the normal path). Supplying an npub here
# is the development self-key path (a machine that holds its own signing
# key); see views_api.api_create_machine.
machine_npub: str | None = None
wallet_id: str
name: str | None = None
location: str | None = None
@ -48,7 +52,7 @@ class CreateMachineData(BaseModel):
class Machine(BaseModel):
id: str
operator_user_id: str
machine_npub: str
machine_npub: str | None # NULL until paired (or supplied on the dev self-key path)
wallet_id: str
name: str | None
location: str | None
@ -56,6 +60,9 @@ class Machine(BaseModel):
is_active: bool
operator_cash_in_fee_fraction: float = 0.0
operator_cash_out_fee_fraction: float = 0.0
# NIP-46 bunker pairing (S0 / #9). NULL until the spire is first paired.
bunker_spire_key_name: str | None = None
paired_at: datetime | None = None
created_at: datetime
updated_at: datetime
@ -78,6 +85,29 @@ class UpdateMachineData(BaseModel):
return round(float(v), 4)
class PairMachineData(BaseModel):
"""Body for POST /machines/{id}/pair (S0 / #9). `relays` are the relays
the spire will use for its own events (kind-21000/30078) typically the
operator's nostrrelay. `bunker_relay` overrides the relay embedded in the
seed's `bunker://` URL (the relay the spire uses to *reach* the bunker);
when omitted it defaults to `settings.lnbits_nsec_bunker_url`. Set it when
the relay lnbits uses to reach the bunker differs from the one the spire
must reach e.g. an internal docker hostname (`ws://lnbits:5001/`) vs a
LAN/public URL (`ws://192.168.0.32:5001/`), or any split-relay deploy.
`duration_hours` optionally time-bounds the spire's connect token
(None = non-expiring)."""
relays: list[str]
bunker_relay: str | None = None
duration_hours: int | None = None
@validator("duration_hours")
def _positive_duration(cls, v):
if v is not None and v <= 0:
raise ValueError("duration_hours must be positive when set")
return v
# =============================================================================
# DCA Clients — LP registrations, scoped per (machine, user).
# =============================================================================
@ -452,6 +482,10 @@ class SuperConfig(BaseModel):
super_cash_in_fee_fraction: float = 0.0
super_cash_out_fee_fraction: float = 0.0
super_fee_wallet_id: str | None
# Per-transaction cash-in ceiling in sats (#31). The bunker ACL gates call
# rate, not sats, so this bounds a single ATM-attested principal. NULL = no
# cap.
max_cash_in_sats: int | None = None
updated_at: datetime
@ -459,6 +493,7 @@ class UpdateSuperConfigData(BaseModel):
super_cash_in_fee_fraction: float | None = None
super_cash_out_fee_fraction: float | None = None
super_fee_wallet_id: str | None = None
max_cash_in_sats: int | None = None
@validator(
"super_cash_in_fee_fraction",
@ -471,6 +506,14 @@ class UpdateSuperConfigData(BaseModel):
raise ValueError("super fee fraction must be between 0 and 1")
return round(float(v), 4)
@validator("max_cash_in_sats")
def _cap_non_negative(cls, v):
if v is None:
return v
if v < 0:
raise ValueError("max_cash_in_sats must be >= 0")
return int(v)
# =============================================================================
# Operator UX action carriers — partial-tx and balance-settlement features.

277
pairing.py Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
"""Seed-URL pairing for bitSpire machines (S0 / aiolabs/spirekeeper#9), model A1.
Mints a per-spire signing key *inside the operator's nsecbunkerd*, issues a
scoped NIP-46 connect token, and builds the one-shot **seed URL** the spire
redeems at first boot. The spire then self-signs all of its own events
(kind-21000 cash RPC, kind-30078 beacon + cassette-state, CLINK 21001-21003)
as that bunker-held key; lnbits' path-B roster (`nostr_transport/roster.py`)
maps the spire npub to the operator's wallet. No nsec ever lands on the
spire's disk.
Division of labour (vs. lnbits' `RemoteBunkerSigner.provision`, which is the
reference for the admin chain):
spirekeeper (here) spire, at first boot (bitspire#52)
1. create_new_key 5. NIP-46 connect redeem the token with a
2. ensure_policy freshly-generated *client* keypair; bunker
3. create_new_token binds (client_pubkey spire key). The
4. get_key_tokens seed client_nsec stays on the spire; the
(package token in URL) signing key never leaves the bunker.
We deliberately do NOT run the connect/eager-bind step here: the spire is the
NIP-46 client, so the binding must happen spire-side with the spire's own
client keypair. spirekeeper only mints + packages.
Seed URL wire format (contract shared with bitspire#52):
spire-seed:v1:<base64url(json)> json = {
"v": 1,
"spire_npub": "npub1…", # the bunker-minted spire identity
"spire_pubkey": "<64-hex>", # same key, hex (consumer convenience)
"bunker_url": "bunker://<spire_pubkey>?relay=<bunker_relay>&secret=<sec>",
"relays": ["wss://…"], # relays for the spire's own events
}
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
from urllib.parse import quote
from lnbits.core.services.nsec_bunker import (
NsecBunkerAdminClient,
NsecBunkerError,
NsecBunkerNotConfiguredError,
npub_to_hex,
)
from lnbits.core.signers.remote_bunker import ensure_policy
from lnbits.settings import settings
from pydantic import BaseModel
from .models import Machine
SEED_URL_SCHEME = "spire-seed:v1:"
# Policy granted to every spire's connect token. Scoped to exactly what a
# bitSpire signs as itself:
# - 21000 nostr-transport cash RPC envelope to lnbits
# - 22242 NIP-42 relay AUTH — the spire authenticates to its relays
# (must be bunker-signed: AUTH proves control of spire_pubkey,
# which only the bunker holds; can't be done with client_nsec)
# - 21001-21003 CLINK Offer / Debit / Manage (dormant on dev; kept)
# - 30078 NIP-78 beacon + bitspire-cassettes-state hello-event
# Kind-scoped rules go in create_new_policy; kind-less methods (nip44, for
# encrypting cassette-state to the operator) are added via add_policy_rule
# because nsecbunkerd's create_new_policy chokes on null `kind`
# (rule.kind.toString()). Mirrors lnbits' DEFAULT_POLICY_* split. nip04 is
# deliberately absent — the v1/nip04 path is dead code (bitspire#52).
#
# Kind set confirmed against the spire's signing sites in bitspire#52
# (2026-06-18): live = 21000 + 30078 + 22242; CLINK 21001-21003 dormant but
# kept; nip04 unused. Under-granting = silent bunker reject, so err toward
# inclusion (low blast radius — only widens what a spire signs as its OWN key).
SPIRE_POLICY_NAME = "spirekeeper-spire"
SPIRE_POLICY_RULES = [
{"method": "sign_event", "kind": 21000},
{"method": "sign_event", "kind": 22242}, # NIP-42 relay AUTH (bitspire#52)
{"method": "sign_event", "kind": 21001},
{"method": "sign_event", "kind": 21002},
{"method": "sign_event", "kind": 21003},
{"method": "sign_event", "kind": 30078},
]
SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND = ["nip44_encrypt", "nip44_decrypt"]
class PairingError(Exception):
"""Pairing could not be completed (bunker unreachable, misconfigured,
or returned an unusable response). The caller maps this to a 4xx/5xx;
no machine state is mutated on failure."""
class PairResult(BaseModel):
"""Output of a successful pair. The API layer persists
`bunker_spire_key_name` + `spire_npub` ( machine_npub) + `paired_at`,
and returns `seed_url` to the operator (QR + copy)."""
