diff --git a/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md b/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md index 6597edd..6c5c5b5 100644 --- a/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md +++ b/CHECKPOINT-encryption.md @@ -1,122 +1,182 @@ -# Checkpoint — Profile metadata publishing + profile pictures (2026-08-22) +# Checkpoint — All audit items closed (2026-08-21) -**App renamed to Keynectr (2026-08-23).** A stopping point you can return to if this session is closed. Everything below was +A stopping point you can return to if this session is closed. Everything below was verified green at the moment this file was written. ## Where things are -- Project: `/home/avi/Projects/Nostr_Keynctr` (renamed from `0_Nostr` after commit `1116dfd`) -- Git repo: `master` @ `a6329d5` ("Publish profile metadata (name + picture) so external - clients show it"). Before it: `db81f8d` (profile deletion with undo), `9a8f334` - (audit checkpoint refresh), and the 2026-08-21 audit-fix commits (`f7db29e`, `d90b6e5`, - `130d7e2`). +- Project: `/home/avi/Projects/0_Nostr` +- Git repo: `master` @ `f7db29e` ("Add SSRF guard, signer queue cap, secret echo, request + timeout"). Before it: `130d7e2` (zeroization), `4461307` (owner-only writes), `4bd7660` + (legacy vault perms), `4d4dfde` (CSP + navigation guards), `6e627a3` (upload tokens), + `4bde395` (IPC allowlist). - Working tree is **clean** apart from this checkpoint update, which is committed right after. -## What was completed +## What was completed: the full 2026-08-21 security audit remediation -**Problem:** profiles created in the app never published a Nostr kind 0 metadata event, -so other clients showed generated petnames ("evil iguana", "homeless leech") or a -truncated npub instead of the user's chosen name. +All ten findings from the 2026-08-21 security audit are fixed. -1. **Automatic metadata on creation** — `create_profile` now publishes a kind 0 event - with the label as `name`/`display_name` to all enabled relays (best-effort; relay - failures never block creation). -2. **"Publish name" action for existing profiles** — new button on every Profiles-screen - card plus CLI `publish-name `. Returns a per-relay report shown in the UI. -3. **Profile pictures end-to-end** — - - Vault: optional `picture: Option` per profile (serde default → old vaults - load unchanged). - - Backend: `set_profile_picture` validates http(s) URLs only, stores the URL, and - publishes kind 0 including `picture`; clearing supported (`None`). - - GUI: "Picture" button opens a modal — paste a URL, upload a file via the existing - nostr.build pipeline, or remove; avatar shows the picture everywhere in-app. - - CLI: `set-picture `. -4. **Nested-runtime safety** — metadata publishing runs on a dedicated OS thread with its - own tokio runtime, so both sync (CLI) and async (IPC server) callers are safe. -5. **Finished prior session's delete/undo work** — exposed `undo_history` in - `AppStateView`, fixed invalid Button variants / missing icon / null-safety errors so - the frontend typechecks again. -6. **Test hygiene fix** — `Settings::default()` points at real relays and tests were - silently publishing events to them (one got rate-limited by damus.io). All test suites - now use offline settings; test time dropped from ~126 s to ~3 s. +**#1 IPC method allowlist (`4bde395`, `main.ts` only):** +- `RENDERER_METHODS` set in the Electron main process: the three native methods + (`pick_image`, `link_preview`, `upload_image`) plus every Rust-backend method used by + `frontend/src/lib/api.ts`. +- `isAllowedMethod()` gate at the top of the `backend:request` handler; unknown methods get + `{status:'error', code:'unknown_method'}`, are logged, and never reach the backend. +- No behaviour change for the real UI (only `api.ts` calls `window.backend.request`). -## Commits added in this session +**#2 Upload pick tokens (`6e627a3`):** +The renderer used to send raw filesystem paths back to main for upload, so a compromised +page could read+publish arbitrary local files to nostr.build. Now: +- `pickImage()` (`main.ts`) mints a random 32-hex-char token per picked file via + `crypto.randomBytes`; tokens map to the file record in `pickedTokens` (main-process memory + only). The renderer receives `{token, name, mime}` — it never sees any path. +- `upload_image` accepts only a valid `token`; the token is consumed (deleted) before the + upload starts, so each pick authorises exactly one upload. Unknown/used/expired tokens + return `{status:'error', code:'unknown_token', message:'That image selection has expired. + Please attach it again.'}` — the user just re-picks the image. +- Renderer updates: `PickedImage.path` → `PickedImage.token` (`types.ts`), `api.uploadImage(token)` + (`api.ts`), context type + callback (`AppProvider.tsx`), `ComposeScreen.onAttach` uses + `image.token`. +- Fake backend mirrors the contract: `upload_image` without a non-empty `token` throws an + `unknown_token` error, so tests exercise the same protocol rule. -- `7c6a085` Rename the app to Keynectr -- `ae5ddda` Allow new profile methods through the Electron IPC allowlist -- `a6329d5` Publish profile metadata (name + picture) so external clients show it +**#3 Header-based CSP + navigation/window guards (`4d4dfde`):** +- The static CSP meta tag was **removed** from `frontend/index.html` and replaced with + response headers stamped by `main.ts` (`onHeadersReceived`, mainFrame only): + - `CSP_PROD` for `app://` pages: `script-src 'self'` — **no `'unsafe-inline'`**, so an + injected `