- package.json homepage: github.com/avi/Keynctr -> git.atitlan.io/avi/Keynctr
- README: title 'Nostr Feed Manager' -> 'Keynctr', resolve all
[YOUR_FORGEJO_INSTANCE_URL]/<OWNER>/<REPO> placeholders with the real
Forgejo URL, fix clone dir and packaged-binary name (nost-feed-manager
-> keynectr), data dir default ~/.local/share/keynectr, refresh test
counts (cargo 225+6 e2e, npm 139/19 files) and project layout
(audit/bunker/feed/updates modules, signer/ dir, Feed+SignerMode screens)
- PRODUCT.md: data dir corrected with migration note
External NIP-46 signer mode is a stronger posture, not a caveat: the key
never arrives on this machine, so a compromised desktop cannot extract it.
The old claim only holds for embedded/bunker modes and undersold the
external-signer option. UI already ranked modes correctly; no code change.
- src/feed.rs: contact_feed + contact_pubkeys fetch the active profile's
kind 3 contact list and aggregate notes only from those authors;
aggregate_for + FeedBuilder accept an optional author whitelist
- IPC: FeedGet accepts contacts_only, resolves the active profile npub
- CLI: feed --contacts [limit] filters to the active profile's contacts
- Frontend: Feed screen Everyone/My contacts toggle, scope-aware empty
states, feedGet(limit, contactsOnly) threading
- Tests for author filtering and the contacts scope in feed.rs and
FeedScreen.test.tsx
- src/feed.rs: aggregate recent kind 1 notes from enabled relays into a
newest-first, de-duplicated feed using a throwaway identity
- IPC: FeedGet; CLI: feed [limit]; frontend: Feed screen + nav + tests
- README: mark feed aggregation as shipped
- profiles::reveal_secret_key returns a key in hex and nsec1... forms, gated on
an unlocked vault (VaultLocked when encrypted + locked)
- IPC: reveal_secret_key method; error replies now carry a machine-readable
code field (ErrorKind as snake_case, e.g. vault_locked)
- CLI: show-secret <npub> prompts for the vault password when locked
- GUI: 'Secret key' button per profile card opens a modal showing hex + nsec
with copy buttons; locked vaults ask for the password inline before revealing
- Tests: Rust (reveal plaintext/encrypted/locked) and Vitest (reveal flow,
lock-then-unlock), all green
- Encrypt stored secret keys with AES-256-GCM under an Argon2id-derived key;
the vault stays plaintext until a password is set (Settings -> Storage or
the CLI set-password command)
- Only secret keys are encrypted; labels and npubs stay readable so profiles
can be browsed while the vault is locked
- Backend: crypto module, Vault.crypto metadata, unlock/lock/set/remove
password on App, VaultLocked/WrongPassword errors, secret resolution on the
publish path
- IPC: set_vault_password, unlock_vault, lock_vault, remove_vault_password
- CLI: set-password, remove-password, unlock; create/publish prompt when the
vault is locked (NFM_PASSWORD env or hidden prompt, never argv)
- GUI: unlock banner + modal on locked vaults, protect/change/remove password
in Settings, password field styling
- Tests: Rust (argon2/AES round-trips, vault lifecycle) and Vitest (unlock
flow, set/change/remove password), all green
- Rust library (nostr-manager-backend) with CLI and JSON-lines IPC serve mode:
profiles, publishing with per-relay reports, relays, settings, vault storage
and legacy-vault migration
- Electron + React + TypeScript desktop GUI using the same backend over stdio IPC
- Vitest suite with a fake backend speaking the real protocol
- electron-builder linux packaging; README with build and usage instructions