spire_npub: str
spire_pubkey_hex: str
bunker_key_name: str
bunker_url: str
seed_url: str
class RevokeResult(BaseModel):
"""Output of revoke. `revoked_count` >= 1 = the spire's signing access
is cut (KeyUser.revokedAt set); 0 = nothing was bound (token minted but
the spire never connected)."""
revoked_count: int
def spire_key_name(machine_id: str) -> str:
"""The spire's key name in the bunker keystore. Stable across re-pairs
so re-issuing a token reuses the same underlying key (create_new_key
is replace-by-name on the bunker side)."""
return f"spire-{machine_id}"
def _recover_token(tokens: list[dict], client_name: str) -> str:
"""Pull the freshly-issued `<npub>#<secret>` token out of the bunker's
`get_key_tokens` response. Match by client name when the bunker
serializes it; otherwise fall back to the most-recent entry (same
defensiveness as lnbits' provision())."""
matching = [
t
for t in tokens
if t.get("clientName") == client_name or t.get("client_name") == client_name
] or tokens
if not matching:
raise PairingError("bunker returned no tokens after create_new_token")
token = matching[-1].get("token")
if not isinstance(token, str) or "#" not in token:
raise PairingError(f"bunker returned a malformed token: {token!r}")
return token
def build_seed_url(
*, spire_npub: str, spire_pubkey_hex: str, bunker_url: str, relays: list[str]
) -> str:
payload = {
"v": 1,
"spire_npub": spire_npub,
"spire_pubkey": spire_pubkey_hex,
"bunker_url": bunker_url,
"relays": relays,
}
blob = (
base64.urlsafe_b64encode(json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
.decode()
.rstrip("=")
)
return SEED_URL_SCHEME + blob
async def pair_spire(
machine: Machine,
*,
relays: list[str],
admin_client: NsecBunkerAdminClient,
bunker_relay: str | None = None,
keystore_passphrase: str | None = None,
duration_hours: int | None = None,
) -> PairResult:
"""Mint a bunker-held key + scoped connect token for `machine` and
return the seed URL the spire redeems at first boot.
`duration_hours` (optional, aiolabs/lnbits#54 item 2) stamps `expiresAt`
on the spire's connect token, bounding the established binding's lifetime.
Since aiolabs/nsecbunkerd#27 (deployed 2026-06-19) the sign-time ACL
evaluates token lifecycle on EVERY request (`checkIfPubkeyAllowed` step 4
joins through a `liveWhere` filter; `applyToken` no longer photocopies
grants), so an expired token stops signing post-bind, not just at connect.
The spire must re-pair to keep signing once the token lapses. None =
non-expiring (the only invalidation path is then `revoke_spire`).
`admin_client` must already be connected (the caller owns the
`async with NsecBunkerAdminClient.from_settings()` context) keeps
connection lifecycle out of the orchestration so this is unit-testable
with a fake client.
`relays` are the relays the spire uses for its *own* events
(kind-21000/30078) typically the operator's public nostrrelay; supplied by
the API layer. `bunker_relay` (the relay baked into `bunker_url`, where the
spire reaches the bunker) defaults to `relays[0]`; `keystore_passphrase`
defaults to the lnbits bunker setting. Both injectable for tests.
Raises PairingError on any bunker failure; no state is persisted here
(the API layer persists on success).
"""
passphrase = (
keystore_passphrase
if keystore_passphrase is not None
else settings.lnbits_nsec_bunker_keystore_passphrase
)
if not passphrase:
raise PairingError(
"LNBITS_NSEC_BUNKER_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE is not set — "
"cannot mint a spire key"
)
if not relays:
raise PairingError("at least one relay is required for the seed URL")
# The relay baked into `bunker_url` is where the *spire* (the remote ATM)
# reaches the bunker, so it must be a machine-reachable public URL — NOT
# `settings.lnbits_nsec_bunker_url`, which is how the co-located lnbits
# reaches the bunker (typically ws://127.0.0.1, unreachable from the ATM —
# the localhost-relay /pair gotcha bitspire flagged). Default to the spire's
# own event relay (the bunker lives on the same operator relay the spire
# publishes to); an explicit `bunker_relay` overrides for split-relay deploys.
relay = bunker_relay if bunker_relay else relays[0]
key_name = spire_key_name(machine.id)
client_name = f"spire-client-{machine.id}"
try:
spire_npub = await admin_client.create_new_key(key_name, passphrase)
spire_pubkey_hex = npub_to_hex(spire_npub)
policy_id = await ensure_policy(
admin_client,
name=SPIRE_POLICY_NAME,
rules=SPIRE_POLICY_RULES,
methods_no_kind=SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND,
)
await admin_client.create_new_token(
key_name, client_name, policy_id, duration_hours=duration_hours
)
tokens = await admin_client.get_key_tokens(key_name)
except NsecBunkerNotConfiguredError as exc:
raise PairingError(f"nsecbunkerd is not configured: {exc}") from exc
except NsecBunkerError as exc:
raise PairingError(f"bunker admin RPC failed during pairing: {exc}") from exc
token = _recover_token(tokens, client_name)
_, _, secret = token.partition("#")
bunker_url = (
f"bunker://{spire_pubkey_hex}?relay={quote(relay, safe='')}"
f"&secret={quote(secret, safe='')}"
)
seed_url = build_seed_url(
spire_npub=spire_npub,
spire_pubkey_hex=spire_pubkey_hex,
bunker_url=bunker_url,
relays=relays,
)
return PairResult(
spire_npub=spire_npub,
spire_pubkey_hex=spire_pubkey_hex,
bunker_key_name=key_name,
bunker_url=bunker_url,
seed_url=seed_url,
)
async def revoke_spire(machine: Machine, *, admin_client: NsecBunkerAdminClient) -> int:
"""Revoke a spire's bunker access (the "Revoke spire access" UX,
aiolabs/spirekeeper#9/#12).
Calls `revoke_key_user` (sets `KeyUser.revokedAt`) the subject-level
sticky ban that's checked at step 2 of `checkIfPubkeyAllowed`, beating
every grant. This cuts the WHOLE binding regardless of how many tokens
were issued to the spire, which is the right semantics for "revoke this
spire." (Since aiolabs/nsecbunkerd#27 token-revoke also works post-bind —
the sign-time ACL now evaluates `Token.revokedAt`/`expiresAt` live every
request, closing the #22 no-op — but per-token revoke only cuts one
token's grant, so `revoke_key_user` remains the correct full-deauth call.)
Returns the number of KeyUsers revoked: >= 1 means the spire's signing
access is now cut; 0 means nothing was bound (token minted but the
spire never connected). Raises PairingError on any bunker failure.
"""
try:
return await admin_client.revoke_key_user(spire_key_name(machine.id))
except NsecBunkerNotConfiguredError as exc:
raise PairingError(f"nsecbunkerd is not configured: {exc}") from exc
except NsecBunkerError as exc:
raise PairingError(f"bunker admin RPC failed during revoke: {exc}") from exc

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@ -103,7 +103,8 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
data: {
super_cash_in_fee_fraction: 0,
super_cash_out_fee_fraction: 0,
super_fee_wallet_id: ''
super_fee_wallet_id: '',
max_cash_in_sats: null
}
},
@ -191,6 +192,14 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
saving: false,
data: {}
},
pairDialog: {
show: false,
saving: false,
machine: null,
relays: '',
durationHours: null,
result: null
},
machineDetail: {
show: false,
loading: false,
@ -568,13 +577,50 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
this.superConfig?.super_cash_in_fee_fraction ?? 0,
super_cash_out_fee_fraction:
this.superConfig?.super_cash_out_fee_fraction ?? 0,
super_fee_wallet_id: this.superConfig?.super_fee_wallet_id || ''
super_fee_wallet_id: this.superConfig?.super_fee_wallet_id || '',
max_cash_in_sats: this.superConfig?.max_cash_in_sats ?? null
}
this.superFeeDialog.show = true
},
// Guard the decimal-vs-percent trap shared by the super + operator fee
// forms: fees are decimal fractions (3% = 0.03), capped at 0.15. A value
// > 0.15 almost always means a percent was typed (3 instead of 0.03).
