From ac614072fe52452eb42867a9d4bc7608139fd1ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Avi <avi@aiolabs.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:54:52 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Refresh checkpoint with CSP and navigation guards

---
 CHECKPOINT-encryption.md | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md b/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md
index d6fd71d..4f2fe91 100644
--- a/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md
+++ b/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Checkpoint — Upload pick tokens (2026-08-21)
+# Checkpoint — Header-based CSP + navigation guards (2026-08-21)
 
 A stopping point you can return to if this session is closed. Everything below was
 verified green at the moment this file was written.
@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ verified green at the moment this file was written.
 ## Where things are
 
 - Project: `/home/avi/Projects/0_Nostr`
-- Git repo: `master` @ `6e627a3` ("Replace upload file paths with single-use pick tokens").
-  Before it: `4bde395` ("Restrict renderer IPC to an explicit method allowlist"), then
-  `dafed33` (checkpoint refresh), on top of contact-aware feed (`a1445d1`) etc.
+- Git repo: `master` @ `4d4dfde` ("Enforce header-based CSP and block window open/navigation").
+  Before it: `6e627a3` (upload pick tokens), `4bde395` (IPC allowlist), then checkpoint
+  commits, on top of contact-aware feed (`a1445d1`) etc.
 - Working tree is **clean** apart from this checkpoint update, which is committed right after.
 
-## What was completed: security hardening items #1 and #2
+## What was completed: security hardening items #1, #2 and #3
 
 Fixes from the 2026-08-21 security audit.
 
@@ -39,8 +39,25 @@ page could read+publish arbitrary local files to nostr.build. Now:
 - Fake backend mirrors the contract: `upload_image` without a non-empty `token` throws an
   `unknown_token` error, so tests exercise the same protocol rule.
 
+**#3 Header-based CSP + navigation/window guards (`4d4dfde`):**
+- The static CSP meta tag was **removed** from `frontend/index.html` and replaced with
+  response headers stamped by `main.ts` (`onHeadersReceived`, mainFrame only):
+  - `CSP_PROD` for `app://` pages: `script-src 'self'` — **no `'unsafe-inline'`**, so an
+    injected `<script>` cannot execute. `connect-src 'self'` (all real network goes through
+    the backend/main process); img-src keeps `https:` for remote feed/preview images.
+  - `CSP_DEV` when `NOSTR_GUI_DEV_URL` matches: keeps `'unsafe-inline'` (Vite's React-refresh
+    preamble is an inline script) but pins `connect-src` to localhost instead of the old
+    wide-open `ws:` — HMR still works.
+  - The meta had to go because it would also have blocked the dev preamble; headers let us
+    ship strict-prod / workable-dev from one HTML file.
+- `will-navigate`: any navigation away from app:// or the dev origin is blocked; http(s)
+  targets open in the system browser via `shell.openExternal`.
+- `setWindowOpenHandler`: all `target="_blank"` popups are denied; external links go to the
+  system browser. Unknown schemes are denied without opening anything.
+
 ## Commits
 
+- `4d4dfde` "Enforce header-based CSP and block window open/navigation" — main.ts + index.html.
 - `6e627a3` "Replace upload file paths with single-use pick tokens" — main.ts, api.ts,
   types.ts, AppProvider.tsx, ComposeScreen.tsx, fakeBackend.ts (+62/−27).
 - `4bde395` "Restrict renderer IPC to an explicit method allowlist" — main.ts (+49 lines).
@@ -65,6 +82,8 @@ Manual protocol checks worth doing once:
 - DevTools console: `window.backend.request('not_a_method')` → `unknown_method` envelope (#1).
 - DevTools console: `window.backend.request('upload_image', {path:'/etc/passwd'})` →
   `unknown_token` error; no file is read (#2). Real attachment flow works unchanged.
+- DevTools console: `document.cookie` / injected `<script>` does not run; Application tab
+  shows the CSP header on the app:// document (#3). Link previews open in the system browser.
 
 ## How to resume
 
@@ -78,13 +97,10 @@ Manual protocol checks worth doing once:
 
 Remaining audit items in priority order:
 
-1. **CSP** — drop `'unsafe-inline'` from `script-src` in `frontend/index.html`; add
-   `setWindowOpenHandler(() => ({action:'deny'}))` + route external links through
-   `shell.openExternal` in `main.ts`.
-2. **Legacy vault perms** — repo-root `profiles_vault.json` is group-readable (0664);
+1. **Legacy vault perms** — repo-root `profiles_vault.json` is group-readable (0664);
    chmod 600 / delete after confirming migration; auto-tighten during migration in `src/vault.rs`.
-3. **Write-race fixes** — create files with mode 0600 at creation time in `vault.rs`
+2. **Write-race fixes** — create files with mode 0600 at creation time in `vault.rs`
    (`write_restricted`, `backup_file`).
-4. **Zeroize** — wipe decrypted key material via the `zeroize` crate.
-5. Smaller: link-preview SSRF guard (block loopback/private IPs), signer pending-cap,
+3. **Zeroize** — wipe decrypted key material via the `zeroize` crate.
+4. Smaller: link-preview SSRF guard (block loopback/private IPs), signer pending-cap,
    NIP-46 secret echo check, backend request timeout.