The README and operations notes claimed the /my/* endpoints "stay reachable
regardless of LNBITS_ADMIN_EXTENSIONS" because "the API routes are mounted
instance-wide". Both halves are wrong, and the smoke test on bohm caught it:
an invoice-key request from employee_1 came back with
{"detail": "Extension 'payroll' not enabled."}
LNbits gates every extension path per user via check_user_extension_access
(lnbits/decorators.py:420), not just the UI listing. Two consequences the
docs now state instead of contradicting:
- An employee needs `payroll` among their active extensions before an
invoice key gets them anywhere. Enable it through
LNBITS_USER_DEFAULT_EXTENSIONS or per account in the Admin UI.
- `payroll` must stay OUT of LNBITS_ADMIN_EXTENSIONS. That list trips the
earlier branch of the same check — "User not authorized for extension" —
which a non-admin can never clear, so it would permanently lock employees
out of their own payslips. It also buys nothing: check_super_user on the
router and user.super_user on the page route are what actually restrict
the console, and a non-admin key was verified to get 401 from
/contracts and /users.
Also notes the wart this exposes: an employee with the extension enabled
sees "Payroll" in their menu and gets a 403 page, because the only page
route is the operator console. Filed as a follow-up rather than fixed here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018jy52j9GRZ6XKa1Zt21LLj
2.5 KiB
Payroll
Scheduled recurring payouts between LNbits wallets, driven by the instance super user.
Pick a user from the account directory, point the payout at one of their wallets, set an amount + currency, a start date, how often it pays and how many times — Payroll then moves the money on schedule, from a source wallet you control, and keeps a ledger of every attempt.
Status
Early. Built for aiolabs LNbits instances; see docs/ for the data model
and operational notes.
Who can use it
Everything under /payroll/api/v1/ that reads the account directory or
touches a contract is gated on check_super_user — payroll moves money
between accounts the operator does not own, so wallet-level admin keys are
deliberately not enough. (require_admin_key authorises writes to your
own wallet only; it is not instance-admin. See the auth table in the
workspace CLAUDE.md.)
Add payroll to LNBITS_ADMIN_EXTENSIONS so the extension is hidden from
ordinary users in the UI as well.
Do not add payroll to LNBITS_ADMIN_EXTENSIONS — see below.
The employee-facing surface — /api/v1/my/payouts, /my/payouts.csv,
/my/contracts — is gated on a wallet invoice key instead. Whoever
holds the read key for a wallet can see what payroll paid into that wallet,
and nothing else.
Employees must have the extension enabled
LNbits gates every extension route per user, not just the UI
(check_user_extension_access, lnbits/decorators.py:420). An employee who
does not have payroll among their active extensions gets
{"detail": "Extension 'payroll' not enabled."}
from /my/payouts, invoice key or not. So enable payroll for anyone who
should read their own payslips — via LNBITS_USER_DEFAULT_EXTENSIONS, or
per account in the Admin UI.
That is also why payroll must stay out of LNBITS_ADMIN_EXTENSIONS.
That list triggers the harder branch of the same check — "User not
authorized for extension" — which a non-admin can never clear, so it would
make the employee surface permanently unreachable. Restricting the operator
console does not depend on it anyway: every super-user route is gated in
code by check_super_user, and the page route checks user.super_user.
Development
make # black + ruff + mypy
make test # pytest
The dev LNbits compose mounts ~/dev/shared/extensions/ at /shared with
LNBITS_EXTENSIONS_PATH=/shared, so this checkout is the installed
extension. FakeWallet is enough — no regtest needed for anything except
end-to-end Lightning behaviour.
Licence
MIT