// Returns false + shows a clear toast so the operator never sees a raw 400.
_assertFeesDecimal(...fracs) {
if (fracs.some((v) => !Number.isFinite(v) || v < 0 || v > 0.15)) {
Quasar.Notify.create({
type: 'negative',
message: 'Enter each fee as a decimal fraction (e.g. 3% = 0.03)',
caption:
'Range 00.15. A value above 0.15 usually means a percent was typed (3 instead of 0.03).'
})
return false
}
return true
},
async submitSuperFee() {
const d = this.superFeeDialog.data
if (!this._assertFeesDecimal(
Number(d.super_cash_in_fee_fraction),
Number(d.super_cash_out_fee_fraction)
)) return
// Blank cap field -> null (the PUT skips null, so the existing value is
// preserved rather than cleared — set 0 to reject every cash-in).
const cap =
d.max_cash_in_sats === '' ||
d.max_cash_in_sats === null ||
d.max_cash_in_sats === undefined
? null
: Number(d.max_cash_in_sats)
if (cap !== null && (!Number.isInteger(cap) || cap < 0)) {
Quasar.Notify.create({
type: 'negative',
message: 'Max cash-in must be a non-negative whole number of sats'
})
return
}
this.superFeeDialog.saving = true
try {
const {data} = await LNbits.api.request(
@ -582,7 +628,8 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
{
super_cash_in_fee_fraction: Number(d.super_cash_in_fee_fraction),
super_cash_out_fee_fraction: Number(d.super_cash_out_fee_fraction),
super_fee_wallet_id: (d.super_fee_wallet_id || '').trim() || null
super_fee_wallet_id: (d.super_fee_wallet_id || '').trim() || null,
max_cash_in_sats: cap
}
)
this.superConfig = data
@ -691,13 +738,17 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
async submitAddMachine() {
const body = this._cleanMachineForm(this.addMachineDialog.data)
if (!body.machine_npub || !body.wallet_id) {
if (!body.wallet_id) {
Quasar.Notify.create({
type: 'negative',
message: 'machine_npub and wallet_id are required'
message: 'A wallet is required'
})
return
}
if (!this._assertFeesDecimal(
Number(body.operator_cash_in_fee_fraction) || 0,
Number(body.operator_cash_out_fee_fraction) || 0
)) return
this.addMachineDialog.saving = true
try {
const {data} = await LNbits.api.request('POST', MACHINES_PATH, null, body)
@ -705,7 +756,7 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
this.addMachineDialog.show = false
Quasar.Notify.create({
type: 'positive',
message: `Machine ${data.name || data.machine_npub.slice(0, 12)} added`
message: `Machine ${data.name || (data.machine_npub || 'unpaired').slice(0, 12)} added`
})
} catch (e) {
this._notifyError(e, 'Failed to add machine')
@ -733,6 +784,10 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
async submitEditMachine() {
const d = this.editMachineDialog.data
if (!this._assertFeesDecimal(
Number(d.operator_cash_in_fee_fraction) || 0,
Number(d.operator_cash_out_fee_fraction) || 0
)) return
this.editMachineDialog.saving = true
try {
const {data} = await LNbits.api.request(
@ -764,7 +819,7 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
Quasar.Dialog.create({
title: 'Delete machine?',
message:
`This removes <b>${machine.name || machine.machine_npub.slice(0, 12)}</b>` +
`This removes <b>${machine.name || (machine.machine_npub || 'unpaired').slice(0, 12)}</b>` +
' from your fleet. Existing settlements and payment history are preserved' +
' — only the machine row itself is removed. Continue?',
html: true,
@ -781,6 +836,93 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
})
},
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// Pair / revoke spire (S0 / #9, #12)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
openPairDialog(machine) {
this.pairDialog.machine = machine
this.pairDialog.relays = ''
this.pairDialog.durationHours = null
this.pairDialog.result = null
this.pairDialog.show = true
},
async submitPair() {
const relays = (this.pairDialog.relays || '')
.split(/[\s,]+/)
.map(s => s.trim())
.filter(Boolean)
if (!relays.length) {
Quasar.Notify.create({
type: 'negative',
message: 'At least one relay is required'
})
return
}
const body = {relays}
if (this.pairDialog.durationHours) {
body.duration_hours = Number(this.pairDialog.durationHours)
}
this.pairDialog.saving = true
try {
const {data} = await LNbits.api.request(
'POST',
`${MACHINES_PATH}/${this.pairDialog.machine.id}/pair`,
null,
body
)
this.pairDialog.result = data
// The bunker-minted key becomes the machine identity; reflect it +
// the paired state in the row immediately.
const m = this.machines.find(x => x.id === this.pairDialog.machine.id)
if (m) {
m.machine_npub = data.spire_pubkey_hex
m.bunker_spire_key_name = data.bunker_key_name
m.paired_at = new Date().toISOString()
}
Quasar.Notify.create({
type: 'positive',
message: 'Spire paired — hand the seed URL to the device'
})
} catch (e) {
this._notifyError(e, 'Pairing failed')
} finally {
this.pairDialog.saving = false
}
},
confirmRevokeMachine(machine) {
Quasar.Dialog.create({
title: 'Revoke spire access?',
message:
`This cuts <b>${machine.name || (machine.machine_npub || 'unpaired').slice(0, 12)}</b>'s` +
' signing access at the bunker — the spire can no longer submit' +
' cash-outs until you re-pair it. Continue?',
html: true,
cancel: true,
persistent: true
}).onOk(async () => {
try {
const {data} = await LNbits.api.request(
'POST',
`${MACHINES_PATH}/${machine.id}/revoke`,
null
)
const m = this.machines.find(x => x.id === machine.id)
if (m) m.paired_at = null
Quasar.Notify.create({
type: data.revoked_count >= 1 ? 'positive' : 'warning',
message:
data.revoked_count >= 1
? 'Spire access revoked'
: 'Nothing was bound (the spire never connected)'
})
} catch (e) {
this._notifyError(e, 'Revoke failed')
}
})
},
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// Machine detail dialog (P9b)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
@ -1420,7 +1562,7 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
// Helpers
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
shortNpub(npub) {
if (!npub) return ''
if (!npub) return 'unpaired'
if (npub.length <= 16) return npub
return npub.slice(0, 8) + '…' + npub.slice(-6)
},
@ -1506,7 +1648,7 @@ window.app = Vue.createApp({
_cleanMachineForm(d) {
return {
machine_npub: (d.machine_npub || '').trim(),
machine_npub: (d.machine_npub || '').trim() || null,
wallet_id: d.wallet_id,
name: (d.name || '').trim() || null,
location: (d.location || '').trim() || null,

View file

@ -130,7 +130,11 @@ async def _handle_payment(payment: Payment) -> None:
