diff --git a/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md b/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md
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--- a/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md
+++ b/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md
@@ -1,3 +1,74 @@
+# Checkpoint — External NIP-46 signing works end-to-end (2026-09-10)
+
+## Where things are
+- Project: `/home/avi/Projects/Keynctr`
+- Branch: `master` @ **`1af79d8`** ("feat(signer): end-to-end external NIP-46 signing in
+  publish and upload auth").
+- Working tree: clean for tracked files (untracked leftovers unchanged — see older
+  "Still untracked" sections).
+- Verification: `cargo test` **200 passed / 0 failed**, `cargo clippy --all-targets`
+  clean, `cargo fmt --check` clean, `cargo build --release` green.
+
+## What was completed (this session)
+
+**Step 3 sub-step 2 (IPC reroute) — DONE, landed as `1af79d8`.** Publishing from an
+external (NIP-46) profile now signs remotely instead of returning
+"External signer not yet supported":
+
+- **`src/signer/nip46_client.rs`** — the outbound/client half of NIP-46:
+  `send_remote_request` encrypts a request (NIP-44) and publishes it to the signer's
+  relay; incoming payloads shaped like responses (`result`/`error`) are demultiplexed
+  to the waiting caller (a response with no registered id is ignored); 30 s
+  `REQUEST_TIMEOUT`; pending waiters are woken with errors on disconnect/failure so
+  callers never hang the full timeout. `Signer::sign_event` is real now: permission
+  check → remote `sign_event` → verify the returned event (a) is signed by the
+  connected remote identity, (b) matches the exact unsigned event requested, (c) has a
+  valid signature — then return it. **No local-key fallback anywhere.**
+  `audit_permission_denied` uses `try_lock` (audit is best-effort; blocking here would
+  deadlock the very request being denied while the IPC dispatcher holds the App lock).
+- **`src/app.rs`** — `App::signing_for(npub)` / `App::signing_active()`: the single
+  place that maps a profile's `SignerMode` to a `Signing` source.
+  `Embedded` → `Signing::Local` with the vault-resolved key; `Nip46Client` →
+  `Signing::External` wrapping the live signer **only when present and connected**,
+  else `ExternalSignerNotConnected` (fail closed, never a silent local fallback);
+  `Nip46Bunker` (not wired) also fails closed.
+- **`src/publish.rs`** — `publish_with_keys` builds the unsigned event from the
+  `Signing`'s own pubkey (external identities validate there before any relay work)
+  and signs via `Signing::sign`; new `publish_signed` entry point for IPC. The CLI's
+  `publish_active`/`publish_as` keep the local vault path.
+- **`src/ipc.rs`** — `PublishNote` and `UploadAuth` route through
+  `app.signing_active()`; no handler branches on signer mode anymore.
+  `Nip46Connect`/`Nip46Disconnect` now clone the signer handle and **drop the App
+  guard before awaiting** `connect()`/`disconnect()` (they re-lock the App
+  internally — a latent deadlock, fixed).
+- **`src/relays.rs`** — keyless relay pool: `open_pool_inner(Option<Keys>, …)` so
+  external signing can publish/relay without local keys (no relay AUTH).
+- **`src/uploads.rs`** — `nip98_authorization(url, method, &Signing)` — NIP-98 upload
+  auth events sign through the same `Signing` source, so uploads authenticate with
+  the remote signer for external profiles.
+- **`src/profiles.rs`** — `store_remote_profile(vault, npub, label)`: connecting a
+  NIP-46 signer creates/refreshes a **secretless** `Nip46Client` profile row (empty
+  `secret_key`, made active) so publish has a selection; refuses to silently convert
+  an existing local profile into a remote one. `connect()` calls it and adopts the
+  remote npub as the signer's active profile.
+
+New tests (`src/app.rs`): embedded → `Signing::Local`; external profile with no live
+signer → `ExternalSignerNotConnected` (fail closed); no active profile →
+`NoActiveProfile`; `store_remote_profile` creates a secretless external profile and
+refuses to clobber a local one.
+
+Security properties: remote-signed events are triple-verified (identity, content
+match, signature) before publish; external profiles never touch a local key; the
+connection secret stays vault-encrypted (Step 3 sub-step 1 unchanged).
+
+## Out of scope this session (deliberate)
+- `publish_profile_metadata` (kind 0) still signs locally from the vault — a
+  synchronous key-based path; rerouting it is a separate follow-up.
+- Dead `src/signer/nip46_external.rs` stub cleanup (untracked leftover).
+- Step 4 (permissions UI), Step 5 (KDF upgrade), Step 7 (rename/hygiene).
+
+---
+
 # Checkpoint — Undo-delete restores working profiles (2026-09-10)
 
 ## Where things are