Secure cash-in: server-side stamped withdraw via signed kind-21000 RPC (no wallet key on the ATM, verified attribution)
Correction accepted — threat model point (1) was wrong
Secure cash-in: server-side stamped withdraw via signed kind-21000 RPC (no wallet key on the ATM, verified attribution)
Consumer-side (bitspire) review. Strong agreement with the design — server-stamped create_withdraw is the right shape. One precision on the threat model that actually makes the change…
Secure cash-in: server-side stamped withdraw via signed kind-21000 RPC (no wallet key on the ATM, verified attribution)
fix(settlements): process cash-in (outbound) payments, not just cash-out
feat: merge a link's `extra` into the payout payment (v1.2.2-aio.2)
feat: merge a link's
extra into the payout payment (v1.2.2-aio.2)
create_new_key clobbers an existing key — silent, unrecoverable identity loss on re-pair
Fixed via PR #40 (merged to dev @ 4a0a3e7). Verified on the dev bunker: a repeat /pair for an already-paired machine now returns the existing spire key with the on-disk entry unchanged…
ACL: an expired/exhausted bound token should hard-reject (false), not fall through to prompt-admin (undefined) — clients time out instead of re-pairing
Fixed via PR #38 (merged to dev @ 3468972). Verified on hardware during the Sintra smoke: an expired/revoked token binding now hard-rejects (BunkerRejectedError → "Pairing Required")…
padreug
deleted branch 2026-06-21 14:01:49 +00:00
fix-create-new-key-idempotent from aiolabs/nsecbunkerd
fix(admin): make create_new_key idempotent — never clobber an existing key (#39)