data = parse_settlement(
machine=machine,
payment_hash=payment.payment_hash,
wire_sats=payment.sat,
# `payment.sat` is signed by protocol direction (negative for an
# outbound cash-in payout, positive for an inbound cash-out
# receipt). The settlement's `wire_sats` is a magnitude — direction
# is carried separately by `tx_type` — so pass the absolute value.
wire_sats=abs(payment.sat),
extra=extra,
super_config=super_config,
)
@ -205,7 +209,8 @@ async def _record_rejected(payment: Payment, machine: Machine, exc: Exception) -
data = CreateDcaSettlementData(
machine_id=machine.id,
payment_hash=payment.payment_hash,
wire_sats=payment.sat,
# Magnitude, not the signed `payment.sat` (negative for outbound).
wire_sats=abs(payment.sat),
fiat_amount=0.0,
fiat_code=machine.fiat_code,
exchange_rate=0.0,
@ -213,11 +218,11 @@ async def _record_rejected(payment: Payment, machine: Machine, exc: Exception) -
fee_sats=0,
platform_fee_sats=0,
operator_fee_sats=0,
# tx_type is unknown for rejection paths; default to cash_out
# (the only direction currently wired). When S8 lands the
# listener will branch on tx_type from extra, and this default
# gets revisited.
tx_type="cash_out",
# The parsed tx_type is unavailable on the rejection path, but the
# authenticated protocol direction is: an outbound payment is a
# cash-in, an inbound one a cash-out. Use that so a rejected row shows
# the right direction instead of always reading "cash-out".
tx_type="cash_in" if not payment.is_in else "cash_out",
)
rejected = await create_settlement_idempotent(
data, initial_status="rejected", error_message=str(exc)
@ -230,7 +235,10 @@ async def _record_rejected(payment: Payment, machine: Machine, exc: Exception) -
return
logger.error(
f"spirekeeper: rejected settlement {rejected.id} "
f"(machine={machine.machine_npub[:12]}..., "
# An unpaired machine (machine_npub None) reaches here now that
# assert_nostr_attribution rejects it — fall back to the id so the
# log line doesn't crash on None[:12].
f"(machine={(machine.machine_npub or machine.id)[:12]}..., "
f"payment_hash={payment.payment_hash[:12]}...): {exc}"
)

View file

@ -131,6 +131,17 @@
<div :style="{fontWeight: 500}" v-text="props.row.name || 'Unnamed'"></div>
<div :style="{fontSize: '0.8em', opacity: 0.6}"
v-text="props.row.location || 'No location set'"></div>
<q-chip v-if="props.row.paired_at"
dense size="sm" color="green-2" text-color="green-9"
icon="link" :style="{marginTop: '2px'}">
paired
<q-tooltip>Bunker key minted; paired ${ new Date(props.row.paired_at).toLocaleString() }</q-tooltip>
</q-chip>
<q-chip v-else
dense size="sm" color="grey-3" text-color="grey-8"
icon="link_off" :style="{marginTop: '2px'}">
not paired
</q-chip>
</q-td>
<q-td key="machine_npub">
<code :style="{fontSize: '0.85em'}"
@ -156,6 +167,17 @@
@click="openEditMachineDialog(props.row)">
<q-tooltip>Edit</q-tooltip>
</q-btn>
<q-btn flat dense round size="sm" icon="qr_code_2"
color="teal"
@click="openPairDialog(props.row)">
<q-tooltip>${ props.row.paired_at ? 'Re-pair (new seed URL)' : 'Pair (seed URL)' }</q-tooltip>
</q-btn>
<q-btn v-if="props.row.paired_at"
flat dense round size="sm" icon="link_off"
color="orange-8"
@click="confirmRevokeMachine(props.row)">
<q-tooltip>Revoke spire access</q-tooltip>
</q-btn>
<q-btn flat dense round size="sm" icon="delete"
color="red-7"
@click="confirmDeleteMachine(props.row)">
@ -770,13 +792,13 @@
<q-input
v-model="addMachineDialog.data.machine_npub"
label="Machine npub (hex or bech32)"
hint="64-char hex pubkey or npub1... bech32 string"
label="Machine npub — DEVELOPMENT ONLY (blank = normal bunker pairing)"
hint="⚠ Leave blank for normal operation: the bunker mints this machine's key when you pair it (no nsec ever lands on the machine). Only fill this to register a machine that holds its OWN signing key — development / self-signing. Hex or npub1…"
color="orange"
class="q-mb-md"
dense outlined
:rules="[
v => !!v || 'Required',
v => (v && v.length >= 32) || 'Looks too short'
v => !v || v.length >= 32 || 'Looks too short — use a full hex/npub, or leave blank'
]"></q-input>
<q-select
@ -797,7 +819,7 @@
<q-input
v-model.number="addMachineDialog.data.operator_cash_in_fee_fraction"
label="Operator cash-in fee % (decimal, 0..0.15)"
label="Operator cash-in fee (decimal fraction, 0-0.15)"
hint="Your per-machine cut on cash-in. Sits on top of the platform fee; cap is 15% total per direction."
type="number" step="0.0001" min="0" max="0.15"
class="q-mb-md"
@ -805,7 +827,7 @@
<q-input
v-model.number="addMachineDialog.data.operator_cash_out_fee_fraction"
label="Operator cash-out fee % (decimal, 0..0.15)"
label="Operator cash-out fee (decimal fraction, 0-0.15)"
hint="Your per-machine cut on cash-out. Sits on top of the platform fee; cap is 15% total per direction."
type="number" step="0.0001" min="0" max="0.15"
class="q-mb-md"
@ -821,6 +843,101 @@
</q-card>
</q-dialog>
<!-- =============================================================== -->
<!-- PAIR SPIRE DIALOG — mint bunker key + one-shot seed URL (S0/#9) -->
<!-- =============================================================== -->
<q-dialog v-model="pairDialog.show" persistent>
<q-card :style="{minWidth: '480px', maxWidth: '95vw'}">
<q-card-section class="row items-center q-pb-none">
<div class="text-h6">Pair spire</div>
<q-space></q-space>
<q-btn icon="close" flat round dense v-close-popup></q-btn>
</q-card-section>
<!-- Step 1 — configure + generate -->
<template v-if="!pairDialog.result">
<q-card-section>
<p class="text-caption q-mb-md" :style="{opacity: 0.7}">
Mints a dedicated signing key for
<b v-text="(pairDialog.machine && pairDialog.machine.name) || 'this spire'"></b>
inside the operator bunker and issues a one-shot seed URL. The
spire's key never touches its disk; its cash-outs route to this
machine's wallet. Re-pairing issues a fresh seed.
</p>
<q-input
v-model="pairDialog.relays"
label="Relay(s) for the spire's events"
hint="One per line. The same relay the spire publishes to (its VITE_RELAY_URL), e.g. wss://your-host/nostrrelay/<id>"
type="textarea" autogrow
class="q-mb-md"
dense outlined></q-input>
<q-input
v-model.number="pairDialog.durationHours"
label="Token lifetime in hours (optional)"
hint="Blank = non-expiring. Set e.g. 720 (30 days) to force periodic re-pairing."
type="number" min="1"
class="q-mb-md"
dense outlined></q-input>
</q-card-section>
<q-card-actions align="right" class="text-primary">
<q-btn flat label="Cancel" v-close-popup></q-btn>
<q-btn
color="primary" label="Generate seed URL" icon="vpn_key"
:loading="pairDialog.saving"
@click="submitPair"></q-btn>
</q-card-actions>
</template>
<!-- Step 2 — show the seed URL -->
<template v-else>
<q-card-section>
<q-banner dense rounded class="bg-green-1 text-grey-9 q-mb-md">
<template v-slot:avatar>
<q-icon name="check_circle" color="green"></q-icon>
</template>
Paired. Scan this on the spire at first boot, or paste the seed URL
into <code>provision-atm</code>. Shown once — copy it now.
