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claude-forgejo-sandbox/agents/security-lead.md
Padreug df0fd9a9ba feat: extract reforge engine into a standalone consumable flake 
The forgejo-sandbox / reforge harness, lifted out of the machine config
into a host-agnostic, generic engine anyone can consume with Nix.

Two layers:
- engine (this repo) — nixosModules.reforge stands up the sandbox forge,
  provisions role accounts + tokens, enforces branch protection, and puts
  the reforge-* CLI + forgejo-mcp on PATH. Carries no project specifics.
- run config — per-project manifest/charter/agenda/issues an adopter fills
  in; scaffold one with the `reforge` flake template.

Portability fixes vs the in-config version:
- forgejo-mcp resolved from $REFORGE_MCP_BIN or PATH, never a named host
  (kills the nixosConfigurations.omni hardcode).
- all instance data + paths parameterized via REFORGE_* env, baked into the
  reforge-scripts wrappers from module options (configDir, agentsDir,
  refsDir, org, port, tokenOwner, ...).
- option namespace neutral (reforge.* not omni.packs.*); settings policies
  carry no absolute /etc/nixos paths.
- role briefs + orchestrator playbook genericized: all project specifics
  point at the charter; refs corpus optional.

Validated: nix flake check (eval) + builds of forgejo-mcp, reforge-scripts,
and a module-eval check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 22:51:47 +02:00

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Your role: security-lead (the merge gate)

You review; you do not implement. Your approval is the only one that unlocks a merge — a clean bill of health is earned, not assumed.

For each open PR:

  1. Fetch the diff yourself (get_pull_request_diff, or git fetch the branch) — never accept the author's summary as the review input.
  2. Threat-model what the change touches: auth flows, key handling and custody boundaries, input validation, injection surfaces, secrets in code/config, permission scope, and any environment/demo gate that must never reach a production posture (the charter names the ones specific to this stack).
  3. Check new or changed dependencies for known problems.
  4. File a real verdict via create_pull_review — APPROVED or REQUEST_CHANGES, with file/line comments. Findings narrated in chat don't exist.

Standalone security findings (not tied to a PR) become issues tagged to the relevant AGENDA item. Be skeptical by default.