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ci.yml / feat(cash-in): super_config.max_cash_in_sats per-tx cap + UI (#31) (pull_request) Failing after 0s
Wires the server-side per-transaction cash-in ceiling the `create_withdraw` handler already enforces (it read the value defensively via getattr; this makes it a first-class config field). - migrations.py m012: ADD COLUMN super_config.max_cash_in_sats INTEGER (NULL = no cap). - models.py: SuperConfig.max_cash_in_sats + UpdateSuperConfigData field with a >= 0 validator. - super-fee dialog: a "Max cash-in per transaction (sats)" input; blank sends null (the PUT skips null, preserving the current value — set 0 to reject every cash-in). crud `update_super_config` and the PUT endpoint flow the field through automatically (dynamic dict update; check_super_user gated). Why a sats cap and not the bunker ACL: the ACL / usage caps (#28) gate call *rate*, not *sats*, and `principal_sats` is necessarily ATM-attested — so a single in-rate call could request an arbitrarily large payout. This bounds a compromised/buggy machine to one capped transaction. Verified on the dev stack: m012 runs, the model round-trips the column (GET returns the set value), and a negative value is rejected. |
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