</q-banner>
<div class="row justify-center q-mb-md">
<lnbits-qrcode
:value="pairDialog.result.seed_url"
:options="{width: 280}"></lnbits-qrcode>
</div>
<q-input
v-model="pairDialog.result.seed_url"
label="Seed URL"
type="textarea" autogrow readonly
class="q-mb-sm"
dense outlined>
<template v-slot:append>
<q-btn flat dense round icon="content_copy"
@click="copy(pairDialog.result.seed_url)">
<q-tooltip>Copy seed URL</q-tooltip>
</q-btn>
</template>
</q-input>
<div class="text-caption" :style="{opacity: 0.7}">
Spire identity:
<code :style="{fontSize: '0.85em'}"
v-text="shortNpub(pairDialog.result.spire_npub)"></code>
<q-btn flat dense round size="xs" icon="content_copy"
@click="copy(pairDialog.result.spire_npub)">
<q-tooltip>Copy npub</q-tooltip>
</q-btn>
</div>
</q-card-section>
<q-card-actions align="right" class="text-primary">
<q-btn flat label="Done" color="primary" v-close-popup></q-btn>
</q-card-actions>
</template>
</q-card>
</q-dialog>
<!-- =============================================================== -->
<!-- MACHINE DETAIL DIALOG — settlements list + per-row actions -->
<!-- =============================================================== -->
@ -1251,12 +1368,12 @@
typically a wallet you (the super) own.
</p>
<q-input v-model.number="superFeeDialog.data.super_cash_in_fee_fraction"
label="Cash-in fee % (decimal, 0..0.15)"
label="Cash-in fee (decimal fraction, 0-0.15)"
hint="0.03 = 3% of principal on cash-in transactions"
type="number" step="0.0001" min="0" max="0.15"
class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
<q-input v-model.number="superFeeDialog.data.super_cash_out_fee_fraction"
label="Cash-out fee % (decimal, 0..0.15)"
label="Cash-out fee (decimal fraction, 0-0.15)"
hint="0.03 = 3% of principal on cash-out transactions"
type="number" step="0.0001" min="0" max="0.15"
class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
@ -1264,6 +1381,11 @@
label="Super fee destination wallet_id"
hint="LNbits wallet that collects the platform fee"
class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
<q-input v-model.number="superFeeDialog.data.max_cash_in_sats"
label="Max cash-in per transaction (sats — blank = no cap)"
hint="Server-side ceiling on a single cash-in's principal. The ATM attests the amount; this bounds a compromised/buggy machine to one capped tx."
type="number" step="1" min="0"
class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
</q-card-section>
<q-card-actions align="right">
<q-btn flat label="Cancel" v-close-popup></q-btn>
@ -1510,12 +1632,12 @@
<q-input v-model="editMachineDialog.data.fiat_code"
label="Fiat code" class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
<q-input v-model.number="editMachineDialog.data.operator_cash_in_fee_fraction"
label="Operator cash-in fee % (decimal, 0..0.15)"
label="Operator cash-in fee (decimal fraction, 0-0.15)"
hint="Sits on top of the platform cash-in fee. Cap 15% total per direction."
type="number" step="0.0001" min="0" max="0.15"
class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>
<q-input v-model.number="editMachineDialog.data.operator_cash_out_fee_fraction"
label="Operator cash-out fee % (decimal, 0..0.15)"
label="Operator cash-out fee (decimal fraction, 0-0.15)"
hint="Sits on top of the platform cash-out fee. Cap 15% total per direction."
type="number" step="0.0001" min="0" max="0.15"
class="q-mb-md" dense outlined></q-input>

167
tests/test_pair_endpoint.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
"""Wiring tests for POST /machines/{id}/pair (S0 / #9).
The pairing *service* is covered in test_pairing.py with a fake bunker;
here we only exercise the endpoint glue ownership, the empty-relays
guard, the post-mint collision guard, persistence of the bunker-minted
hex npub, and error mapping by monkeypatching the module-level deps.
"""
import asyncio
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from types import SimpleNamespace
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException
from lnbits.utils.nostr import hex_to_npub
from .. import views_api
from ..models import Machine, PairMachineData
from ..pairing import PairingError, PairResult
_NOW = datetime(2026, 6, 16, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
_SPIRE_HEX = "522a4538f1df96508d9ee8b14072344dd4a566acfe03c25a92a39179c6fca891"
_SPIRE_NPUB = hex_to_npub(_SPIRE_HEX)
def _machine(npub: str = "placeholder") -> Machine:
return Machine(
id="m1",
operator_user_id="op1",
machine_npub=npub,
wallet_id="w1",
name="sintra",
location=None,
fiat_code="EUR",
is_active=True,
created_at=_NOW,
updated_at=_NOW,
)
class _FakeAdmin:
@classmethod
def from_settings(cls):
return cls()
async def __aenter__(self):
return self
async def __aexit__(self, *exc):
return False
def _result() -> PairResult:
return PairResult(
spire_npub=_SPIRE_NPUB,
spire_pubkey_hex=_SPIRE_HEX,
bunker_key_name="spire-m1",
bunker_url="bunker://x?relay=r&secret=s", # pragma: allowlist secret
seed_url="spire-seed:v1:abc",
)
def _wire(monkeypatch, *, pair="ok"):
state: dict = {"persisted": None, "collision": None}
async def fake_owned(machine_id, user_id):
return _machine()
async def fake_pair(machine, *, relays, admin_client, duration_hours=None):
if pair == "error":
raise PairingError("boom")
return _result()
async def fake_collision(npub):
state["collision"] = npub
async def fake_persist(
machine_id, *, machine_npub, bunker_spire_key_name, paired_at
):
state["persisted"] = (machine_id, machine_npub, bunker_spire_key_name)
return _machine(npub=machine_npub)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "_machine_owned_by", fake_owned)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "NsecBunkerAdminClient", _FakeAdmin)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "pair_spire", fake_pair)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "_assert_no_pubkey_collision", fake_collision)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "set_machine_pairing", fake_persist)
return state
def _call(relays):
user = SimpleNamespace(id="op1")
return asyncio.run(
views_api.api_pair_machine("m1", PairMachineData(relays=relays), user)
)
def test_pair_persists_hex_npub_and_returns_seed(monkeypatch):
state = _wire(monkeypatch)
result = _call(["wss://r"])
assert result.seed_url == "spire-seed:v1:abc"
# collision guard ran on the bunker-minted hex, and we persisted it as npub
assert state["collision"] == _SPIRE_HEX
assert state["persisted"] == ("m1", _SPIRE_HEX, "spire-m1")
def test_pair_empty_relays_rejected(monkeypatch):
_wire(monkeypatch)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei:
_call([])
assert ei.value.status_code == 400
def test_pair_failure_maps_to_bad_gateway(monkeypatch):
state = _wire(monkeypatch, pair="error")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei:
_call(["wss://r"])
assert ei.value.status_code == 502
# nothing persisted on failure
assert state["persisted"] is None
def _wire_revoke(monkeypatch, *, revoke="ok", count=2):
state = {"unpaired": None}
async def fake_owned(machine_id, user_id):
return _machine()
async def fake_revoke(machine, *, admin_client):
if revoke == "error":
raise PairingError("boom")
return count
async def fake_unpaired(machine_id):
state["unpaired"] = machine_id
return _machine()
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "_machine_owned_by", fake_owned)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "NsecBunkerAdminClient", _FakeAdmin)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "revoke_spire", fake_revoke)
monkeypatch.setattr(views_api, "set_machine_unpaired", fake_unpaired)
return state
def _call_revoke():
user = SimpleNamespace(id="op1")
return asyncio.run(views_api.api_revoke_machine("m1", user))
def test_revoke_cuts_access_and_marks_unpaired(monkeypatch):
state = _wire_revoke(monkeypatch, count=2)
result = _call_revoke()
assert result.revoked_count == 2
assert state["unpaired"] == "m1"
def test_revoke_zero_when_nothing_bound(monkeypatch):
_wire_revoke(monkeypatch, count=0)
assert _call_revoke().revoked_count == 0
def test_revoke_failure_maps_to_bad_gateway(monkeypatch):
state = _wire_revoke(monkeypatch, revoke="error")
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as ei:
_call_revoke()
assert ei.value.status_code == 502
assert state["unpaired"] is None # not persisted on failure

332
tests/test_pairing.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
"""Unit tests for the seed-URL pairing service (S0 / #9, model A1).
