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bitspire/.claude/skills/security.md
Patrick Mulligan c98f126ba7 feat(docker): add dev.sh with auto-funding and ATM app setup 
- Add dev.sh script for managing regtest development environment
- Implement cmd_fund to fund ATM app owner via Lightning.Pub API
- Add --fund flag to cmd_up for automatic funding on startup
- Update setup_atm_app to write VITE_APP_ID to machine .env
- Fix Electron IPC to pass appId and extensionApiUrl to renderer
- Restructure repo from nested lamassu-next/ to root

The dev.sh script now supports:
- ./dev.sh up --fund  # Start regtest and auto-fund ATM
- ./dev.sh fund       # Fund existing ATM app
- ./dev.sh status     # Show environment status
- ./dev.sh reset      # Clean restart

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-15 14:19:16 -05:00

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/security - Security Review Agent

Purpose

Perform security audits on code changes, focusing on Bitcoin/Lightning ATM-specific vulnerabilities.

Invocation

/security [target]

Where target can be:

  • A file path (e.g., packages/lightning/src/client.ts)
  • A directory (e.g., packages/hal/)
  • --staged for staged git changes
  • --all for full codebase scan

Review Checklist

1. Bitcoin/Lightning Security

  • Private keys never logged or exposed
  • nsec (Nostr secret keys) protected with proper permissions (0600)
  • Invoice amounts validated before payment
  • Payment preimages handled securely
  • No hardcoded mnemonics, seeds, or keys
  • Proper BOLT11/BOLT12 invoice validation

2. Hardware Security (ATM-specific)

  • Bill validator amounts cross-checked
  • Dispenser commands validated (prevent over-dispensing)
  • Hardware error states handled gracefully
  • No race conditions in cash handling
  • Timeout handling for hardware operations

3. Nostr Security

  • NIP-44 encryption used for sensitive messages
  • Event signatures verified before processing
  • Relay URLs validated (no injection)
  • NIP-42 auth implemented for private relay
  • No pubkey/npub confusion (proper type safety)

4. General Security

  • Input validation on all external data
  • SQL injection prevention (parameterized queries)
  • No command injection in Bash/shell calls
  • Proper error handling (no sensitive data in errors)
  • Rate limiting on API endpoints
  • HTTPS/WSS enforced in production

5. Rust-specific (HAL)

  • No unsafe blocks without justification
  • Error handling with Result, no unwrap() in production
  • Buffer bounds checking for serial communication
  • Proper lifetime management

6. TypeScript-specific

  • Strict null checks honored
  • No any types
  • Zod validation on external data
  • No eval() or dynamic code execution

Output Format

## Security Review: [target]

### Critical Issues
- [ ] Issue description with file:line reference

### High Priority
- [ ] Issue description with file:line reference

### Medium Priority
- [ ] Issue description with file:line reference

### Low Priority / Suggestions
- [ ] Suggestion with rationale

### Passed Checks
- [x] Check that passed

Example Usage

/security packages/lightning/src/client.ts

Output:

## Security Review: packages/lightning/src/client.ts

### Critical Issues
None found.

### High Priority
- [ ] `client.ts:45` - Invoice amount not validated before `payInvoice()` call

### Medium Priority
- [ ] `client.ts:78` - Error message includes full stack trace, may leak internal paths

### Passed Checks
- [x] Private keys not exposed in logs
- [x] NIP-44 encryption used for DMs
- [x] Proper TypeScript strict mode