The bunker admin client is faked these exercise the orchestration
(create_new_key -> ensure-policy -> create_new_token -> get_key_tokens),
the policy reconciliation, and the seed-URL / bunker:// wire shape, with
no live nsecbunkerd. npub<->hex round-trips through lnbits' real helpers
so the parsing is exercised for real.
Async is driven via asyncio.run (this venv has no pytest-asyncio), matching
the rest of the suite.
"""
import asyncio
import base64
import json
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import pytest
from lnbits.core.services.nsec_bunker import NsecBunkerError
from lnbits.utils.nostr import hex_to_npub
from ..models import Machine
from ..pairing import (
SEED_URL_SCHEME,
SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND,
SPIRE_POLICY_NAME,
SPIRE_POLICY_RULES,
PairingError,
build_seed_url,
pair_spire,
revoke_spire,
spire_key_name,
)
_NOW = datetime(2026, 6, 16, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
_SPIRE_HEX = "522a4538f1df96508d9ee8b14072344dd4a566acfe03c25a92a39179c6fca891"
_SPIRE_NPUB = hex_to_npub(_SPIRE_HEX)
_RELAYS = ["wss://lnbits.demo.aiolabs.dev/nostrrelay/demo"]
_BUNKER_RELAY = "wss://bunker.internal/relay"
_PASSPHRASE = "keystore-pass" # pragma: allowlist secret
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _clear_policy_cache():
# lnbits' ensure_policy caches resolved policy ids on
# (admin_pubkey, name); clear between tests so each FakeBunker's
# canned policy state is honoured rather than a stale cached id.
from lnbits.core.signers import remote_bunker
remote_bunker._POLICY_ID_CACHE.clear()
yield
def _machine(mid: str = "m1") -> Machine:
return Machine(
id=mid,
operator_user_id="op1",
machine_npub="placeholder",
wallet_id="w1",
name="sintra",
location=None,
fiat_code="EUR",
is_active=True,
created_at=_NOW,
updated_at=_NOW,
)
class FakeBunker:
"""Records calls; returns canned bunker responses."""
admin_pubkey = "fake-admin-pubkey"
# pragma: allowlist secret
def __init__(self, *, policies=None, token_secret="s3cr3t", revoke_count=1):
self._policies = policies or []
self._token_secret = token_secret
self._revoke_count = revoke_count
self.calls: list[tuple] = []
self._next_policy_id = 7
async def create_new_key(self, name, passphrase):
self.calls.append(("create_new_key", name, passphrase))
return _SPIRE_NPUB
async def get_policies(self):
self.calls.append(("get_policies",))
return list(self._policies)
async def create_new_policy(self, name, rules):
self.calls.append(("create_new_policy", name, rules))
pid = self._next_policy_id
self._policies.append({"id": pid, "name": name, "rules": list(rules)})
return pid
async def add_policy_rule(self, policy_id, rule):
self.calls.append(("add_policy_rule", policy_id, rule))
async def create_new_token(
self, key_name, client_name, policy_id, duration_hours=None
):
self.calls.append(
("create_new_token", key_name, client_name, policy_id, duration_hours)
)
async def revoke_key_user(self, key_name):
self.calls.append(("revoke_key_user", key_name))
return self._revoke_count
async def get_key_tokens(self, key_name):
self.calls.append(("get_key_tokens", key_name))
return [
{
"clientName": f"spire-client-{key_name.split('-', 1)[1]}",
"token": f"{_SPIRE_NPUB}#{self._token_secret}",
}
]
def named(self, name):
return [c for c in self.calls if c[0] == name]
def _pair(bunker, machine=None):
return asyncio.run(
pair_spire(
machine or _machine(),
relays=_RELAYS,
admin_client=bunker,
bunker_relay=_BUNKER_RELAY,
keystore_passphrase=_PASSPHRASE,
)
)
def test_pair_happy_path_mints_key_policy_token():
bunker = FakeBunker(token_secret="abc123") # pragma: allowlist secret
result = _pair(bunker)
assert ("create_new_key", "spire-m1", _PASSPHRASE) in bunker.calls
assert result.bunker_key_name == spire_key_name("m1") == "spire-m1"
assert result.spire_npub == _SPIRE_NPUB
assert result.spire_pubkey_hex == _SPIRE_HEX
created = bunker.named("create_new_policy")
assert created and created[0][1] == SPIRE_POLICY_NAME
token_call = bunker.named("create_new_token")[0]
assert token_call[1] == "spire-m1" # key_name
assert token_call[2] == "spire-client-m1" # client_name
assert token_call[3] == 7 # policy_id from the fake's create_new_policy
def test_bunker_url_carries_pubkey_relay_secret():
result = _pair(FakeBunker(token_secret="topsecret")) # pragma: allowlist secret
assert result.bunker_url.startswith(f"bunker://{_SPIRE_HEX}?")
assert "relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fbunker.internal%2Frelay" in result.bunker_url
assert "secret=topsecret" in result.bunker_url
def test_seed_url_decodes_to_contract():
result = _pair(FakeBunker(token_secret="zzz")) # pragma: allowlist secret
assert result.seed_url.startswith(SEED_URL_SCHEME)
blob = result.seed_url[len(SEED_URL_SCHEME) :]
payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(blob + "=" * (-len(blob) % 4)))
assert payload == {
"v": 1,
"spire_npub": _SPIRE_NPUB,
"spire_pubkey": _SPIRE_HEX,
"bunker_url": result.bunker_url,
"relays": _RELAYS,
}
def test_fresh_policy_adds_kindless_nip44_rules():
bunker = FakeBunker() # no existing policies
_pair(bunker)
added = [c[2]["method"] for c in bunker.named("add_policy_rule")]
# kind-scoped rules went in via create_new_policy; only the kind-less
# nip44 methods are reconciled in via add_policy_rule.
assert set(added) == set(SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND)
def test_existing_policy_reused_not_recreated():
existing = [
{
"id": 42,
"name": SPIRE_POLICY_NAME,
"rules": [dict(r) for r in SPIRE_POLICY_RULES],
}
]
bunker = FakeBunker(policies=existing)
_pair(bunker)
assert not bunker.named("create_new_policy") # reused, not recreated
assert bunker.named("create_new_token")[0][3] == 42 # used existing id
added = [c[2]["method"] for c in bunker.named("add_policy_rule")]
assert set(added) == set(SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND)
def test_fully_provisioned_policy_adds_nothing():
rules = [dict(r) for r in SPIRE_POLICY_RULES] + [
{"method": m, "kind": None} for m in SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND
]
bunker = FakeBunker(policies=[{"id": 9, "name": SPIRE_POLICY_NAME, "rules": rules}])
_pair(bunker)
assert not bunker.named("add_policy_rule")
assert not bunker.named("create_new_policy")
def test_malformed_token_raises():
bunker = FakeBunker()
async def _bad_tokens(key_name):
_ = key_name
return [{"token": "no-hash-here"}]
bunker.get_key_tokens = _bad_tokens
with pytest.raises(PairingError, match="malformed token"):
_pair(bunker)
def test_bunker_relay_defaults_to_spire_event_relay():
"""No explicit bunker_relay -> the relay baked into bunker_url is the spire's
own public event relay (relays[0]), NOT lnbits's internal bunker URL. This
is the localhost-relay /pair gotcha: a UI-minted seed (the form has no
bunker_relay field) must embed a machine-reachable relay, not ws://127.0.0.1.
An empty bunker_relay falls back to the same default."""
from urllib.parse import quote
for empty in (None, ""):
result = asyncio.run(
pair_spire(
_machine(),
relays=_RELAYS,
admin_client=FakeBunker(token_secret="s"), # pragma: allowlist secret
bunker_relay=empty,
keystore_passphrase=_PASSPHRASE,
)
)
assert f"relay={quote(_RELAYS[0], safe='')}" in result.bunker_url
assert "127.0.0.1" not in result.bunker_url
def test_missing_relay_or_passphrase_raises():
with pytest.raises(PairingError, match="PASSPHRASE"):
asyncio.run(
pair_spire(
_machine(),
relays=_RELAYS,
admin_client=FakeBunker(),
bunker_relay=_BUNKER_RELAY,
keystore_passphrase="",
)
)
with pytest.raises(PairingError, match="relay is required"):
asyncio.run(
pair_spire(
_machine(),
relays=[],
admin_client=FakeBunker(),
bunker_relay=_BUNKER_RELAY,
keystore_passphrase=_PASSPHRASE,
)
)
def test_build_seed_url_roundtrip():
url = build_seed_url(
spire_npub=_SPIRE_NPUB,
spire_pubkey_hex=_SPIRE_HEX,
bunker_url="bunker://x?relay=r&secret=s",
relays=_RELAYS,
)
blob = url[len(SEED_URL_SCHEME) :]
payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(blob + "=" * (-len(blob) % 4)))
assert payload["spire_pubkey"] == _SPIRE_HEX
assert payload["relays"] == _RELAYS
def test_pair_threads_duration_hours():
bunker = FakeBunker()
asyncio.run(
pair_spire(
_machine(),
relays=_RELAYS,
admin_client=bunker,
bunker_relay=_BUNKER_RELAY,
keystore_passphrase=_PASSPHRASE,
duration_hours=720,
)
)
# create_new_token tuple is (name, key, client, policy_id, duration_hours)
assert bunker.named("create_new_token")[0][4] == 720
def test_pair_default_duration_is_none():
bunker = FakeBunker()
_pair(bunker) # no duration_hours
assert bunker.named("create_new_token")[0][4] is None
def test_revoke_spire_calls_revoke_key_user():
# revoke goes through revoke_key_user (KeyUser.revokedAt) — the subject-
# level ban that cuts the whole binding, not just one token's grant.
# (Token-revoke also works post-bind since nsecbunkerd#27, but only
# severs a single token; revoke_key_user is the full-deauth call.)
bunker = FakeBunker(revoke_count=2)
count = asyncio.run(revoke_spire(_machine(), admin_client=bunker))
assert count == 2
assert bunker.named("revoke_key_user") == [("revoke_key_user", "spire-m1")]
assert not bunker.named("revoke_token") # never token-revoke
def test_revoke_spire_maps_bunker_error():
bunker = FakeBunker()
async def _boom(key_name):
raise NsecBunkerError("nope")
bunker.revoke_key_user = _boom
with pytest.raises(PairingError, match="revoke"):
asyncio.run(revoke_spire(_machine(), admin_client=bunker))
def test_policy_authorizes_required_signing_kinds():
# Kinds the spire signs as its OWN identity, confirmed against the
# consumer signing sites in bitspire#52 (2026-06-18). A missing kind is a
# silent bunker reject. 22242 = NIP-42 relay AUTH (must be bunker-signed —
# it proves control of spire_pubkey). nip04 stays out (v1 path is dead).
kinds = {r["kind"] for r in SPIRE_POLICY_RULES if r["method"] == "sign_event"}
assert {21000, 30078, 22242} <= kinds
assert "nip04_encrypt" not in SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND
assert "nip04_decrypt" not in SPIRE_POLICY_METHODS_NO_KIND

View file

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
"""
Regression: `machine_npub` is nullable (#29/m011 register-unpaired flow), so
every consumer that derives a Nostr identity from it must handle `None` rather
than crash `normalize_public_key(None)` (AttributeError: 'NoneType' has no
'startswith') or `machine_npub[:12]` (TypeError). See PR #33 — an unpaired
machine on the demo broke the platform-fee update (500) and the cassette
consumer.
These cover the pure-function guards; the DB-backed loops
(get_machine_by_atm_pubkey_hex, the super-config republish loop) are exercised
on the dev stack with an unpaired active machine.
"""
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import pytest
from ..bitspire import SettlementAttributionError, assert_nostr_attribution
from ..cassette_transport import build_state_d_tags_for_machines
from ..models import Machine
_PAIRED_HEX = "82341f882b6eabcbd6b1c2da5cd14df14b8e91dd0e6da41a72b78ad8f3a7d3b9"
def _machine(npub: str | None) -> Machine:
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
return Machine(
id="unpaired1",
operator_user_id="op1",
machine_npub=npub,
wallet_id="w1",
name="unpaired",
location=None,
fiat_code="EUR",
is_active=True,
created_at=now,
updated_at=now,
)
def test_attribution_rejects_unpaired_machine_cleanly():
"""An unpaired machine must raise the domain SettlementAttributionError
(which the listener records as 'rejected'), not an uncaught AttributeError
from normalize_public_key(None)."""
with pytest.raises(SettlementAttributionError):
assert_nostr_attribution(
_machine(None),
{"source": "bitspire", "nostr_sender_pubkey": _PAIRED_HEX},
)
def test_cassette_d_tags_skip_unpaired_machine():
"""build_state_d_tags_for_machines must skip unpaired machines rather than
crash _atm_hex_pubkey on a None npub the cassette-consumer loop crash."""
tags = build_state_d_tags_for_machines([_machine(_PAIRED_HEX), _machine(None)])
assert len(tags) == 1 # only the paired machine contributes a d-tag
assert all("None" not in t for t in tags)

View file

@ -5,12 +5,18 @@
# LNbits instance can never see each other's machines, settlements, or
# clients. The super-only platform-fee write endpoint lands in P2.
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from http import HTTPStatus
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
from lnbits.core.crud import get_wallet
from lnbits.core.crud.users import get_account_by_pubkey
from lnbits.core.models import User
from lnbits.core.services.nsec_bunker import (
NsecBunkerAdminClient,
NsecBunkerError,
NsecBunkerNotConfiguredError,
)
from lnbits.decorators import check_super_user, check_user_exists
from lnbits.utils.nostr import normalize_public_key
@ -23,6 +29,13 @@ from .cassette_transport import (
publish_to_atm,
)
from .fee_transport import publish_fee_config
from .pairing import (
PairResult,
PairingError,
RevokeResult,
pair_spire,
revoke_spire,
)
from .crud import (
append_settlement_note,
count_completed_legs_for_settlement,
@ -55,6 +68,8 @@ from .crud import (
lp_is_onboarded,
replace_commission_splits,
reset_settlement_for_retry,
set_machine_pairing,
set_machine_unpaired,
update_cassette_config,
update_dca_client,
update_deposit,
@ -80,6 +95,7 @@ from .models import (
DcaPayment,
DcaSettlement,
Machine,
PairMachineData,
PartialDispenseData,
PublishCassettesPayload,
SetCommissionSplitsData,
@ -232,7 +248,7 @@ async def _assert_super_config_cap_safe(
HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST,
(
f"super cash-in fee {effective_in:.4f} would exceed cap "
f"on machine {m.id} ({m.name or m.machine_npub[:12]}): "
f"on machine {m.id} ({m.name or (m.machine_npub or m.id)[:12]}): "
f"+ operator {op_in:.4f} = "
f"{total_in:.4f} > {MAX_FEE_FRACTION_PER_DIRECTION}"
),
@ -242,7 +258,7 @@ async def _assert_super_config_cap_safe(
HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST,
(
f"super cash-out fee {effective_out:.4f} would exceed cap "
f"on machine {m.id} ({m.name or m.machine_npub[:12]}): "
f"on machine {m.id} ({m.name or (m.machine_npub or m.id)[:12]}): "
f"+ operator {op_out:.4f} = "
f"{total_out:.4f} > {MAX_FEE_FRACTION_PER_DIRECTION}"
),
@ -259,7 +275,13 @@ async def api_create_machine(
data: CreateMachineData, user: User = Depends(check_user_exists)
) -> Machine:
await _assert_wallet_owned_by(data.wallet_id, user.id)
await _assert_no_pubkey_collision(data.machine_npub)
# machine_npub is optional: blank = register UNPAIRED — the bunker mints
# the identity at pairing (the normal path). An npub supplied up front is
# the development self-key path; only then do we collision-check + publish
# a fee config now (an unpaired machine has no target yet, so it gets its
# config at pairing instead — see api_pair_machine).
if data.machine_npub:
await _assert_no_pubkey_collision(data.machine_npub)
await _assert_machine_fee_cap_safe(
data.operator_cash_in_fee_fraction,
data.operator_cash_out_fee_fraction,
@ -268,10 +290,98 @@ async def api_create_machine(
# Layer 2 (#39): publish initial fee config to the ATM so it can
# unblock past its `awaiting-fees` maintenance gate. Soft-fails on
# transport errors — machine creation has already succeeded.
if machine.machine_npub:
super_config = await get_super_config()
if super_config is not None:
await publish_fee_config(machine, super_config, user.id)
return machine
@spirekeeper_api_router.post(
"/api/v1/dca/machines/{machine_id}/pair", response_model=PairResult
)
async def api_pair_machine(
machine_id: str,
data: PairMachineData,
user: User = Depends(check_user_exists),
) -> PairResult:
"""Seed-URL pairing (S0 / #9, model A1). Mints a per-spire signing key
inside the operator's nsecbunkerd and returns the one-shot seed URL the
spire redeems at first boot. The bunker-minted key becomes the machine's
npub, so lnbits' path-B roster routes the spire's cash-out RPCs to this
operator's wallet — no nsec ever lands on the spire.
Re-pair is supported (re-issues a token for the same spire key).
`duration_hours` (optional) time-bounds the token; revoke via the
sibling `POST .../revoke` endpoint."""
machine = await _machine_owned_by(machine_id, user.id)
if not data.relays:
raise HTTPException(HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST, "at least one relay is required")
try:
async with NsecBunkerAdminClient.from_settings() as client:
result = await pair_spire(
machine,
relays=data.relays,
admin_client=client,
bunker_relay=data.bunker_relay,
duration_hours=data.duration_hours,
)
except NsecBunkerNotConfiguredError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
HTTPStatus.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
f"nsecbunkerd is not configured on this LNbits instance: {exc}",
) from exc
except (PairingError, NsecBunkerError) as exc:
raise HTTPException(HTTPStatus.BAD_GATEWAY, f"pairing failed: {exc}") from exc
# The bunker-minted identity becomes the machine npub — run the same
# collision guard as create before persisting (fresh keys ~never collide,
# but defence-in-depth keeps the no-collision invariant intact).
await _assert_no_pubkey_collision(result.spire_pubkey_hex)
await set_machine_pairing(
machine_id,
machine_npub=result.spire_pubkey_hex,
bunker_spire_key_name=result.bunker_key_name,
paired_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
)
# Now that the machine has a bunker identity, publish its fee config so
# the spire can clear its `awaiting-fees` gate. For a machine created
# unpaired, this is the first time it has a target. Soft-fails (mirrors
# create); pairing has already succeeded.
super_config = await get_super_config()
if super_config is not None:
await publish_fee_config(machine, super_config, user.id)
return machine
paired = await _machine_owned_by(machine_id, user.id)
await publish_fee_config(paired, super_config, user.id)
return result
@spirekeeper_api_router.post(
"/api/v1/dca/machines/{machine_id}/revoke", response_model=RevokeResult
)
async def api_revoke_machine(
machine_id: str,
user: User = Depends(check_user_exists),
) -> RevokeResult:
"""Revoke a spire's bunker access — the "Revoke spire access" UX
(#9/#12). Cuts the spire's signing ability at the bunker
(`KeyUser.revokedAt` via `revoke_key_user`; token-revoke alone is a
no-op once the token is redeemed see #22), then marks the machine
unpaired. `revoked_count` >= 1 = access cut; 0 = nothing was bound."""
machine = await _machine_owned_by(machine_id, user.id)
try:
async with NsecBunkerAdminClient.from_settings() as client:
revoked_count = await revoke_spire(machine, admin_client=client)
except NsecBunkerNotConfiguredError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
HTTPStatus.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
f"nsecbunkerd is not configured on this LNbits instance: {exc}",
) from exc
except (PairingError, NsecBunkerError) as exc:
raise HTTPException(HTTPStatus.BAD_GATEWAY, f"revoke failed: {exc}") from exc
await set_machine_unpaired(machine_id)
return RevokeResult(revoked_count=revoked_count)
@spirekeeper_api_router.get("/api/v1/dca/machines", response_model=list[Machine])
@ -971,6 +1081,12 @@ async def api_update_super_config(
)
if super_fractions_changed:
for machine in await list_all_active_machines():
# Unpaired machines (machine_npub is None — nullable since #29/m011)
# have no Nostr identity to publish a fee-config beacon to. Skip
# them; they pick up the current fee config when they pair
# (api_pair_machine publishes on success).
if not machine.machine_npub:
continue
await publish_fee_config(machine, config, machine.operator_user_id)
return config
@ -1037,6 +1153,14 @@ async def api_publish_machine_cassettes(
500 anything else from the publish path
"""
machine = await _machine_owned_by(machine_id, user.id)
if not machine.machine_npub:
# Unpaired machine (machine_npub None — nullable since #29/m011) has no
# ATM identity to publish a cassette config to. Fail fast with a clean
# 400 instead of crashing publish_to_atm's normalize_public_key(None).
raise HTTPException(
HTTPStatus.BAD_REQUEST,
"machine is not paired — pair it before publishing cassette config",
)
existing = await list_cassette_configs_for_machine(machine_id)
existing_positions = {row.position for row in existing}